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ABSTRACT
STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Jiayi Bao
Iwan Barankay
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters on strategic human capital and en-
trepreneurship and explores the causal impacts of specific perks, benefits, and compensation
structures on worker behavior and venture outcomes.
Chapter 1 addresses a popular trend in technology companies and startups of o↵ering un-
limited vacation as an employee perk. I examine whether unlimited vacation benefits firms,
the mechanisms, and the contingencies based on organizational conditions in three empiri-
cal settings. Using a combination of text analysis of online reviews, di↵erence-in-di↵erences
regression of archival data at a high-tech company, and randomized controlled experiments
with online workers, I find that the perk leads to more vacation time, higher subjective pro-
ductivity, and increased overall labor e ciency. These e↵ects involve multiple mechanisms
(sorting, productivity, and engagement) and are contingent on social dynamics, bundled
HR practices, and the culture for punishing under-performance.
Chapter 2 shifts the focus from industry trends in firm HR practices to institutional changes
that a↵ect employees’ access to benefits. Through a di↵erence-in-di↵erences design, I ex-
amine how employees’ access to the New Jersey Paid Family Leave program impacts the
profitability of new ventures. I find that the program adversely a↵ects the likelihood of
making profits for the average new venture. The negative e↵ect is stronger for businesses
in greater financial stress and with more reliance on incumbent employees. Innovative
ventures, however, are more likely to be profitable post treatment.
Chapter 3, joint with Andy Wu, links worker preferences to compensation structure to ex-
vi
plain why the distribution of equity compensation is more equal than that of salary in many
startups. We propose that workers have di↵erent equality preferences for di↵erent types of
payo↵s and test our predictions in an experimental group production game. Results suggest
that workers view salary and equity in two separate domains, and they are more inequal-
ity averse in the equity domain, implying that firms could benefit from a compensation
structure that is more equitable in the equity portion. Furthermore, we find a presentation
e↵ect: separation of the two domains is triggered only when equity is shown in a di↵erent
percentage form from the absolute form of salary.
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OVERVIEW
Human capital is the most critical asset of modern technology and service firms (Bresnahan
et al., 2002; David et al., 1998; Machin and Van Reenen, 1998) and has been recognized as
a resource of sustainable competitive advantage for businesses (Barney and Wright, 1998;
Becker and Huselid, 2006; Campbell et al., 2012a; Wright and McMahan, 1992). Conse-
quently, human capital management has become a strategy imperative for firms and has
led to a plethora of economics and management studies on when organizational perfor-
mance can be improved through specific compensation structures (e.g., Bandiera et al.,
2007; Campbell et al., 2012b; Carnahan et al., 2012; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Lazear, 2000;
Oyer and Schaefer, 2005), perks and benefits (e.g., Bloom et al., 2015; Burbano, 2016; Eriks-
son and Kristensen, 2014; Manchester, 2012), and human resource systems (e.g., Cappelli
and Neumark, 2001; Gittell et al., 2010; Huselid, 1995; Koch and McGrath, 1996).
The context of entrepreneurship, especially considering the heterogeneity in its definition
(Gartner, 1990), warrants distinctive scrutiny amidst the scholarly interests in strategic
human capital for two main reasons. First, insights from research on traditional firms may
not apply to entrepreneurial ventures, which are characterized by the liabilities of newness
(Stinchcombe, 1965) and high risk (Aldrich and Yang, 2012). These ventures face unique
human capital management challenges because they typically lack legitimacy as employer
organizations (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Williamson et al., 2002), do not have formal
HR policies or systems for managing employees (Klaas et al., 2000), and are known to
compensate employees with less pay and fewer benefits (Burton et al., 2018; Evans and
Leighton, 1989; Litwin and Phan, 2013). Second, new perspectives can be generated for
human capital research from studying entrepreneurial firms that are characterized by their
innovation and growth orientation. Given the fast-paced and flexible nature of these firms,
they are more likely to engage in experimentation and pivots (Kerr et al., 2014; Manso,
2016; Pillai et al., 2019), thus are more likely to test di↵erent compensation structures,
benefits models, and bundles of practices to attract, incentivize, and retain talent.
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To date, however, research at the intersection of human capital and entrepreneurship has
mostly adopted the upper echelon view and focused on the human capital of the individual
entrepreneur (e.g., Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Haber and Reichel, 2007) or the founding
team (e.g., Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Yang et al., 2020; Zarutskie, 2010), paying little
attention to human capital issues in the management of employees. Studies that do exam-
ine the relationship between strategic human resource practices for employees and venture
performance, on the other hand, are mostly descriptive, as they typically cannot unbundle
specific practices from the human resource system in field settings, nor do they aim to iden-
tify the causal e↵ects and specific mechanisms of the practices examined (e.g., Andries and
Czarnitzki, 2014; Hayton, 2003; Maes et al., 2005; Rauch et al., 2005; Rauch and Hatak,
2016; Sels et al., 2006; Way, 2002).
This dissertation, consisting of three self-contained chapters on strategic human capital and
entrepreneurship, aims to fill these scholarly gaps by providing a causal understanding of
how strategic human capital issues in managing employees can a↵ect the performance of
entrepreneurial firms. Using a combination of theoretical modeling, di↵erence-in-di↵erences
regression, and experimental design, I adopt a multi-method approach to investigate three
specific understudied topics in the literature, manifested through three important ongoing
phenomena respectively, and explore the interplay of firm practices and characteristics,
institutional environments, and individual worker preferences.
Chapter 1 addresses the recent trend of o↵ering unlimited vacation to employees, which is
an innovative firm practice that is most popular among technology companies and startup
ventures. Given the scant work on the newer, unconventional HR practices that have
emerged as a result of the changing workplace, this chapter examines whether unlimited
vacation benefits firms, the mechanisms of its e↵ect, and the contingencies based on orga-
nizational conditions through three empirical settings. Setting 1 provides background on
macro-patterns of unlimited vacation adoption based on qualitative online benefits reviews.
Setting 2 illustrates what unlimited vacation does to employees in a large high-tech company
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through a di↵erence-in-di↵erences design. I find that the perk leads to more vacation time
and higher subjective productivity; the latter e↵ect is much larger in close-knit teams but
becomes negative in teams with weak interpersonal relationships. In Setting 3, guided by
a formal model predicting worker behavior, I conducted a randomized controlled trial with
two experiments and hired online workers for a month-long job to cleanly examine the e↵ects
of unlimited vacation on firms by itself (n=631). I find that unlimited vacation leads to
higher overall labor e ciency through three channels: (1) attracting more high-performers
during recruitment, (2) increasing worker productivity in the performance stage, and (3)
inducing extra work from more engaged and happier workers. A strong firing threat con-
ditional on performance reduces the slacking rate. A performance-oriented bundled system
strengthens the performance gains, but unlimited vacation also improves productivity by
itself. This chapter demonstrates how managers can create a highly skilled, productive, and
motivated workforce through the perk of unlimited vacation. It further highlights the con-
tingencies based on social dynamics, bundled HR practices, and the culture for punishing
under-performance.
In Chapter 2, I shift the focus from industry trends in firm HR practices to institutional
changes that a↵ect employees’ access to benefits by joining the ongoing policy debate over
the business impacts of state-funded paid family leave programs for workers. Despite a large
literature on how institutional environments shape venture formation, little is known about
how social safety nets for employees at entrepreneurial firms influence business performance
post the founding stage. This chapter examines how employees’ access to the 2009 New
Jersey Paid Family Leave (PFL) program impacts the profitability of new ventures. Using
a di↵erence-in-di↵erences design, I find that the state PFL program adversely a↵ects the
likelihood of making profits for the average new venture. The negative e↵ect is stronger for
businesses in greater financial stress and those that are more reliant on incumbent employ-
ees, suggesting two operating mechanisms—the lack of financial resources and the lack of
flexibility in sta ng—that render new ventures particularly vulnerable to human capital
shocks as a result of institutional changes. Innovative ventures, however, experience an
3
asymmetric e↵ect and are more likely to be profitable post treatment. Taken together, this
study combines institutional perspectives, employment topics, and human resource consid-
erations to highlight that social safety nets for workers may have unintended consequences
for nascent businesses, especially considering the heterogeneity in how ventures can absorb
these impacts.
Lastly, motivated by the pattern that the distribution of equity compensation (i.e., stock
options) is more equal than the distribution of salary in many startups, Chapter 3, joint
with Andy Wu, proposes a possible explanation resulted from unique individual worker
preferences. Linking behavioral theory to compensation structure, this chapter examines
whether workers have di↵erent equality preferences depending on the type of payo↵. We
design an experimental group production game to examine how workers respond to com-
binations of di↵erent distributions of equity and salary. Results suggest that workers view
salary and equity in two separate domains, and they are more inequality averse in the equity
domain, implying that firms could benefit from a compensation structure that is more equi-
table in the equity portion. Furthermore, we find a presentation e↵ect underlying inequality
aversion across di↵erent payo↵s: the separation of the two domains is triggered only when
equity is shown in a di↵erent percentage form from the absolute form of salary. These
results highlight that worker preferences can be contingent on the compensation domain,
and more specifically the framing of the domain, and therefore have implications for the
design of compensation structure in organizations.
In all, this dissertation sets out to facilitate a scholarly dialogue across the fields of strat-
egy, entrepreneurship, human resource management, and personnel economics through the
triangulation of multiple methods. By studying ongoing phenomena, these chapters also
hope to generate useful insights for practitioners and policy makers.
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CHAPTER 1 : (How) Do Risky Perks Benefit Firms?
The Case of Unlimited Vacation
Wharton People Analytics Research Paper Competition Winner, 2020
Best Student Paper Finalist, REER Conference, 2019
Abstract
This paper addresses the recent trend of o↵ering unlimited vacation to employees. While
potentially useful for acquiring human capital benefits, unlimited vacation is a risky perk
for firms due to the possibility of abuse. Does unlimited vacation actually benefit firms? If
so, how? And what are the contingencies based on organizational conditions? I explore the
phenomenon in three empirical settings. Setting 1 provides background on macro-patterns
of unlimited vacation adoption based on qualitative online benefits reviews. Setting 2 il-
lustrates what unlimited vacation does to employees in a large high-tech company through
a di↵erence-in-di↵erences design. I find that the perk leads to more vacation time and
higher subjective productivity; the latter e↵ect is much larger in close-knit teams but be-
comes negative in teams with weak interpersonal relationships. In Setting 3, guided by a
formal model predicting worker behavior, I conducted a randomized controlled trial with
two experiments and hired online workers for a month-long job to cleanly examine the ef-
fects of unlimited vacation on firms by itself (n=631). In Experiment 1, I varied worker
type (high- vs. low-performers), work contract (unlimited vacation, capped vacation, or
a choice between the two), and firing threat (strong vs. weak). In Experiment 2, I in-
troduced additional treatments to separate out the vacation feature from other typically
bundled practices in the unlimited vacation contract. I find that unlimited vacation leads to
higher overall labor e ciency through three channels: (1) attracting more high-performers
during recruitment, (2) increasing worker productivity in the performance stage, and (3)
inducing extra work from more engaged and happier workers. A strong firing threat con-
5
ditional on performance reduces the slacking rate. A performance-oriented bundled system
strengthens the performance gains, but unlimited vacation also improves productivity by
itself. This paper demonstrates how managers can create a highly skilled, productive, and
motivated workforce through the perk of unlimited vacation. It further highlights the con-
tingencies based on social dynamics, bundled HR practices, and the culture for punishing
under-performance.
1.1. Introduction
“Our vacation policy is ‘take vacation.’ We don’t have any rules or forms around
how many weeks per year. Frankly, we intermix work and personal time quite a
bit, doing email at odd hours, taking o↵ weekday afternoons for kids’ games, etc.
Our leaders make sure they set good examples by taking vacations, often coming
back with fresh ideas, and encourage the rest of the team to do the same.”
— Netflix Culture Document
In 2004, Netflix introduced its well-known “unlimited vacation policy” that allowed its
employees to take as much vacation as needed and whenever needed, in an e↵ort to “focus
on what people get done, not how many hours or days worked.”1 The idea of unlimited
paid vacation was revolutionary at the time and thus was slow to gain acceptance. In
the last four to five years, however, there has been a spike in its popularity—about 2,000
firms have o↵ered unlimited vacation to their employees2 and there has been a nearly
200% increase in how frequently unlimited vacation is mentioned in job postings.3 A main
driver for this recent trend is the changing workplace. As firms are experiencing recruiting
di culties and talent shortages (Belenzon and Tsolmon, 2016), workers are increasingly
valuing job flexibility and autonomy.4 Unlimited vacation, mostly paid and implemented
1Netflix (2009). Freedom & Responsibility Culture. Retrieved from https://www.slideshare.net/.
2I identified 1,901 firms with unlimited vacation using benefits review data on Glassdoor. See Section 1.3
for more details.
3Andrew Flowers, “Unlimited Vacation: A Rare but Quickly Growing Job Benefit,” The Indeed Hiring
Lab, June 18, 2019, https://www.hiringlab.org.
4Fractl (2016). Employee Benefits Study: The Cost and Value of Employee Perks. Retrieved from
http://www.frac.tl/employee-benefits-study/.
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with an emphasis on performance rather than face time, not only removes the cap on
vacation time but also gives employees more discretion in when to take vacation—a form
of schedule flexibility and autonomy in jobs. As stated by the CEO of the Portland startup
Mammoth in one of my interviews:5
“Firms are forced to look at unlimited vacation since technology is resetting the
employer-employee relationship, and employees want more flexibility/autonomy.”
Despite its current popularity, there is no consensus on what unlimited vacation actually
does to firms. Anecdotally, we know that some firms that have implemented it claim
to have seen benefits. The American multinational conglomerate General Electric argues
that unlimited vacation is “a game changer” in how they can “compete for experienced
talent,”6 thus benefiting recruitment. Mammoth reports that unlimited vacation “drives up
productivity through induced flexibility for a more motivated workforce,”7 thus benefiting
performance. Others are more agnostic about its benefits. The retailer Target acknowledges
that unlimited vacation “removes the liability line for unused vacation on the balance sheet”
but suggests it likely has “no other real impacts.”8 On the other hand, unlimited vacation
also presents potential costs to firms due to the risk of abuse by indolent workers. As
pointed out by an employee at Morningstar, “unlimited vacation rewards only the greedy
and those who abuse it.”9
The tension between the unclear human capital benefits and the potential agency costs
highlights that unlimited vacation is a risky perk for firms. Unlike traditional benefits
like health insurance, pension, stock options, and capped paid vacation that are often
formally stated in employment contracts and thus di cult to change ex post, perks are
incidental, less likely to be contracted fully, and can be potentially taken away.10 As a
5From an interview I conducted with the CEO of Mammoth, Nathan Christensen, on December 12, 2018.
6Romy Newman, “Why Your Company Needs to O↵er Unlimited Vacation,” Inc., April 10, 2017,
https://www.inc.com.
7From an interview I conducted with the CEO of Mammoth, Nathan Christensen, on December 12, 2018.
8From an interview I conducted with the Benefits Director of Target on November 26, 2016.
9A Glassdoor review made by an employee at Morningstar on July 3, 2015.
10This definition of perk follows the Merriam Webster Dictionary, which states that perk is “a privilege,
gain, or profit incidental to regular salaries or wages,” and is consistent with the concepts of perks illustrated
by Marino and Zabojnik (2008) and Rajan and Wulf (2006).
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result, the use of employee perks has become an important way to attract, motivate, and
retain people, as firms have more leeway to experiment with them. While some perks are
not risky—examples include gym membership, standing desks, and free child care, for the
costs associated with perk consumption are directly controllable by the firm, other perks are
risky and can incur negative consequences that cannot be directly controlled. For instance,
corporate sabbatical program faces the risk of employees never coming back, job sharing
option comes with the risk of accountability issues, and free workplace alcohol presents the
risk of improper behavior.
What do we know about these risky perks from research? While a large body of literature
has looked at various ways for firms to capture and create value from their human assets
through the acquisition of talent externally (Chatterji and Patro, 2014; Kim, 2018), the
adoption of strategic HR practices internally (Collins and Clark, 2003; Gittell et al., 2010;
Huselid, 1995; Koch and McGrath, 1996), and the use of non-pecuniary incentives such as
corporate social responsibility (Burbano, 2016; Carnahan et al., 2017), corporate wellness
programs (Gubler et al., 2018), and family-friendly work options (Bloom et al., 2011, 2015;
Mas and Pallais, 2017), there is almost no work on the aforementioned newer risky perks
that are increasingly gaining traction. Moreover, even though some prior work has shown
the important role of human capital management strategy and practices in benefiting re-
cruitment, performance, and retention, the discussion around the unintended consequences,
such as increased labor costs (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Sels et al., 2006; Way, 2002)
or unethical behavior (Lu et al., 2017), is still limited. It is essential, however, to have a
wholistic view of how risky perks a↵ect multiple organizational domains to fully evaluate
their e↵ectiveness. Lastly, there is little empirical evidence on the unique organizational
conditions (Barney and Wright, 1998; Wright et al., 2001) and micro-foundational under-
pinnings (Co↵ and Kryscynski, 2011; Felin et al., 2015; Foss, 2011) that help firms sustain
the competitive advantages from using risky perks.
This paper aims to shed light on the trade-o↵ in the organizational use of risky perks by
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focusing on the case of unlimited vacation—a perk that endows schedule flexibility and
autonomy to workers but also incurs the risk of abuse. First, does unlimited vacation
benefit firms? If so, how? Second, what are the contingencies based on organizational
conditions? To this end, I adopt a multi-method approach and exploit three complementary
empirical settings to provide a comprehensive study of the unlimited vacation phenomenon.
The first two settings are motivational and provide important background on unlimited
vacation adoption and preliminary evidence on what it does to workers; the last setting
cleanly answers the research questions by examining the overall e↵ect on labor e ciency,
drilling down to worker behavior to shed light on mechanisms in both the recruitment and
performance stages, and manipulating organizational level cultures and systems to evaluate
the contingencies.
The first setting provides background information on the macro-patterns of how unlimited
vacation is adopted across firms, utilizing a unique qualitative database of 319,963 online
reviews about job benefits and perks during 2014-2018 for 32,988 firms. Unlimited vacation
is found to be mostly adopted by emerging companies, but is also gaining popularity in all
kinds of firms. Two major themes are uncovered: unlimited vacation is inseparable from
organizational systems and cultures that emphasize performance; and its use is contingent
upon social interaction.
In the second setting, I turn to a large high-tech company and examine how unlimited
vacation is carried out at the micro-level in the field where the perk is available to em-
ployees with various job levels and functions. Focusing on a sample of employees who
experienced internal transfers from capped vacation roles to unlimited vacation roles, I
adopt a di↵erence-in-di↵erences design and evaluate the e↵ect of having access to unlimited
vacation on employees’ vacation and subjective productivity, treating employees who also
experienced transfers but stayed in capped vacation roles as the control group. I find that
having access to unlimited vacation increases vacation time and self-reported productivity
for employees. Notably, the e↵ect on perceived productivity is much more positive for em-
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ployees in great teams with supportive social dynamics, but becomes negative for people in
bad teams where interpersonal relationships are weak. The partnership with the high-tech
company, however, also reveals key challenges in studying the perk in real firm settings.
First, the e↵ect on performance is measured subjectively at large, which may or may not
translate into productivity for firms, as performance metrics are typically di↵erent for jobs
with unlimited vacation and jobs with capped vacation. Second, we do not know how much
of the e↵ect is due to selection into unlimited vacation roles, how much is due to the actual
treatment of unlimited vacation, and how much is due to other changes in the job that
always come with the perk. Therefore, the fundamental question remains, does unlimited
vacation lead to actual firm benefits by itself after removing all the other complexities?
My third setting answers this question through a longitudinal randomized controlled trial
(RCT) with two experiments discussed in the next paragraph. To guide the experimental
design and generate testable predictions at the worker level, I establish a theoretical model
and elucidate how heterogeneous workers respond to unlimited vacation both in recruitment
and in the subsequent performance stage. Workers start by choosing between two types of
firms—firms with a capped vacation contract (a cap on vacation but with no performance
requirements) and firms with an unlimited vacation contract (no cap on vacation but with
a performance requirement)—and then allocate time between work and vacation. Workers
who choose unlimited vacation may experience a potential complementarity to productivity,
but also face a threat of firing when performance is not on par. Three main predictions
come from the model: first, unlimited vacation is more attractive to high-performers than
to low-performers, leading to a sorting e↵ect; second, workers are more productive under
unlimited vacation than under capped vacation, even after controlling for the sorting e↵ect;
third, a strong firing threat conditional on performance reduces the likelihood of slacking.
I test these theoretical predictions in an RCT that consists of two experiments on an online
labor market, Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)11 where I hired workers for a well-paid
11https://www.mturk.com/.
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month-long image-counting job that required working for a 16-minute session on each week-
day during four consecutive weeks. Experiment 1 adopted a 2⇥3⇥2 design by first assigning
workers to either a high-performer or a low-performer treatment through the manipulation
of unit e↵ort cost for task completion. Second, I replicated how unlimited vacation and
capped vacation are typically contracted in practice where unlimited vacation is bundled
with a performance requirement and a removal of face time requirement. Workers were
either given an opportunity to choose between the two contracts or were randomly assigned
to one of them. Lastly, I varied whether workers experienced a strong or a weak firing threat
under unlimited vacation when performance expectation could not be met. Experiment 2
introduced additional contract treatments to separate out the e↵ect of each feature in the
unlimited vacation contract. Results show that unlimited vacation leads to actual benefits
for firms by improving overall labor e ciency12 through three di↵erent mechanisms. First,
it attracts more high-performers in the recruitment stage. Second, controlling for the sort-
ing e↵ect, there is an increase in individual worker productivity from unlimited vacation in
the performance stage. Third, unlimited vacation workers show a high level of engagement,
producing extra work outputs beyond their performance requirement in an e↵ort to signal
commitment to the job, and they are also happier. A stronger firing threat conditional
on performance reduces slacking rate and ensures a higher level of labor e ciency, sug-
gesting the need for appropriate firing culture to e↵ectively curb opportunism. An aligned
system that emphasizes performance strengthens the productivity gain, but the unlimited
vacation feature also works by itself by contributing about 20-30% to the gain. In all, the
findings regarding sorting, productivity, and slacking are consistent with the rational model
predictions, and the findings regarding engagement point to additional benefits for firms.
Workers also benefit from unlimited vacation themselves as they take more vacation than
their capped vacation counterparts.
This paper makes several contributions and facilitates a dialogue across a number of fields.
12Following Cappelli and Neumark (2001), overall labor e ciency is measured as output per dollar spent
on labor.
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First, it contributes to the strategic human capital literature in the resource-based view
tradition (Becker and Huselid, 2006; Campbell et al., 2012a; Wright and McMahan, 1992)
by presenting a new consideration for how firms can capture and create value from their
human assets through a risky perk. Moreover, the findings provide insights into the unique
organizational systems and cultures that may a↵ect firms’ capability in sustaining the com-
petitive advantage from using this perk (Barney and Wright, 1998; Wright et al., 2001).
Second, despite the large human resource management literature linking HR practices and
organizational outcomes (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Bartel, 1994; Becker and Gerhart, 1996;
Datta et al., 2005; Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1996; Koch and McGrath, 1996), there is
little work on the newer, unconventional HR practices that have emerged as a result of the
changing workplace and the contingencies and mechanisms through which these practices
take e↵ect. This paper advances the knowledge of new HR trends by providing a wholistic
evaluation on the causal e↵ects of unlimited vacation in multiple domains including recruit-
ment, performance, and engagement, along with the potential costs. Third, this paper joins
the call for micro-foundations in management studies, especially in multi-level human cap-
ital research (Barney and Felin, 2013; Co↵ and Kryscynski, 2011; Ployhart and Moliterno,
2011), by linking firm-level results to individual-level worker responses. Also adding to the
labor and personnel economics literatures on sorting and incentives, the experimental find-
ings provide causal confirmation that non-pecuniary perks can induce self-selection among
workers and that schedule flexibility can improve work productivity by itself.
Lastly, this study addresses a topic of growing practitioner interest that we have little knowl-
edge about both theoretically and empirically. The phenomenon has sparked heated debate
in practice regarding its positive or negative impact on organizations and workers. Notably,
unlimited vacation is most relevant for emerging companies that comprise the majority of
firms o↵ering it, as we will see in the first empirical setting. As these entrepreneurial firms
focus more on scaling-up challenges regarding human capital management and organiza-
tional design (DeSantola and Gulati, 2017), understanding the e↵ects of unlimited vacation
and the contingencies can help them make better decisions regarding the adoption of the
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perk and other innovative HR trends more generally—an implication which I will unpack
in the discussion.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the related literature. Section 1.3
provides background on macro-patterns of unlimited vacation adoption through qualita-
tive evidence. Section 1.4 illustrates how unlimited vacation is carried out in a socially
complex high-tech firm. Section 1.5 establishes a theoretical model that generates testable
predictions about the e↵ect of unlimited vacation. Section 1.6 describes the design of a lon-
gitudinal randomized controlled trial that tests the model predictions. Section 1.7 presents
the experimental findings. Section 1.8 discusses implications and limitations. Section 1.9
concludes.
1.2. Related Literature
1.2.1. Unlimited Vacation and Benefits through the Recruitment Channel
Recruitment is considered the foundation of organizational performance (Phillips and Gully,
2015), and more so for entrepreneurial firms that are rapidly growing (Olian and Rynes,
1984; Buller and Napier, 1993). How can firms attract and select the talent they desire?
Traditionally, the economics literature has focused on how firms can use di↵erent forms of
compensation models and monetary rewards to achieve this goal, including performance pay
(Cadsby et al., 2007; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Eriksson and Villeval, 2008; Lazear, 2000),
convex incentives (Larkin and Leider, 2012), risk-bearing compensation such as equity (Oyer
and Schaefer, 2005), deferred compensation such as pensions (Allen et al., 1993; Gustman
et al., 1994; Lazear, 1985), and tuition reimbursement program (Manchester, 2012). On
the other hand, the strategic human resource management literature typically examines
firms’ deliberate choices of recruitment practices that are non-pecuniary, such as employer
branding, marketing and messaging, sourcing, interviews, referrals, etc. (Phillips and Gully,
2015). Recently, there is a growing interest in how corporate social responsibility can be a
potential way for firms to attract high-performers (Bode et al., 2015; Burbano, 2016).
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Relatively little attention, however, has been paid to the role of employer-provided perks in
inducing the sorting of employees with di↵erent characteristics. Oyer (2008) and Eriksson
and Kristensen (2014) argue that people sort to firms based on their demand for particular
benefits including health insurance, child care, on-the-job meals, flextime, training, and
employer-provided PC and Internet. Ye and Tambe (2015) consider a more comprehensive
list of work-related perks by examining high-tech firms and conjecture that these perks
attract workers who are better at adapting to technological change. While these three
studies highlight the relevance of perks in a↵ecting employee choices during recruitment,
they are largely descriptive and o↵er little discussion about the strategic implications and
contingencies for firms.
This lack of causal work in how perks can be a tool for strategic recruitment is not surprising
due to two problems. First, at the firm level, it is di cult to observe the entire pool of
potential candidates since those who are not attracted to the firm (perhaps because the
firm does not o↵er desired perks) are not observed. Second, at the individual level, it
is di cult to observe the entire choice set of job o↵ers that may di↵er in terms of the
perks provided since only the revealed preference is usually observed. This paper fills the
gap in the literature by providing causal evidence regarding how unlimited vacation—an
understudied perk—a↵ects the employee behavior of selection. In particular, my focus is on
how such self-selection occurs along the dimension of individual performance, which is an
important strategic human capital consideration for firms since higher-performers are the
driver for organizational success (Nyberg, 2010; Zucker et al., 2002).
Two characteristics associated with unlimited vacation suggest that the perk may be more
attractive to high-performers. First, the schedule flexibility and autonomy endowed by
the perk, highly valued by people with certain demographic characteristics, e.g., women
with children (Mas and Pallais, 2017), may also be especially attractive to high-performing
individuals. For instance, high-performing employees following job exits are more drawn to
the career choice of entrepreneurship (Carnahan et al., 2012), which is known to o↵er more
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autonomy (Roach and Sauermann, 2015) than jobs in established firms. Second, unlimited
vacation is typically implemented in a way that the management focus shifts from work time
to performance. Most commonly, the perk comes with a performance expectation. Similar
to performance pay schemes that induce the self-selection of the more productive employees
(Cadsby et al., 2007; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Eriksson and Villeval, 2008; Lazear, 2000),
the rationale is that high-performing individuals can gain more from the perk of unlimited
vacation because they can meet their performance expectation in less time and consequently
take more vacation.
1.2.2. Unlimited Vacation and Benefits through the Performance Channel
A plethora of studies have demonstrated the correlations between strategic human resource
management and firm-level performance outcomes (Arthur, 1994; Batt, 2002; Bloom et al.,
2011; Cappelli and Singh, 1992; Fey et al., 2000; Huselid, 1995; Pfe↵er and Villeneuve,
1994). Taking a micro-foundation perspective of strategic human capital (Co↵ and Kryscyn-
ski, 2011), this paper centers on individual worker productivity as a driver for firm-level
performance gains. Rajan and Wulf (2006) find supportive evidence that perks are o↵ered
when they can improve the productivity of managers. Do the productivity gains hold for
non-managerial employees?
A large body of the human resource management (HRM) literature has highlighted the im-
portance of HRM practices in improving worker productivity. Initially, this HRM literature
focused on Japanese-influenced employment management and concepts such as job rota-
tion, teamwork, and practices that promote employee involvement (especially training and
employment security) and suggested a positive impact of these practices on labor produc-
tivity (Katz et al., 1983, 1985; Womack et al., 1990). Later works have then turned to the
relationship between productivity and a more diverse range of high-performance work prac-
tices such as information sharing, attitude assessment, job design, performance appraisal,
promotion, compensation models that recognize and reward merit, etc. (Appelbaum et al.,
2000; Bartel, 1994; Becker and Gerhart, 1996; Datta et al., 2005; Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski
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et al., 1996; Koch and McGrath, 1996). Some of these HRM practices involve the provision
of perks to employees.
A caveat remains, however, in interpreting the positive e↵ect of perks on employee pro-
ductivity in these HRM studies—firms adopting certain HRM practices may have adopted
them because they can be particularly useful. This selection into implementation implies
potential confounders in the productivity gains discovered. More recent work has started
to address such concerns by resorting to randomized field trials, and particularly examining
increasingly popular perks that grant workers flexibility and autonomy. Bloom et al. (2015)
investigate how location autonomy endowed by the work-from-home option incentivizes per-
formance and find that it improves worker productivity. This paper aims to cleanly measure
the productivity e↵ect of unlimited vacation—a perk that grants employees autonomy and
control over their schedule.
Past work has suggested that perks are likely complementary to e↵ort (by reducing the
marginal cost of extra work time) (Marino and Zabojnik, 2008; Oyer, 2008) and can enhance
productivity when transferring control to employees (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011; Freeman
and Lazear, 1994; Lazear and Shaw, 2007). Specifically, the control over work schedule
allows people to work when they are more productive and recharge when they are burnt out,
resulting in a more e cient use of work time. Relatedly, Moen et al. (2016) find that flexible
work time can reduce employees’ perceived stress and improves their job satisfaction. This
e↵ect on employee well-being may in turn lead to an increase in productivity. For instance,
happier workers who are more satisfied with their job may be more productive, according
to early human relation theory (Strauss, 1968), emotion theory (Staw et al., 1994), and
recent experimental and empirical evidence (Krekel et al., 2019; Oswald et al., 2015). In
addition, workers who feel trusted with the endowed control over their own job may work
more productively out of reciprocity (Helper and Henderson, 2014). By these arguments,
the perk of unlimited vacation may also contribute to employee productivity improvement.
As stated by employees with access to unlimited vacation:
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“Unlimited vacation...is a huge plus. It allows you to work late nights when you
have to and feel comfortable with getting to work later the next morning. It also
makes scheduling appointments and planning vacations simple and stress free.”
— Glassdoor review by anonymous employee at HubSpot
“Unlimited PTO was a terrific benefit. As one of the top performers on the sales
team, I could manage my own time, work from wherever I could deliver the best
results, and take as much time as necessary to recharge.” — Glassdoor review
by anonymous employee at Sizmek
1.2.3. Unlimited Vacation, Its Risks, and Organizational Conditions
While possibly generating strategic benefits to firms, perks can also incur costs. A strand
of work has found that high-performance work practices can increase labor costs that o↵set
the productivity raise (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Sels et al., 2006; Way, 2002). Perks
that endow job autonomy come with their own potential costs due to the risk of abuse
by indolent workers—a typical agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance, Yahoo
rescinded its work-from-home policy in 2013, as its virtual private network (VPN) data
suggested that employees who worked from home were slacking o↵.13 Broadly, research has
confirmed that high job autonomy can increase work-related unethical behavior (Lu et al.,
2017). Similarly, unlimited vacation may allow some workers to take too much vacation and
under-perform, dragging down overall labor e ciency at the cost of the firm. As a result,
the aforementioned performance benefits are only tangible when firms have e↵ective tools
in place to manage performance and curb the opportunism of slacking.
What are some solutions that address the agency problem in perk consumption? One
possible remedy is to closely monitor whether workers slack or not (Graetz et al., 1986). As
the probability of getting caught goes up, workers are less likely to engage in undesirable
work behavior (Nagin et al., 2002). However, close monitoring may run counter to the idea
of perks that o↵er autonomy and control, and can be less e↵ective than outcome-oriented
contracts that enforce performance management (Eisenhardt, 1989). In particular, posing
an output requirement along with a threat of firing (Lazear, 2000) may be particularly
13Nicholas Carlson, “How Marissa Mayer Figured Out Work-At-Home Yahoos Were Slacking O↵,” Busi-
ness Insider, March 2, 2013, businessinsider.com.
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helpful in mitigating slacking, especially when the probability of firing enforcement is high
(Becker, 1968). As the strategic human resource management literature points out, it is
necessary to consider the alignment and fit (Delery and Doty, 1996; Han et al., 2019) with
other organizational conditions in maximizing the e↵ectiveness of a single practice. By these
arguments, the implementation of unlimited vacation should be more e↵ective when firms
bundle the perk with clear performance requirement in its system and appropriate threat
of firing punishment in its culture.
1.3. Setting 1: The Background of Unlimited Vacation
In order to characterize the phenomenon of unlimited vacation and provide the background
on how the perk is adopted across firms, I created a unique qualitative dataset of online
employee benefits reviews. A number of 555,530 firms identified from Crunchbase14 were
searched on Glassdoor15 to construct a database of 32,988 matched firms with 319,963
benefits reviews and ratings made from 2014 to 2018. Of these firms, 1,901 firms were
identified with unlimited vacation through 5,438 publicly available reviews.16 Linking review
data to data on firm characteristics, I first document patterns across firms regarding which
firms are more likely to adopt unlimited vacation. Second, focusing on firms that adopt
unlimited vacation, I explore the qualitative data and shed light on the common themes
regarding how unlimited vacation is typically implemented in practice.
1.3.1. What Firms Adopt Unlimited Vacation
Matching 32,988 firms with reviews data to Crunchbase data on firm characteristics, I
identified 11,230 matched firms with 193,659 reviews. In total, 1,318 matched firms provide
unlimited vacation as an employee perk. Table 1 shows the results comparing firms with
14Crunchbase is a widely recognized platform for finding business information about private and public
companies.
15Glassdoor is a commonly used website where employees and former employees anonymously review com-
panies and their management. It has ratings and reviews for over 600,000 companies worldwide, according
to its website in February 2019.
16While this figure does not present the true percentage of firms that are adopting unlimited vacation due
to potential selection into reviews, the evidence at least shows that this perk has gained popularity among
a significant number of firms and thus warrants a scrutiny.
18
and without unlimited vacation across various characteristics. Firms adopting unlimited
vacation tend to fit the description of a typical emerging company—they are younger,
smaller, more likely to be located in California, New York and Massachusetts, more heavily
clustered in high-tech industries,17 and less likely to have experienced an IPO or acquisition.
Two other variables highlight another important characteristic of firms providing unlimited
vacation—these firms tend to be growth-oriented firms with more financing rounds and
product market diversity. While emerging companies comprise the majority of the firms
o↵ering unlimited vacation, the perk is also gaining popularity in all kinds of other firms
in terms of firm age (see Figure A.1 in Appendix), size (see Figure A.2 in Appendix),
location,18 and industry.19
——————–Insert Table 1——————–
1.3.2. How Firms Adopt Unlimited Vacation: Common Themes
From the qualitative reviews, two common themes become clear regarding how unlimited
vacation is typically adopted in firms. First, unlimited vacation is rarely a standalone perk
and is inseparable from organizational systems and cultures that emphasize performance.
As employees often do not describe their benefits and perks in detail when submitting their
reviews on Glassdoor, I focus on firms that have at least 30 reviews on Glassdoor, which
is the average number of reviews firms have, to ensure that there is enough content that
elaborates the implementation of unlimited vacation. For these firms, 56% of the reviews
mention some version of “performance requirement” associated with unlimited vacation—
examples of keywords include performance, quota, number, hit, goal, conditional on getting
work done, etc. For one thing, unlimited vacation is typically a part of a bundled system
that emphasizes performance expectation and removes the requirement for face time, as is
revealed by the following reviews:
17High tech industries include apps, data analytics, internet services, information technology, messaging
communications, software, biotechnology, mobile, science engineering, platforms, and navigation mapping.
18Unlimited vacation is found to be o↵ered by firms in 42 states.
19Unlimited vacation is found to be o↵ered by firms in 26 non-high-tech industries.
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“As long as you hit your numbers, you can take many days o↵.” — Glassdoor
review by anonymous employee at Groupon
“Unlimited vacation focuses on performance and getting the job done rather than
face time.”20 — Glassdoor review by anonymous employee at HookLogic
For another, unlimited vacation is also often embedded in a culture with some level of firing
threat for under-performance:
“Unlimited paid vacation—but you have to make your quota or you are fired.”
— Glassdoor review by anonymous employee at Zocdoc
“You better hit your goals or you’ll be fired during your vacation.” — Glassdoor
review by anonymous employee at Groupon
Second, the use of unlimited vacation is contingent upon social interaction among teammates
and with managers, and the theme of “team” and “manager” appears in 71% of the reviews
for firms that have at least the mean number of reviews. For instance:
“Unlimited vacation requires coordination within the team functions.” — Glass-
door review by anonymous employee at TrueAccord
“Only some managers are okay with it (unlimited vacation).” — Glassdoor re-
view by anonymous employee at Zocdoc
Together, the qualitative reviews give a delineation of how unlimited vacation is typically
implemented in practice that echoes the example at the beginning of this paper about
Netflix, a firm known as the “firing machine” by stating “we keep only our highly e↵ective
people” in the exact same Culture Document—for employees, there is no limit on vacation
time, there is a lot of control over work schedule, there are social dynamics that supports
its use, but there are also clear performance expectations in the HR system, as well as a
culture of firing in the case of under-performance.
20Face time refers to time spent at one’s place of employment.
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1.4. Setting 2: A Large High-Tech Company
To unpack how unlimited vacation is carried out in practice and impacts workers at the
micro level, I turn to a field context of a large high-tech company who has been experiencing
rapid growth in the last few years. There are two types of full-time roles at the firm. On one
hand, 361 unique roles are labeled “UTO roles,” which correspond to roles with unlimited
time-o↵ or, in other words, unlimited vacation. On the other hand, 26 unique roles are
labeled “LTO roles,” which correspond to roles with limited time o↵ or, in other words,
capped vacation. Together, these roles span 10 job levels and 11 job functions. While LTO
roles only exist for lower job levels, there is a good proportion of UTO roles at each job
level and across all job functions.
Due to the high turnover nature of the company, nobody currently at the firm witnessed
the introduction of unlimited vacation (which was non-existent when the firm was initially
founded). Therefore, my approach is to focus on employees who experienced a sudden
access to unlimited vacation due to an internal transfer from an LTO role to a UTO role.
For instance, a COE Team Lead (an LTO role) in the core business job function would
transfer to be an Inbound Sourcer (a UTO role) in the HR job function at the same job
level, with both roles involving similar skills. Through a di↵erence-in-di↵erences design, I
examine the e↵ects of having access to unlimited vacation on vacation and performance by
treating a group of employees who also transferred but stayed in LTO roles as the control
group. These transfers are typically not related to consideration for job-associated perks,
and all other benefits remain the same pre and post transfers. Transfer cases associated
with promotions are excluded.
1.4.1. Methods
Data. The sample consists of 352 employees who experienced internal transfers during
2017-2018. The treatment group is defined to be the group of employees who transferred
from an LTO role to a UTO role (114 employees) and the control group is defined to be the
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group of employees who transferred from an LTO role to an LTO role (238 employees). One
complication for studying the e↵ect on performance is that performance metrics at the high-
tech company are inconsistent for LTO roles and UTO roles and are thus non-comparable.
To deal with this challenge, I use a measure of subjective productivity collected in the
company’s quarterly employee surveys, which the company started in 2017. Specifically,
the survey asks employees to rate how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement,
“My work stress does not cause my productivity to su↵er,” based on a Likert Scale (1-6).
In all, I have 571 responses for 340 of those transferred employees across four quarters
during 2017-2018. As discussed in Section 1.2, an important mechanism through which
unlimited vacation may increase productivity is by reducing perceived stress and improving
employee well-being. Therefore, this subjective rating allows me to directly study how un-
limited vacation a↵ects employee performance on the job through this potential mechanism.
For vacation, I have a dataset of 22,290 daily time-o↵ requests for 304 of the transferred
employees during 2016-2019 April.
Dependent Variables. The first dependent variable of interest is Monthly Time O↵ Days,
i.e., the monthly total amount of time o↵ converted to number of days. I collapse time o↵
requests to monthly level due to the high turnover nature of the company—collapsing to
the annual level would significantly reduce power and the total amount of annual time o↵
can be typically understated due to early job termination, which is very common at this
company. The second dependent variable is Subjective Productivity, a rating based on the
aforementioned survey question which takes integer values from 1 to 6. A higher rating
indicates a higher perceived level of productivity.
Independent Variables. The first key independent variable is Treat, which equals 1 if
an employee transferred from an LTO role to a UTO role and equals 0 if an employee
transferred from an LTO role to another LTO role. The second key independent variable
is Post, which equals 1 for time periods after transferring and 0 otherwise. Several other
independent variables are considered to examine the contingent e↵ect of unlimited vacation
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based on the social dynamics at the workplace. Three variables are created to measure
how people rate their teams. Great Team 1 is a binary variable that indicates whether an
employee is in a team with great interpersonal relationships. Specifically, employees who
indicate that they “strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement “I feel close to people at
work” have a value of 1 for this variable; employees who “strongly disagree” or “disagree”
with the statement have a value of 0 for this variable. Two other measures are created
similarly based on alternative statements that elicit employee perception of teams. Great
Team 2 is created based on ratings for the statement “Most people make a good e↵ort to
consult other employees where appropriate.” Great Team 3 is created based on ratings for
the statement “I feel I am part of a team.” Lastly, Great Manager is a binary variable
created to measure how people rate their managers based on the statement “I feel heard by
my manager” and indicates whether an employee has a great relationship with his or her
manager.
Analytical Strategy. The main specification is a di↵erence-in-di↵erences design using
ordinary least squares regressions on individual-quarter panel dataset (to test the e↵ect on
perceived productivity) or individual-month panel dataset (to test the e↵ect on vacation
use). The first di↵erence is whether an individual transferred to a UTO role or an LTO role,
and the second di↵erence is the time (quarter or month) of transfer. Additional controls
include the change in job level, job tenure at transfer, and pre-transfer job level and function.
1.4.2. Results
The treatment and the control groups do not appear to di↵er significantly in terms of age
and marital status, but the treatment group has a slightly larger percentage of men, slightly
higher average job level before transfer, and slightly shorter job tenure at transfer. Results
are robust controlling for gender and all analyses include controls for pre-transfer job level
and job tenure at transfer. Vacation distributions are similar pre-transfer for both groups.
For brevity, employee-level summary statistics are reported in Appendix in Table A.1 and
Figure A.3.
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Results for how unlimited vacation a↵ects employee vacation patterns are reported in Table
2. Across all specifications, there is a consistent considerable increase in vacation time
when employees gain access to unlimited vacation. On average, unlimited vacation leads to
0.71-0.84 more days o↵ per month for employees. This e↵ect may even be underestimated
as some employees may under-report their vacation time once they move to a UTO role.21
——————–Insert Table 2——————–
Results for how unlimited vacation a↵ects subjective productivity are reported in Table 3.
As shown by Models (1) and (2), subjective productivity rating increases by 0.44-0.45 when
employees gain access to unlimited vacation, which is about 9-10% increase from the baseline
level. This positive e↵ect on perceived productivity is significantly larger for employees in
great teams, as suggested by the estimated coe cients for the triple-di↵erence terms Great
Team⇥Treat⇥Post in Models (3)-(5). However, the e↵ect becomes negative for those people
in bad teams, as shown by the estimated coe cients for the di↵erence-in-di↵erences terms
Treat⇥Post in these models. I also find that the perceived productivity gain is larger for
employees with great managers, but there is a drop in perceived productivity for people
with bad managers, as indicated by Model (6).
——————–Insert Table 3——————–
1.4.3. Discussion
It is worth mentioning that the sample consists of the relatively lower level employees at the
high-tech company due to the nature of LTO roles prior to transfer. It appears that even
for the lower-tiered employees, the benefits from having access to unlimited vacation are
tangible, both in terms of actual time o↵ use and in terms of perceived e↵ect on productivity
21One complication for studying the e↵ect on vacation patterns is that employees are no longer required
to submit their time o↵ records once they have access to unlimited vacation, though some people still keep
track of their vacation time through the time o↵ records. This leads to an issue of potential under-reporting
in vacation time for UTO employees. Such a measurement error would be problematic when interpreting a
negative e↵ect on vacation use due to access to unlimited vacation, as it might simply be because employees
no longer submit time o↵ requests. However, when a positive e↵ect is found, this e↵ect can only be under-
estimated.
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through the mechanism of reduced work stress.
The finding that the e↵ect of unlimited vacation on perceived productivity varies based
on relationships with team members and managers highlights the importance of social
interaction in shaping performance at workplace (Bandiera et al., 2010; Hasan and Koning,
2019). In this field context, a great team is largely measured by how close the employees
are to other team members and how well they communicate with each other. As geographic
proximity has been shown to facilitate information sharing and reduce coordination costs
for joint projects (Catalini, 2017), social proximity may similarly bring about these benefits
through better communication and thus improve employee productivity. People in close-knit
teams may also experience large productivity spillovers from other high-performers in their
teams (Mas and Moretti, 2009), for instance, through learning about better work practices
(Chan et al., 2014), especially regarding how to better manage their time and make full
use of the unlimited vacation perk. Teams with strong social ties or supportive managers
typically have strong cultures with features of flexibility, openness, and responsiveness that
are more likely to improve performance (Denison and Mishra, 1995). Specifically, in these
workplace cultures, employees would be less concerned about being viewed negatively by
other team members and managers when they take time o↵ and are more likely to be covered
when they need to leave on a short notice.
Nevertheless, this setting also reveals key challenges in studying this unlimited vacation
perk in real firm settings. First, as performance metrics are inconsistent for jobs with
unlimited vacation and jobs with capped vacation, the e↵ect on performance is measured
subjectively at large, which may or may not translate into actual productivity for firms.
Second, it is di cult to study how much of the observed e↵ects is due to selection into
unlimited vacation roles, how much is due to the treatment of unlimited vacation, and how
much is due to other changes in the job that always come with the perk.
Therefore, the fundamental question still remains: does unlimited vacation lead to actual
benefits for firms in itself? This is what I aim to address in the rest of this paper through
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a formal model and a randomized controlled trial.
1.5. Theoretical Model and Predictions
To examine how heterogeneous workers respond to unlimited vacation, I establish a three-
period model involving a labor-leisure trade-o↵ for workers. I adapt the model of Autor
(2001) by assuming workers can self-select into di↵erent types of firms, build on Lazear
(2000) by imposing a threat of firing when worker output is below a threshold, and follow
the punishment model of Becker (1968) by stipulating a probability of firing enforcement
in the case of misconduct. The model predictions generate implications for the channels
through which and the conditions under which firms can benefit from the provision of
unlimited vacation to workers.
1.5.1. Model Setup
Timeline. There are three periods: t = 1, 2, 3. At t = 1, workers know about their type
⌘ and choose between working for firms with vacation regime R 2 {0, 1}. When R = 1,
the firm o↵ers unlimited vacation to its workers. When R = 0, the firm o↵ers capped
vacation (capped at L̄) to its workers. At t = 2, workers receive a pre-determined flat wage
w(R), supply labor by choosing vacation time l, and generate output y = (T   l) · f(⌘|R)
where T is total time an individual may have. At t = 3, firms with unlimited vacation fire
workers whose output is below Y with probability p.22 Firms continue to pay remaining
workers with the pre-determined flat wage. With probability a, fired workers are rehired
immediately by an unlimited vacation firm; with probability b, fired workers are rehired
immediately by a capped vacation firm; with probability (1  a  b), they stay unemployed
and receive Vu.
Worker types. The heterogeneous labor force comprises two worker types: high-performers
22I impose an output threshold in the model for two reasons. First, from the practitioner standpoint, it
mimics how unlimited vacation is typically bundled in reality with a performance expectation. Second, it
is theoretically necessary to have a trade-o↵ within the unlimited vacation contract. Without a condition
on performance, sorting is not possible as all workers would simply prefer unlimited vacation over capped
vacation. Without the perk of unlimited vacation, sorting is still not possible as all workers would simply
prefer a contract with no performance requirement.
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and low-performers. Firms cannot observe worker type at t = 1. Worker type is determined
by individual performance, ⌘ > 0, where ⌘ 2 {⌘H , ⌘L} and ⌘H > ⌘L. The distribution of
worker type is characterized by parameter ⇢ = NLN , which is the fraction of low-performers
in the population.
Worker output. Actual worker output, y, depends on both labor supply (work time),
T   l, and productivity (output per unit of work time), f(⌘|R). For each worker, productiv-
ity is determined by f(⌘|R) = ⌘(1+ ⌧R) where ⌧R represents the potential complementarity
between the workplace vacation regime and worker performance. This specification of com-
plementarity follows Autor (2001). I further assume ⌧1 > ⌧0   0 following the discussion
in Section 1.2, which implies that unlimited vacation likely o↵ers more complementarity
than capped vacation as it supposedly transfers control to workers with respect to schedule
management, may reduce work stress, or can make workers happier and feel more trusted.




U(l;R) = w(R)  c(T   l), s.t. l  L̄ R = 0, capped vacation
s.t. l  T R = 1, unlimited vacation
where u(·) is standard Bernoulli utility function, c(·) is convex and c(0) = 0.
Firms. Firms are risk neutral. Each firm chooses from two vacation regimes, R 2 {0, 1},
with no direct costs. When R = 1, the firm adopts unlimited vacation and implements a
firing rule, i.e., workers whose output is below Y will be fired with probability p, 0  p  1.
When R = 0, the firm adopts capped vacation and does not implement firing based on
output. I also assume that firms may di↵er in how they value high-performers. Let x(R) be
the proportion of high-performers at a firm with vacation regime R. The firm then values its
high-performers at v(x(R)). v(·) may vary for di↵erent firms, and is concave. For instance,
growth-oriented firms in high-tech industries may have a particularly high valuation for
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high-performers. Note that I assume there are many firms and wages are set competitively
for either type of firm.
1.5.2. Predictions about Worker Responses
My model generates testable predictions about worker responses both in the recruitment
phase of selection into firms (Prediction 1) and in the performance phase of subsequent work
behavior (Predictions 2-3). Specifically, the first two predictions establish the main e↵ects
of how unlimited vacation can benefit firms through two channels. The last prediction
considers the contingency based on the firing culture that punishes under-performance. All
proofs are relegated to Appendix A.2.
Once selected into firms, workers under unlimited vacation would either comply, producing
Y , or slack, producing nothing, given that the utility function is monotonically increasing
in vacation time. Whether a worker complies or slacks depends on whether the worker is
paid above his or her non-slacking condition:
w(1)   2
p  pac(T   L0) +
b
1  a [w(0)  c(T   L̄)] +
(1  a  b)
1  a Vu
where L0 = T   Y⌘(1+⌧
1
) . My predictions are derived taking into consideration that the
non-slacking condition may or may not hold for either high- or low-performers.
Prediction 1. Sorting. High-performers are more likely to choose unlimited vacation over
capped vacation than low-performers.
The theory suggests that the reason for the above is that it is more costly for low-performers
to meet the output threshold under unlimited vacation. In other words, it is easier for high-
performers to produce enough to meet the performance expectation and avoid the risk of
getting fired, thus making use of extra vacation days. As a result, high-performers are more
likely to self-select into firms with unlimited vacation while low-performers are deterred by
the threat of firing and consequently sort into firms with capped vacation. This predic-
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tion relies on the premise of repeated interaction between workers and firms; otherwise,
low-performers would simply flood into unlimited vacation firms with the intention of not
delivering work.
Prediction 2. Productivity. Worker productivity is higher under unlimited vacation than
under capped vacation, even after controlling for the sorting e↵ect.
This is a result of the assumption that there is a larger work complementarity under the
unlimited vacation scheme than under the capped vacation scheme. Unlimited vacation of-
fers workers more schedule flexibility and autonomy so that they can choose to work when
they are productive and rest when they are not. Other factors may also contribute to the
larger complementarity under unlimited vacation, such as reduced work stress, higher job
satisfaction and perceived trust.
Prediction 3. Slacking and Firing Threat. Under unlimited vacation, workers are
more likely to meet the output threshold, i.e., they are less likely to slack, when firing threat
is stronger.
Like Becker (1968), an increase in the probability of getting fired in my context reduces the
expected utility from slacking and thus tends to reduce the likelihood of non-compliance.
This prediction highlights the importance of bundling unlimited vacation with appropriate
performance management tools. Following this prediction, when there is a stronger firing
threat, unlimited vacation workers are more likely to work more to achieve the performance
requirement and thus take less vacation.23
My model also generalizes to the case when workers do not know their type perfectly ex
23This is a consequence of the production function, more specifically the linear relationship between work
time and output, which has no scope for cramming–workers need to work consistently to produce enough
output. This is a common feature of daily work tasks for most jobs. This assumption of the production
function does not a↵ect the main predictions. Moreover, as long as there is a positive relationship between
output and work time, the implication for vacation pattern under a strong firing threat remains the same.
For instance, a production function dictating that only exceptional performance matters would still generate
the same predictions as long as work output is positively a↵ected by how much time a worker devotes to his
or her job.
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ante but rather receive a signal about their type at t = 1. In other words, workers are
heterogeneous both in terms of performance type and in terms of their belief about their
type. Predictions would remain the same.24
1.5.3. Implications for Firm Decisions
While the testable model predictions are at the individual worker level, I also formally derive
the implications for firm-level vacation scheme decision. A firm choosing capped vacation
scheme expects profit:




(T   L̄)⌘L(1 + ⌧0)  w(0).
A firm choosing unlimited vacation scheme expects profit:








, both high- and low-performers comply, or




, high-performers comply, low-performers slack
Therefore, a firm should adopt unlimited vacation if and only if E[⇡;R = 1]   E[⇡;R = 0].
I find that a firm is more likely to be profitable adopting unlimited vacation when the
following statements are true (all proofs are relegated to Appendix A.2):
1. when the firm has greater needs for high-performers (i.e., v(x) is higher for any x)
2. when the firm has a stronger culture of firing conditional on performance (i.e., p is
higher)
3. when the firm sees a stronger complementarity gain between unlimited vacation and
worker performance (i.e., ⌧1   ⌧0 is higher)
These results are consistent with the empirical observation that unlimited vacation is most
widely adopted by fast-growing high-tech emerging companies that have high demand of
24Predictions 1 would refer to “high belief” and “low belief” workers instead of “high-performers” or
“low-performers” as workers do not know their type in the selection phase.
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high-performing employees, typically imbued with the “hire fast, fire fast” mantra, and
loaded with jobs tasks that allow high-performers to work better with the control of their
own work schedule.
1.6. Setting 3: A Randomized Controlled Trial
1.6.1. Design Overview
Very few existing datasets provide information regarding the adoption of unlimited vacation
by firms, and the lack of implementation details as well as disconnection from worker-level
responses in these datasets prohibits researchers from generating useful insights. Even in
the Setting 1 qualitative dataset where employees discuss this perk in detail, their actual
work behavior in response to the perk is unobserved. Moreover, as revealed by the high-
tech company in Setting 2, there are many complexities that pose further challenges to
empirically test the e↵ects of unlimited vacation in itself in real firm settings. Therefore,
I resort to a randomized controlled trial that consists of two experiments to cleanly test
my model predictions about the consequences of o↵ering unlimited vacation as a perk to
workers. The design bridges controlled experiments in labs and field experiments inside
companies by replicating a virtual workplace on an online labor market with key elements
of existing organizations: long-term repeated interaction between workers and the employer,
real-e↵ort tasks, separation of workdays from weekends, and inclusion of paid vacation time.
The goal of Experiment 1 is to rigorously replicate and compare the typical unlimited
vacation contract and the typical capped vacation contract in practice, as discussed in Sec-
tion 1.3, and test the theoretical predictions regarding sorting, productivity, and slacking.
Specifically, the unlimited vacation contract di↵ers from the capped vacation contract re-
garding three features: (1) the absence of a vacation cap, (2) the presence of a performance
requirement, and (3) the absence of attendance checks to ensure face time. The goal of
Experiment 2 is to separate out the e↵ect of each of these features through additional con-




Experiment 1. I recruited 691 workers from an online labor market,26 Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk), in late January 2019 via a Qualtrics survey into the study, which was framed
as “a four-week-long image-counting job” that required “working for up to 16 minutes per
weekday for four consecutive weeks.” The sample was restricted to workers with an HIT
approval rate greater than 98% and who were residents in the U.S. I excluded any worker
who might have viewed the job during previous pilots. At the end of my recruitment
survey, 8 workers indicated that they were either no longer interested in the job or could
not commit to a four-week long job and were thus excluded. An additional 13 workers
were further dropped due to duplicated IP addresses. A total of 444 workers successfully
passed the run-in period, which involved a three-day clicking test (details follow), and hence
received an email confirming that they were eligible for the job and asking them to view
their work contract through a link; 435 workers opened the link and formed the sample of
the treatment assignment; 426 workers confirmed that they would be taking the job and
were hired; and 414 workers eventually started the job in early February 2019.
Experiment 2. The recruitment process for Experiment 2 was the same as Experiment
1. I started by recruiting 400 workers from MTurk in early April 2019 for the job.27 A
total of 375 workers remained interested at the end of the recruitment survey; 372 workers
remained after dropping duplicated IP addresses; 232 workers passed the clicking test and
received the eligibility email for the job; 229 workers opened the work contract link and
formed the sample of the treatment assignment; and 217 workers eventually started the job
in mid-April 2019.
Online Workers. Considering the long-term nature of the study and potential high
25Links: https://osf.io/n54mk/ (Experiment 1); https://osf.io/e3cqb (Experiment 2).
26This sample size is determined based on power calculation, which suggests a target sample of 380 workers,
as well as an attrition rate of 55% according to several pilots run in July-October 2018.
27This sample size is determined based on power calculation using results from Experiment 1, which also
suggests an attrition rate of 37%.
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attrition rates, I intentionally chose MTurk workers as my sample to get quick access to a
large sample of online workers at a reasonable cost. MTurk workers have become a useful
sample in the scholarly study of labor and workplace employment issues (Burbano, 2016;
Cassar and Meier, 2017; Chandler and Kapelner, 2013; Horton et al., 2011), and more so
as firms are increasingly reliant on online labor marketplaces to recruit temporary workers,
freelancers, and independent contractors.28
To ensure that the workers I hire for the job could be trusted to follow instructions and
pay attention to the job requirements, I adopted three main approaches. First, I included
a run-in period during which workers needed to pass a clicking test by clicking on a link
for three consecutive workdays. This test aimed to make sure that workers could commit
to consistently showing up at the online job. Second, I required workers to view their
work contract, finish a practice session of the job task, and correctly answer a number
of comprehension questions about the job. The comprehension questions were designed
to make sure that workers understood multiple aspects of their work contract, including
the duration of the job, the number of vacation days they were allowed to take, potential
attention checks during work, work output requirements, and rule of dismissal.29 When
questions were answered incorrectly, workers were prompted to review their contract again
and retry. When questions were answered correctly, a message would pop up to explain in
detail why the choices were correct. Third, workers were asked to click on a link to verify
that they understood how the work session would work prior to the start of the job. These
approaches combined helped to ensure that workers who were eventually hired did read
instructions carefully and understood what the job entailed.
One other concern about the MTurk sample is external validity—whether these temporary
online workers will behave di↵erently from regular workers of interest in the context of a
28Accenture Institute for High Performance (2013). Trends reshaping the future of HR: The rise of the
extended workforce. Retrieved from https://www.accenture.com/us-en/ /media/Accenture/Conversion-
Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Strategy 3/Accenture-Future-of-HR-Rise-Extended-
Workforce.pdf.
29I framed firing as “dismissal” in the experiment.
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vacation study. First, the nature of gig work is to o↵er temporal flexibility (Lehdonvirta,
2018), so MTurk workers who show up on the platform and sign up for the experimental
job would be at a relatively high level of job flexibility when compared to regular workers
in full-time jobs. As a result, the increase in job schedule flexibility when MTurk workers
choose unlimited vacation over capped vacation for the MTurk job would likely be small, as
there is limited scope for enhanced flexibility. For regular full-time jobs, the increase in job
schedule flexibility from capped vacation to unlimited vacation can be much larger due to a
low baseline level, thus leading to a larger response from workers choosing between firms with
di↵erent vacation schemes. Therefore, the recruitment gains may be even larger in regular
full-time jobs. Second, the performance gains may also be larger for many regular full-
timer workers, as the work complementarity due to schedule flexibility o↵ered by unlimited
vacation can be larger. For instance, the scope for productivity improvement for an MTurk
job can be limited since an MTurk job typically does not require high skills. However,
the potential for productivity improvement in regular full-time jobs can be much larger as
these jobs are much more complex and allow for more variation in performance. Third,
MTurk workers are also less likely to be deterred by the threat of firing, as the stakes of
a temporary MTurk job are much smaller than those of a long-term traditional job. This
suggests that the performance management tool of firing threat is likely to be even more
e↵ective for regular full-time workers. Therefore, the di↵erences between MTurk workers
and regular workers suggest that my study o↵ers a conservative test of my predictions.
Lastly, to the extent that “vacation” in this temporary non-full-time job may be perceived
as di↵erent from vacation taken in a long-term full-time job, I conducted a follow-up survey
to ask how the workers in my study actually used their vacation time allowed by the job. I
ran robustness checks for workers who used vacation in the job for di↵erent purposes.
While online workers are a unique population, the rationale behind the findings can be
applied to other contexts sharing similar characteristics—where workers are empowered by
new technologies and are less reliant on o ce locations, when job tasks are less dependent
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on co-workers or customers in real time, and for millennial workers who particularly value
flexibility.30 The job length in the RCT also goes beyond the typical short-term jobs online,
as it requires commitment for repeated daily work during an entire one-month period.
1.6.3. Procedures
Experiment 1. The entire experiment lasted 36 days, starting from a Monday in January
2019. On Day 1, I advertised an HIT on MTurk for completing a recruitment survey to
show interest for a four-week-long image-counting job. The recruitment survey described
the longitudinal nature and the time commitment required for the job, what the image-
counting task would look like, and how payments would be made. Workers who confirmed
their interest after completing the recruitment survey subsequently entered a run-in period,
which involved a clicking test during Days 2-4 that determined eligibility for the job. To
pass the clicking test, workers needed to click on a link once each day for three consecutive
workdays.
All workers who passed the clicking test were considered eligible for the job and received
random treatment assignments (details follow). These workers received a separate email on
Day 5, which provided detailed information about their work contract(s) and included a
four-minute practice session of the image-counting task. At the end of the practice session,
workers received feedback on their performance during the practice session and needed to
complete a range of comprehension checks. Depending on treatment, workers either had
been randomly assigned a work contract or at this point were asked to choose between an
unlimited vacation contract and a capped vacation contract. Workers were subsequently
shown the work session interface based on their contract. The daily check-in requirement was
then explained to workers, which required workers to check in on each workday to indicate if
they would work or take vacation for that workday. Finally, workers were asked to confirm
if they were still interested in the job. Those who confirmed interest also answered a few




questions about basic demographic information and their work patterns on MTurk, and
later received a “congratulations” email on Day 7. This email confirmed that the recipient
was hired, provided a summary of the work contract and job requirements for the recipient,
gave the recipient a mock session link that could be used repeatedly to get familiarized with
the task interface, and asked the recipient to click on a separate link to verify that they had
viewed the mock session and understood how the task interface worked prior to the start
of the job.
The actual job started on Day 8 and lasted 20 weekdays over four consecutive weeks until
Day 33. During each week, Monday through Friday were workdays (weekends were o↵),
and the workers needed to check in on each workday through a daily link to choose between
work and vacation. When they chose to work for a day, they would start a 16-minute work
session for an image-counting task. At the end of each week, their work was evaluated
based on the requirements of their corresponding work contract to determine whether they
would be dismissed or they would stay employed. A weekly summary email was then sent to
all workers employed in the week regarding their past week performance and the dismissal
decision.
For each worker, a follow-up survey was administered upon job termination at any point
during the study, which collected information about the perception of the job and the
contract, reasons for particular vacation or work behavior during the job, reasons for the
decision over contract choice, and reasons for voluntary dropout or dismissal when applica-
ble. The last follow-up survey was sent out on Day 34 to all workers who stayed employed
for all four weeks and was collected by Day 36.
Experiment 2. The procedures were the same as Experiment 1 with only one di↵erence—
workers were not able to choose between contracts on Day 5 after the practice session, and
they were randomly assigned to one of three potential work contracts that aim to separate
out the bundled e↵ect of the unlimited vacation contract.
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1.6.4. Task
For both experiments, workers worked on the same image-counting task for all workdays.
In this task, they were asked to count the number of circles in each given image and submit
their answer. Figure 1 presents an example of the task. I chose an image-counting task
(Abeler et al., 2011; DeJarnette, 2017) for a number of reasons. First, the task does not
require prior knowledge. Second, the task generates precise productivity measures. Third,
the task requires costly real-e↵ort and has little entertainment value. Fourth, the task has
well-defined levels of di culty. I can vary the size of the image matrix to make it easy or
di cult for workers, and thus vary the unit e↵ort cost for the task.
——————–Insert Figure 1——————–
Each work session for a non-vacation day lasted 16 non-stop minutes.31 Once a worker
started a work session, it was not possible for the worker to stop and then resume the
session.
1.6.5. Treatments
Experiment 1. I adopted a 2⇥3⇥2 design with random assignment along three dimensions:
worker type, contract, and firing threat under unlimited vacation:
1. Worker Type. Workers were first randomly assigned to one of two possible worker type
treatments: high-performer and low-performer. The di↵erence between the two types
was the unit e↵ort cost, which I varied by changing the size of the image matrix the
worker experienced in the practice session and would be working on in the actual job.
In the high-performer treatment, workers counted easy matrices of images that were
7⇥14 in size. In the low-performer treatment, workers counted di cult matrices of
images that were 14⇥14 in size. In other words, it took less e↵ort for high-performer
workers to complete each image-counting task.
31I designed the work sessions to be 16 minutes so that I could more conveniently map each session to an
eight-hour working day.
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2. Contract. Workers were subsequently assigned to three contract treatments randomly:
selection, unlimited vacation, and capped vacation. In the selection treatment, workers
could choose between two types of labor contracts—an unlimited vacation contract
and a capped vacation contract. In the unlimited vacation treatment and the capped
vacation treatment, workers were randomly assigned to the respective labor contract
and were not aware of the other unassigned contract.
3. Firing threat. Lastly, workers who saw the unlimited vacation contract, i.e., those in
the selection and the unlimited vacation contract treatments, were randomly assigned
to one of two possible firing threat treatments: weak firing threat and strong firing
threat. In the weak firing threat treatment, one out of ten workers who did not comply
with the contract would be dismissed at the end of each week. In the strong firing
threat treatment, all workers who did not comply with the contract would be dismissed
at the end of each week. The baseline firing threat for workers in the capped vacation
contract was a strong firing threat.
All 435 workers who passed the run-in period clicking test and opened the link with their
contract information were randomly assigned to a treatment. Figure 2 shows how these
workers were randomly assigned to the treatments. In all, 426 workers confirmed interest
in the job and were eventually hired; 414 workers actually started the job.
——————–Insert Figure 2——————–
Figure 3 lists the details of the capped vacation contract and the unlimited vacation contract.
Attendance checks were framed as “attention checks” to workers, and the two terms will be
used interchangeably. Under the capped vacation contract, workers could take one vacation
day per week. They needed to work until the end of the 16-minute work session for each
non-vacation day and pay full attention during the session. There would be attendance
checks at random time points, which required them to click on a button within 30 seconds
38
after seeing a pop-up message.32 There were no output requirements. At the end of each
week, all workers who took more than one vacation day and all workers who failed any of
the attendance checks would be dismissed from the job.33 Under the unlimited vacation
contract, workers could take as many vacation days as needed per week. They could leave
before the end of the 16-minute work session for each non-vacation day, and there were no
attendance checks. They must produce at least 80 correctly counted images per week.34
At the end of each week, all workers in the strong firing threat whose work output did
not meet the weekly minimum threshold would be dismissed from the job; one out of ten
workers in the weak firing threat whose work output did not meet the weekly minimum
threshold would be dismissed from the job. In particular, the unlimited vacation contract
resembles how unlimited vacation is typically implemented in practice—apart from being
allowed to take as much vacation as possible, workers are often relieved of “face time”
and can take vacation more conveniently, yet in the presence of either explicit or implicit
performance expectation. Therefore, the unlimited vacation contract captures these three
essential aspects: the allowance of unlimited vacation time, the removal of attendance checks
that encourage “face time,” and the presence of a performance threshold. In contrast, the
capped vacation contract installs a cap on vacation time, introduces attendance checks to
monitor face time, and does not put in place an explicit requirement for performance.
——————–Insert Figure 3——————–
32I designed the clicking window to be 30 seconds in a 16-minute work session to mimic a 15-minute break
in an eight-hour working day.
33In practice, I recognized that workers sometimes experienced technical di culties with the attention
checks (e.g., Internet connection issues, power outages, malfunctioning mouse) that resulted in noncompli-
ance with the attendance checks. Therefore, when a worker failed the attention checks for the first time
during the entire job, I issued an email warning to the worker stating that “This is a warning that you
did not pass the attention checks in your work session on [date]. Since this is the first time you failed the
attention checks, we will give you a second chance. You will not be dismissed for the missed attention checks
on [date]. However, from now on, if you miss any of the attention checks in the future, you will be dismissed
at the end of the week as specified by your work contract.”
34I calibrated this output threshold through previous pilots. I set the threshold so that it would be easy
for workers in the high-performer treatment to meet but di cult for workers in the low-performer treatment
to meet.
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Experiment 2. I adopted a 2⇥3 design with random assignment first along the dimension
of worker type as in Experiment 1, high-performer and low-performer, and then along the
dimension of contract, where I introduced two new contracts in additional to the unlimited
vacation contract. In total, there are three contract treatments: unlimited vacation, new
capped 1, and new capped 2. Firing threat was strong for all treatments, i.e., all workers who
did not comply with the contract would be dismissed at the end of each week. Contract
details for the two new contract treatments are shown in Figure 4. How workers were
randomly assigned to treatments are shown in Appendix in Figure A.4.
——————–Insert Figure 4——————–
1.6.6. Incentives
Incentives were the same for both experiments. All payments were made via MTurk. A
worker could earn up to $46.40 in total from the study. The average final payment for a
worker that actually started the job was $36.90.
Workers received $0.10 for completing the recruitment survey on Day 1. During the run-
in-period clicking test (Days 2-4), workers received $0.10 for each successful click, which
totaled $0.30 for the three consecutive workdays. Workers who then viewed their work
contract and completed their practice session received $1. Once workers were hired for the
job, they would receive a weekly payment of $11 at the end of each week, as long as they
stay employed. The $11 payment reflected an e↵ective hourly wage of $8.25 for any worker
who would work for five days per week and 16 minutes per day. All vacation time during
the job was paid. The job paid well considering that the current federal minimum wage is
$7.25 (in 2019) and the majority of the MTurk workers are earning less than that.35 Lastly,
workers were paid $1 for completing the follow-up survey.




Focusing on results from Experiment 1, I first discuss whether unlimited vacation leads
to actual benefits for firms by evaluating its e↵ect on overall labor e ciency. I explore
the mechanisms and specifically examine the sorting of high-performers in the recruitment
channel and the productivity gains in the performance channel, as suggested by Predictions 1
and 2 respectively. A third engagement channel is also discussed. I next turn to the behavior
of slacking and provide evidence for Prediction 3 regarding the role of a firing culture that
emphasizes performance. Using evidence from Experiment 2, I then decompose the bundled
e↵ects of the unlimited vacation contract to shed light on the role of an aligned system that
emphasizes performance. Moreover, I discuss whether unlimited vacation benefits workers
by focusing on their vacation patterns. The section ends with a number of robustness
checks.
1.7.1. Does Unlimited Vacation Lead to Actual Benefits for Firms?
Overall Labor E ciency. Figure 5 shows that unlimited vacation leads to higher overall
labor e ciency, defined as output per dollar spent on labor, than capped vacation—a result
that is true across four weeks. Therefore, unlimited vacation does lead to actual benefits
for firms. But why? What are the mechanisms?
——————–Insert Figure 5——————–
Mechanism 1: The Recruitment Channel. Focusing on workers who are in the selec-
tion contract treatment, Figure 6 shows that high-performers are about three times more
likely than low-performers to choose the unlimited vacation over the capped vacation con-
tract, a medium e↵ect size of 0.55.36 Even within the same worker type treatment, workers
who perform better initially in the practice session are more likely to choose the unlimited
vacation contract, as suggested by Figure 7. At each level of cumulative distribution, work-
36E↵ect size is calculated as (0.32-0.095)/0.41 where 0.32 is the proportion of high-performers choosing
unlimited vacation, 0.095 is the proportion of low-performers choosing unlimited vacation, and 0.41 is the
sample variance.
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ers who select into unlimited vacation are mostly those who perform better in the practice
session. This pattern of sorting also persists across di↵erent firing threat treatments.37
Overall, the results are consistent with Prediction 1 that unlimited vacation is more at-
tractive to high-performers than to low-performers. At the aggregate level, this sorting
mechanism means that unlimited vacation acquires a workforce with more high-performers.
In fact, under the capped vacation contract, only 43% of the workers are high-performers,
but this number increases to 77% for the unlimited vacation contract.
——————–Insert Figure 6——————–
——————–Insert Figure 7——————–
But does sorting explain all of the labor e ciency gap between unlimited and capped
vacation? I find that a gap still remains when sorting is controlled for by restricting the
analysis to workers who cannot select between contracts (see Figure A.5 in Appendix),
suggesting that there must be some other mechanisms at play in the performance stage.
Mechanism 2: The Performance Channel. I now turn to the investigation of how
workers under unlimited vacation behave post contract selection. More specifically, I eval-
uate Prediction 2 regarding how worker productivity varies across di↵erent contracts. As
37One caveat is that workers appear to be less likely to choose unlimited vacation when there is a stronger
firing threat, though the di↵erence is not statistically significant and is mostly driven by high-performers.
Interestingly, the strength of the firing threat seems to have a smaller influence on the choice of low-
performers. There are several potential reasons. First, some low-performers may select into the unlimited
vacation contract and are prepared to slack without caring about the consequences of misconduct, thus paying
little attention to the strength of firing threat. Second, some workers may not fully understand their level of
performance and have an incorrect perception of how likely they can fulfill their performance expectation.
Third, it is possible that some workers in the low-performer treatment are still capable of passing the output
threshold, even though the threshold is high. I find that the majority of the low-performers (four out of
seven who ended up working for us) may have been overconfident about their ability to pass the threshold
in the selection phase and only realized that they couldn’t do so once they started the job—they exerted
great e↵ort in the task at the beginning of the job. Only one low-performer appears to be an indolent
worker whose plan was to slack under unlimited vacation from the very beginning. Two workers selected
into unlimited vacation because they were in fact the very capable ones in the low-performer treatment
who were nevertheless able to fulfill the performance expectation. In fact, the only indolent worker is in
the weak firing threat treatment. This pattern suggests that even with performance feedback, workers may
still be over-confident about their ability to perform well on the job, and this over-confidence may be more
rampant when workers do not get information about their performance ex ante. Therefore, it is essential to
o↵er workers an opportunity to learn about how they well can do the job early on to induce more accurate
self-selection based on underlying performance level.
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the self-selection of high-performers into the unlimited vacation contract complicates the
interpretation of any potential productivity gains from the unlimited vacation scheme over
capped vacation scheme, I separate workers who can choose between contracts from those
who are randomly assigned a contract. To measure worker productivity, I calculate weekly
productivity for each worker using the number of correctly counted images in a week di-
vided by the total work time during the week (in minutes).38 As shown in Figure 8, workers
under the unlimited vacation contract are significantly more productive than workers under
the capped vacation contract. The left subfigure shows the productivity gains due to both
sorting and the treatment of unlimited vacation while the right subfigure shows the produc-
tivity gains due to the treatment of unlimited vacation exclusively. Even controlling for the
sorting e↵ect, there is a 51% increase in worker productivity from the capped vacation to
the unlimited vacation contract (mean productivity under capped vacation is 0.97 images
per minute while mean productivity under unlimited vacation is 1.46 images per minute).
These results are robust when worker type is controlled for and when potential time trends
are taken into consideration (See Figure A.6).
——————–Insert Figure 8——————–
Table 4 restates the findings with results from OLS regressions. Model (1) shows the pro-
ductivity gains from the unlimited vacation over the capped vacation without controlling
for the potential sorting e↵ect. Models (2)-(3) show that the productivity gains remain sub-
stantial after sorting is controlled. Moreover, controlling for sorting, I find that both high-
and low-performers benefit from unlimited vacation in terms of productivity improvement,
as is shown in Model (4). However, I do not find a statistically significant di↵erence in the
degree of complementarity gains between the two types of worker, as suggested by Model
(5).39
38The results remain robust if I use an alternative measure of daily productivity (number of correctly
counted images in a day divided by the total work time during the day in minutes).
39What does matter for the degree of complementarity is how committed a worker is to the job and whether
performance management is associated with a strong firing threat. Since organizational commitment may
play a role in the e↵ect of HR practices (Kehoe and Wright, 2013), I examine whether the performance
gains vary for workers with di↵erent levels of job commitment. In a follow-up survey, I asked workers to
43
——————–Insert Table 4——————–
Overall, I find consistent evidence for Prediction 2 that workers under unlimited vacation
are more productive than those under capped vacation due to complementarity gains at the
individual level. However, at the aggregate level, whether such productivity raise ultimately
leads to higher labor e ciency also depends on how much vacation people take. As payments
are the same per unit of labor in the experiments, overall labor e ciency depends on
individual worker outputs—a product of individual worker productivity and work time. If
unlimited vacation workers are more productive, they could just work really fast and take
the most vacation they can by just meeting the performance requirement; and if this were
the case, overall labor e ciency under unlimited vacation would be much lower than that
under capped vacation (see Figure A.7 in Appendix). Therefore, there must be some other
reasons apart from improved worker productivity that have also contributed to the labor
e ciency gap after sorting is controlled for.
Mechanism 3: The Engagement Channel. It turns out that apart from the predicted
sorting of high-performers and productivity gains, there are additional benefits resulting
from the unlimited vacation contract in the domain of worker engagement. Interestingly,
workers under the unlimited vacation contract not only comply with the performance re-
quirement, but work beyond expectation most of the time. In fact, 68% of the times, an
unlimited vacation worker produces more than 80 correctly counted images per week. No-
tably, these workers are not simply producing a few more images above the requirement;
they on average produce 21% more than what is required (i.e., 16.4 more correctly counted
images per week than the 80-image requirement). Are they acting reciprocally? Do they
have career concerns? Or are they simply providing more work due to a habit of providing
rate how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement “I tried my best to fulfill the requirements of
my work contract” and generated a proxy for job commitment based on a 7-point Likert scale. A response
with a value greater than 4 is considered to be showing high job commitment while workers responding with
a value less than 4 are considered to have low job commitment. Regression results (Table A.2 in Appendix)
suggest that workers with higher levels of job commitment gain a larger complementarity from the unlimited
vacation contract. In addition, the size of the productivity complementarity is much larger when there is a
stronger firing threat under the unlimited vacation contract.
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good work? When asked about why they produced more than required by the performance
requirement, workers who produced extra outputs under the unlimited vacation contract
listed the top reason as “I wanted to work more than what was required to signal commit-
ment to the job” (see Figure A.8 in Appendix).
Moreover, the unlimited vacation workers are also happier about their job than the capped
vacation workers across a number of dimensions. In a follow-up survey,40 I asked workers
to evaluate a range of statements about the job and their contract (presented in a ran-
dom order) and rate how strongly they agree or disagree with each statement based on a
7-point Likert scale. Table 5 shows that workers under the unlimited vacation contract rate
the job higher in terms of job satisfaction (Questions 1-3), perceived flexibility and auton-
omy (Questions 4 and 5), time management e ciency (Question 6), and endowed trust by
the employer (Question 7, though not statistically significantly so); they also show higher
level of consideration for their productivity level when choosing between work and vacation
(Question 8).41
——————–Insert Table 5——————–
In summary, unlimited vacation not just attracts the high-performers, not just improves
worker productivity, but also makes workers more engaged and happier in the job and
contribute extra work for no extra pay. Altogether, these mechanisms lead to actual benefits
for firms as unlimited vacation improves overall labor e ciency.
40Out of 414 workers who started the job, 394 workers completed the follow-up survey (a 95% response
rate).
41I restrict to workers who were randomly assigned a contract, stayed in the job for all four weeks, and
were under the strong firing threat treatment due to several reasons. First, workers who were able to
select a contract would naturally rate their contract better than those who could not select due to revealed
preference. Since more workers chose the capped vacation contract, the average ratings for this contract can
be artificially higher than the average ratings for the unlimited vacation contract if workers who were able to
choose between contracts are included. Second, workers who left the job early were mostly involuntary, i.e.,
due to firing. Consequently, these workers would naturally rate their contract worse when compared to those
who stayed for all four weeks. Since there is a higher rate of attrition under the unlimited vacation contract,
the average ratings for this contract can be artificially lower than the average ratings for the capped vacation
contract if workers who left the job early are included. Third, the strength of firing threat can potentially
a↵ect worker ratings as well, so I control for this potential confounder.
45
1.7.2. The Role of a Performance-Oriented Firing Culture
While unlimited vacation brings about human capital benefits through multiple channels, it
also comes with the risk of abuse by some workers. Figure 9 shows the distribution of weekly
output, i.e., the number of correctly counted images, under unlimited vacation and suggests
that many workers do slack by failing to meet the performance requirement. Overall, the
slacking rate under the unlimited vacation contract is 31%.42
——————–Insert Figure 9——————–
Importantly, I find evidence for Prediction 3 that the strength of firing threat conditional
on performance plays a role in how much workers comply with the performance expectation
under the unlimited vacation, confirming that the risky perk should be bundled with a
performance-oriented firing culture. Figure 10 shows that when there is a stronger firing
threat, more workers are complying with performance expectation. Specifically, the slacking
rate decreases from 38% to 21%—a 45% decrease. In particular, the benefits of a stronger
firing threat in mitigating undesirable behavior mainly come from the actual enforcement
of the firing post the first week of the job. As shown by the right panel, the di↵erence
in compliance rate becomes sizable starting at week 2 and remains relatively stable going
forward. Relatedly, unlimited vacation workers tend to take less vacation when there is a
strong firing threat; indolent workers who do not work at all only exist under the weak
firing threat (see Figures A.9 and A.10 in Appendix).
——————–Insert Figure 10——————–
At the aggregate level, a lower slacking rate due to the strong firing threat leads to a higher
level of output and ultimately higher overall labor e ciency, as seen in Figure 11. Therefore,
an appropriate culture of punishment for under-performance is an e↵ective way to deal with
the risk from agency issues. One caveat, however, is that a stronger firing threat under the
4222% of the slackers are high-performers vs. 78% are low-performers; 28% of the slackers are under strong
firing threat vs. 72% are under weak firing threat.
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unlimited vacation contract may on the other hand increase worker turnover, both through
voluntary dropout and actual firing of the underperforming workers.43
——————–Insert Figure 11——————–
1.7.3. The Role of a Performance-Oriented Aligned System
What is the role of a performance-oriented aligned system that bundles unlimited vacation
with other practices in the post selection performance stage? As discussed, these features are
bundled together to mimic how unlimited vacation is typically implemented in workplaces
along with other HR practices. Nevertheless, the question remains: does the unlimited
vacation feature work in itself in terms of the contribution to the productivity gain? In
Experiment 2, I decompose how each feature contributes to the productivity gain by ad-
dressing two questions. First, does the productivity gain vanish after attendance checks are
removed under the capped vacation contract? Second, does the productivity gain vanish af-
ter a performance requirement is instated, in addition to the removal of attendance checks,
under the capped vacation contract? Panel A of Table 6 summarizes the new contract
treatments in Experiment 2 in comparison to the contract treatments in Experiment 1.
——————–Insert Table 6——————–
Panel B of Table 6 shows the results comparing estimated coe cients for the productivity
gain under the unlimited vacation contract over other contracts, based on Model (1) in Table
4 with additional controls as indicated. I find that the productivity gain is persistent when
attendance checks are removed under capped vacation—with a decrease in the size of the
estimated coe cient from 0.676 to 0.590—and when a performance requirement is instated
in addition to the removal of attendance checks—with a further decrease in the size of the
estimated coe cient from 0.590 to 0.151. The decomposition of the total productivity gain
to each contract feature suggests that the unlimited vacation feature accounts for 22% of
43In total, 36 workers under the strong firing threat treatment were still employed in Week 4 under the
unlimited vacation; 54 workers under the weak firing threat treatment were still employed in Week 4 under
the unlimited vacation.
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the gain when worker type is not controlled for and about one-third of the gain when worker
type is controlled for. Finally, I investigate whether high-performers and low-performers
di↵er in terms of the level of complementarity they experience under various unlimited
vacation contract features by including an interaction term into model estimation. I find
that high-performers enjoy a larger complementarity to productivity than low-performers
resulting from the unlimited vacation feature, but they do not appear to gain more from
the other features of the unlimited vacation contract.
These findings from Experiment 2 suggest that an aligned HR system with bundled practices
that emphasize performance does strengthen the performance gains from unlimited vacation,
but the perk also improves worker productivity by itself. Moreover, the unlimited vacation
feature is particularly beneficial to the productivity of high-performers.
1.7.4. Worker Vacation Patterns
Having examined whether unlimited vacation would benefit firms and the contingencies
based on organizational cultures and systems, I now turn to the discussion of the e↵ect on
vacation patterns to shed light on the implication for workers. Under the capped vacation
contract, workers are allowed to take at most one vacation day per week. Under the un-
limited vacation contract, workers can take as much vacation as needed.44 If workers are
maximizing their utility rationally, they should take one weekly vacation day if they are
under capped vacation, and should only work to the extent that they can fulfill the per-
formance expectation if they are under unlimited vacation. Two complexities exist in the
prediction of how many vacation days workers will take under unlimited vacation contract.
First, high-performers may not work through the entire 16-minute work sessions, and can
quit whenever they want. This means that they may take fewer vacation days while taking
more vacation time in total. Second, low-performers who do not have the goal of complying
44The output threshold of 80 correctly counted images for the unlimited vacation contract was calibrated
to first make it feasible for high-performers to take more than one vacation day per week, provided that they
work through the entire 16 minutes for other workdays; and then to make it challenging for low-performers
to take more than one vacation day.
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with performance expectations will slack and simply take more vacation time and days.
Figure 12 presents the distribution of weekly vacation days by worker type and actual
vacation scheme absent sorting. First, as expected, both high- and low-performers under the
capped vacation cluster at one vacation day per week. Second, workers under the unlimited
vacation contract on average take more vacation days than their counterparts under capped
vacation—1.04 vacation days for unlimited vacation workers versus 0.79 vacation days for
capped vacation workers pooling high-performers and low-performers (p <0.001). While a
di↵erence of 0.25 days appears small, the di↵erence in average vacation time under the two
contracts is much larger. Workers under the unlimited vacation on average take 12.34 more
vacation minutes per week than workers under the capped vacation (p <0.001), which is
about 0.77 days in the experimental context (12.34/16). Third, there are many indolent low-
performers under the unlimited vacation contract, though the majority strives to achieve
the performance expectation by taking zero vacation days.
——————–Insert Figure 12——————–
Interestingly, under the unlimited vacation, high-performers take zero vacation days 40%
of the time and low-performers take zero vacation days 47% of the time. At first glance,
this evidence seems to confirm the concern often discussed in media that unlimited vacation
may make people take less vacation.45 Yet, the reality is much more nuanced. For those
high-performers who take zero vacation days under unlimited vacation, they in fact take
very similar vacation time per week (12.86 minutes on average) when compared to an aver-
age high-performer under capped vacation (13.50 minutes on average) with no statistically
significant di↵erence (p-value is 0.666), but they simply spread out the vacation time and
take it more conveniently. On the other hand, low-performers who do not take any weekly
vacation days under the unlimited vacation actually work more per week in terms of to-
tal time (71.14 minutes on average) than low-performers under the capped vacation (65.25
45Jonathan Chew, “Why Unlimited Vacation May Sound Better Than It Really Is,” Fortune, March 10,
2016, http://fortune.com.
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minutes on average), with a di↵erence statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Moreover,
even within the high-performer treatment group, those who take zero vacation days under
the unlimited vacation contract tend to be the workers with lower initial performance in
the practice session prior to the job. Overall, these results indicate that unlimited vacation
workers on average take more vacation time, though the low-performers in this group may
need to work more.
1.7.5. Robustness Checks
I conduct a number of robustness checks to address concerns about the idiosyncrasies of
the MTurk worker sample and the potential di↵erential attrition rates due to voluntary
dropouts across contracts. Specifically, I examine whether the main benefits from unlimited
vacation are robust regarding the sorting e↵ect, productivity gains, and extra work from
happier workers. I also evaluate whether the e↵ect of strong firing threat holds true in
terms of mitigating undesirable work behavior and whether vacation patterns under the
two contracts remain similar.
The first concern is regarding whether vacation means very di↵erent things to online workers
in a temporary job when compared to full-time workers in long-term jobs in physical o ces.
In the follow-up survey, I explicitly asked workers how they usually used their vacation time
in the experiment. MTurk workers do vary in terms of how they spend their vacation time
(see Figure A.11). Some workers used their vacation time in the experimental job to work
on other MTurk jobs or their primary job other than MTurk work. Nevertheless, 54% of
the workers still used their vacation time mainly for relaxation or entertainment, dealing
with family or medical issues, spending time with family, and running chores and errands.
I restrict my analyses to this 54% of the worker population and all results remain robust. A
similar concern is that workers on MTurk may have other work/life commitments that force
them into taking vacation on certain days. To address this concern, I restrict my analyses
to workers who reveal that they work on MTurk seven days a week (40% of the sample)
and find that all results remain robust.
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Another concern is that the rate of voluntary dropouts may di↵er for unlimited and capped
vacation contracts. Under the capped vacation contract, workers may decide to drop out
early once they fail their attendance checks at a given time in a work session since they
know for sure that they will be dismissed at the end of week. As the weekly payment is
fixed, there are no additional benefits to the workers from working more. For this reason, it
is possible that the average weekly output or productivity is lower for the capped vacation
workers due to earlier dropouts. To address this concern, I restrict my analyses to workers
who did check in every workday during a week to exclude those who dropped out early
(94 workers). I also exclude the capped vacation workers who failed attendance checks (29
workers). All results remain robust. Moreover, the benefits of unlimited vacation regarding
sorting, productivity, and inducing extra work from workers become even stronger. The
e↵ect of a strong firing threat also becomes more prominent in nudging workers to comply
more and produce more.
Finally, I control for a range of worker characteristics for evaluating the productivity gains
from unlimited vacation. The result remains robust after controlling for gender, race, ed-
ucation, work status (full or part time), hourly earnings for primary job, how often people
work on MTurk (days and hours), when they typically work on MTurk, and how much they
usually earn on MTurk.
1.8. Discussion
Implications for firms
First, the sorting benefits from unlimited vacation through the recruitment channel would
depend on the organizational need for high-performers, and are likely most pronounced for
growth-oriented firms with a large demand for top talent.46 Examples include both small
startups in the scaling-up phase and big technology companies in the high-growth stage.
Second, the productivity raise through the performance channel due to the unlimited va-
46Patty McCord, “Hiring the Best People,” interview with Harvard Business Review, January 2, 2018,
https://hbr.org.
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cation feature itself suggests that this perk may be a substitute for complex and costly
performance monitoring, especially for those resource-constrained nascent ventures. Third,
the engagement benefits from o↵ering unlimited vacation to workers imply that the em-
ployment contract becomes more relational as workers feel happier and more committed,
which can be a potential way to improve retention at high-turnover technology firms. In all,
unlimited vacation appears to be a relevant consideration for entrepreneurial firms of all
kinds, as well as other types of firms that compete with these firms on the basis of human
capital.
Firms should also consider their unique organizational conditions when evaluating the con-
tingencies in the aforementioned benefits. Across my three empirical settings, I find that at
least three things matter: supportive social dynamics with healthy interpersonal relation-
ships, a strong culture of punishment for under-performance, and an aligned HR system
that reinforces the focus on performance rather than face time. In particular, bureaucratic
firms typically have strict policies to govern inappropriate behavior in the workplace, but
entrepreneurial firms may lack clear policies or credible punishment devices to deal with po-
tential slacking and thus would rely more on the culture of punishment. This does not imply,
however, that firms should aim for a stressful and hostile workplace culture. Rather, firms
should set explicit performance expectations, conduct transparent performance evaluations,
and employ consistent policies for both rewards and penalties.
Implications for workers
Implications for workers are mixed. While an average worker under unlimited vacation
is happier and is able to take more vacation than his or her counterparts under capped
vacation, I do find that a good number of unlimited vacation workers in my RCT end up
taking no vacation days at all. At first glance, this observation seems to confirm a common
concern in the media that “‘unlimited vacation’ is code for ‘no vacation.’”47 Yet, the reality
47Megan McArdle, “‘Unlimited Vacation’ Is Code for ‘No Vacation,’” Bloomberg, September 30, 2015,
https://www.bloomberg.com.
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discovered by my study is that high-performers in this group actually take about the same
total vacation time as their counterparts under capped vacation, for they tend to spread
out vacation time more conveniently by leaving work earlier on workdays, rather than take
a day or two o↵ completely. Low-performers who take zero vacation days, on the other
hand, do appear to be working more than their capped vacation fellows. It turns out that
unlimited vacation may be a reward for high-performers only.
Limitations
Admittedly, my theory leaves out a number of other potential benefits firms may acquire
by adopting an unlimited vacation scheme: avoiding the end of year chaos when employees
all rush to use the pre-granted vacation days, eliminating the HR burden of tracking and
managing vacation time, and dodging the additional liability line of unused and accrued
vacation on the balance sheet. These forces may co-exist; nevertheless, the gains from un-
limited vacation through the recruitment, performance, and engagement channels uncovered
in this study are sizable enough for firms to consider this perk more seriously.
A few limitations are also worth noting about the external validity of the experimental
results. First, the RCT took place online, which could not fully capture all relational
aspects in the workplace from the interaction between people. For instance, workers may
take little vacation under unlimited vacation when they feel pressured to stay on the job
to ensure job security48 or to impress the higher-ups.49 Nevertheless, the finding about
sorting is likely una↵ected. Moreover, survey evidence suggests that some of the relational
aspects remain in e↵ect even in the online experimental context as workers indicate that
they supplied more work to signal commitment to the job. Most importantly, results from
the field setting suggest that even in a socially complex workplace environment, workers on
average tend to take more vacation and experience improved subjective productivity due
48Trent Gillies, “Take all the time you need: The rise of ‘unlimited vacations’,” CNBC, December 20,
2015, http://www.cnbc.com.
49Susan Milligan, “The Limits of Unlimited Vacation,” Society for Human Resource Management, March
1, 2015, https://www.shrm.org.
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to access to the perk of unlimited vacation. Second, “vacation” may not necessarily reflect
actual vacation for MTurk workers, as 45% of the workers spent time on other MTurk tasks
or even their primary job during the “vacation” time for the experimental job. Yet, vacation
may not necessarily be vacation for real workers either. It is increasingly common for regular
workers to use their time outside their main job to engage in other forms of gig work or
entrepreneurial endeavor, e.g., driving for Uber, picking up some coding task on Elance, or
launching a project on Kickstarter. Third, I use an image-counting task in the design so
that output and productivity can be measured precisely. However, some potential features
of work tasks are not captured such as creativity, meaningfulness, and interdependence. My
theoretical model predicts that the scope for complementarity between the work nature and
schedule autonomy also matters for the degree of benefits resulting from unlimited vacation.
I expect that the performance gains would be more pronounced for jobs that are creative
and independent, but may be obscure for roles that require intensive real-time interaction
with co-workers or customers. I leave this for future research.
1.9. Conclusion
My study addresses a topic with emerging relevance and importance in practice—how firms
can use new, innovative, non-pecuniary, but risky perks like unlimited vacation to achieve
strategic benefits in talent recruitment and management. Through three complementary
empirical settings, this paper provides a wholistic view on the phenomenon of unlimited
vacation by shedding light on its trade-o↵s in multiple HR domains and the contingencies
based on various organizational conditions. I find empirical evidence that unlimited vacation
o↵ers human capital benefits by improving overall labor e ciency through three major
ways: (1) attracting high-performers in recruitment, (2) creating complementarity to work
that makes people more productive, and (3) inducing extra work outputs from happier
workers. Aligned HR practices including a clear performance requirement and a removal
of attendance checks lead to strengthened gains in the performance stage. However, I
also show that the perk is indeed risky—it may hurt productivity in teams with non-
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supportive social dynamics and it can encourage slacking when there is a weak culture of
punishment for under-performance. Together, this paper demonstrates how managers can
create a highly skilled, productive, and motivated workforce through the perk of unlimited
vacation. It further highlights the organizational conditions that are essential for sustaining
the competitive advantage from this superior human capital pool.
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Figure 1: Task in Setting 3. This is an example of the image-counting task for workers in
the high-performer treatment in Setting 3 (RCT). Workers in the low-performer treatment
worked on images twice the size.
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Figure 2: Treatments (Experiment 1) in Setting 3. This table shows treatment
assignment based on worker type, contract, and firing threat in Setting 3 (RCT). 435
workers were assigned randomly to the treatments. 426 workers confirmed interest in the
job and were hired. 414 workers started the job.
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Figure 3: Contracts (Experiment 1) in Setting 3. This table shows the details for the
capped vacation contract and the unlimited vacation contract in Setting 3 (RCT).
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Figure 4: Contracts (Experiment 2) in Setting 3. This table shows the details for the
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Figure 5: Overall Labor E ciency in Setting 3. This figure shows overall labor




























High Performers Low Performers
Figure 6: Sorting by Worker Type in Setting 3. This figure shows the percentage of
workers choosing unlimited vacation by worker type treatment in Setting 3 (RCT), using
only workers who are in the selection contract treatment (N = 169). The di↵erence between
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Figure 7: Sorting by Initial Performance Across Worker Type Treatments in
Setting 3. This figure shows the cumulative distribution of workers choosing the unlimited
vacation or the capped vacation contract in Setting 3 (RCT), controlling for worker type


















































































Capped Vacation Unlimited Vacation
No Selection
Weekly Productivity by Contract
Figure 8: Weekly Productivity by Contract in Setting 3. This figure shows the aver-
age weekly productivity (number of outputs per minute) by the vacation contract separately
for workers who can choose between two contracts (left subfigure) and workers who are ran-
domly assigned a contract (right subfigure) in Setting 3 (RCT). The di↵erence between the
means is statistically significant di↵erence at the 0.1% level for both subfigures.
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Figure 9: Distribution of Weekly Output under Unlimited Vacation in Setting 3.
This figure shows the distribution of weekly output under unlimited vacation in Setting 3
(RCT). Weekly output is defined as the number of correctly counted images per week. The
gray bar shows the performance requirement, i.e., 80 correctly counted images per week.
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Figure 10: Compliance by Firing Threat in Setting 3. This figure shows the per-
centage of workers complying with the performance expectation, i.e., meeting the output
threshold, by firing threat in Setting 3 (RCT), using workers who work under the unlimited
vacation. The left subfigure shows the percentage of complying workers by firing threat
pooling together all 4-week data. The di↵erence between the proportions is statistically sig-
nificant at the 0.1% level. The right subfigure shows the percentage of complying workers by
firing threat over time. The di↵erence between the proportions at each week is statistically
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Figure 11: Labor E ciency over Time by Firing Threat in Setting 3. This figure
shows overall labor e ciency by firing threat treatment using workers who work under the
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Distribution of Weekly Vacation Days
Figure 12: Distribution of Weekly Vacation Days in Setting 3. This figure shows the
distribution of weekly vacation days by worker type treatment and actual vacation scheme
in Setting 3 (RCT), restricting to workers who cannot choose between contracts, i.e., no
sorting. The top left subfigure shows the distribution for high-performers under the un-
limited vacation, with a mean of 0.88 vacation days. The top right subfigure shows the
distribution for high-performers under the capped vacation, with a mean of 0.77 vacation
days. The bottom left subfigure shows the distribution for low-performers under the un-
limited vacation, with a mean of 1.27 vacation days. The bottom right subfigure shows the
distribution for low-performers under the capped vacation, with a mean of 0.82 vacation
days.
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Table 1: Firm Characteristics by Vacation Type in Setting 1. This table compares
firms with and without unlimited vacation across various characteristics in Setting 1 (Glass-
door). Firm size is coded numerically into rankings in terms of number of employees. A
numeric value of 3 represents 51-250 employees, and a numeric value of 4 represents 251-
500 employees. Product diversity is measured as the number of category groups the firm is
associated with.
Capped Vacation Unlimited Vacation Di↵erence
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N p-value
Firm Age in Years 27.23 30.83 9530 12.85 13.85 1300 < 0.001
Firm Size (Numeric Coding) 4.04 2.00 8902 3.44 1.59 1150 < 0.001
Location in CA, NY, MA 0.39 0.49 9912 0.66 0.47 1318 < 0.001
High Tech Industry 0.51 0.50 9912 0.75 0.43 1318 < 0.001
IPO or Acquired 0.41 0.49 9912 0.22 0.42 1318 < 0.001
Funding Rounds 1.57 2.14 9912 3.30 2.51 1318 < 0.001
Product Diversity 2.13 1.58 9912 2.99 1.56 1318 < 0.001
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Table 2: E↵ect on Vacation in Setting 2. This table shows the regression results for
evaluating changes in vacation pattern due to unlimited vacation in Setting 2 (a large high-
tech company). Models (2)-(4) restrict to employees who did not experience a change in
job function due to the transfer. Models (2) and (3) control for job functions pre-transfer.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the individual level
in Model (4). * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 **** p < 0.001.
Dependent Variable:
Monthly Time O↵ Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat 0.130⇤ -0.050 -0.020
(0.078) (0.153) (0.151)
Post -0.274⇤⇤⇤ -0.181⇤ 0.125 0.115
(0.084) (0.094) (0.117) (0.123)
Treat ⇥ Post 0.838⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.766⇤⇤⇤ 0.765⇤⇤⇤ 0.707⇤⇤
(0.218) (0.261) (0.262) (0.292)
Change in Job Level 0.055 -0.019
(0.087) (0.088)
Job Level before Transfer 0.281 0.272
(0.196) (0.196)
Job Tenure (Months) at Transfer 0.006 0.003
(0.005) (0.006)
Year Fixed E↵ects No No Yes Yes
Individual Fixed E↵ects No No No Yes
Constant 2.101⇤⇤⇤⇤ 1.646⇤⇤⇤⇤ 1.808⇤⇤⇤⇤ 2.302⇤⇤⇤⇤
(0.037) (0.228) (0.286) (0.168)
Observations 3436 2982 2982 2982
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Table 3: E↵ect on Subjective Productivity in Setting 2. This table shows the
regression results for evaluating subjective productivity gain from unlimited vacation in
Setting 2 (a large high-tech company). Models (2)-(6) control for job functions pre-transfer
and restrict to employees who did not experience a change in job function due to the transfer.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
**** p < 0.001.
Dependent Variable: Subjective Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat -0.274 -0.980⇤⇤ -0.195 -1.141 -1.660⇤ -0.884
(0.188) (0.438) (0.950) (0.702) (0.984) (0.695)
Post -0.275⇤⇤ -0.228 -0.107 -0.216 0.661 0.324
(0.136) (0.143) (0.691) (0.530) (0.863) (0.544)
Treat ⇥ Post 0.453⇤ 0.438⇤ -2.156⇤ -1.053 -2.117⇤ -1.704⇤
(0.249) (0.256) (1.117) (0.815) (1.178) (0.961)
Change in Job Level -0.100 -0.171 0.106 -0.234 -0.194
(0.173) (0.204) (0.184) (0.170) (0.189)
Job Level before Transfer 0.721 0.406 1.088⇤⇤ 1.060⇤⇤ 0.566
(0.458) (0.566) (0.544) (0.468) (0.365)
Job Tenure (Months) at Transfer -0.002 -0.000 -0.006 -0.005 0.006
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Great Team 1 1.008⇤⇤
(0.478)
Great Team 1 ⇥ Post -0.224
(0.719)
Great Team 1 ⇥ Treat -0.757
(0.918)
Great Team 1 ⇥ Treat ⇥ Post 3.053⇤⇤⇤
(1.160)
Great Team 2 1.244⇤⇤⇤
(0.388)
Great Team 2 ⇥ Post -0.074
(0.548)
Great Team 2 ⇥ Treat -0.545
(0.768)
Great Team 2 ⇥ Treat ⇥ Post 1.827⇤⇤
(0.877)
Great Team 3 1.705⇤⇤⇤
(0.586)
Great Team 3 ⇥ Post -1.007
(0.876)
Great Team 3 ⇥ Treat 0.349
(0.941)




Great Manager ⇥ Post -0.610
(0.559)
Great Manager ⇥ Treat -0.028
(0.682)
Great Manager ⇥ Treat ⇥ Post 2.088⇤⇤
(0.990)
Constant 4.731⇤⇤⇤⇤ 4.145⇤⇤⇤⇤ 3.687⇤⇤⇤⇤ 2.837⇤⇤⇤⇤ 2.571⇤⇤⇤ 3.231⇤⇤⇤⇤
(0.094) (0.494) (0.812) (0.733) (0.832) (0.529)
Observations 571 496 356 353 394 406
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Table 4: Weekly Individual Worker Productivity in Setting 3. This table shows the
regression results for evaluating productivity gain from the unlimited vacation contract in
Setting 3 (RCT). The dependent variable is weekly productivity (number of outputs per
minute). All models include week fixed e↵ects. Robust standard errors clustered at the
individual level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 ****
p < 0.001.
Dependent Variable:
Weekly Productivity (Number of Outputs per Minute)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unlimited Vacation 0.645⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.631⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.512⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.416⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.483⇤⇤⇤⇤
(0.062) (0.066) (0.083) (0.065) (0.113)
Selection -0.032 -0.151⇤ -0.102⇤ -0.099⇤
(0.065) (0.082) (0.054) (0.054)




Unlimited Vacation ⇥ High-Performer -0.116
(0.122)
Constant 0.674⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.693⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.767⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.420⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.394⇤⇤⇤⇤
(0.040) (0.055) (0.063) (0.040) (0.045)
Observations 1274 1274 1274 1274 1274
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Table 5: Follow-Up Survey Ratings in Setting 3. This table shows the average rat-
ings for survey questions based on a 7-point Likert scale separately for workers under the
unlimited vacation and for workers under the capped vacation in Setting 3 (RCT). For each
survey question, the respondent indicates how strongly he/she agrees or disagrees with the
statement. A rating of 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree” and a rating of 7 indicates “Strongly
Agree.” A higher rating indicates that the respondent more strongly agrees with the state-
ment. Actual order of question was randomized. The analysis restricts to workers who were
randomly assigned a contract, stayed for the entire job, and were under the strong firing
threat treatment.
Survey Question Unlimited Vacation Capped Vacation p-value
(N = 33) (N = 57)
1. In general, I was satisfied with this job. 6.52 6.16 0.041
2. All in all, this job was great. 6.21 5.70 0.021
3. This job was very enjoyable. 5.30 4.61 0.031
4. My work contract o↵ered me flexibility. 6.70 6.16 0.009
5. My work contract o↵ered me autonomy. 6.30 6.00 0.088
6. My work contract allowed me to manage my
time e ciently.
6.64 6.37 0.066
7. I felt trusted by the employer under my work
contract.
6.39 6.09 0.107
8. I usually did not consider my level of productiv-




Table 6: Unbundling the Unlimited Vacation Contract in Setting 3. This table
shows treatments that unbundle the unlimited vacation contract in Setting 3 (RCT). Panel
A of this table summarizes the contract features of new contract treatments in Experiment
2, in comparison to the treatments in Experiment 1. Panel B of this table examines how
each aspect of the unlimited vacation contract contributes to the productivity gain over
the capped vacation contract, based on Model (1) in Table 4 with additional controls as
indicated. All workers included are those who cannot choose between contracts and are
under a strong firing threat. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 **** p < 0.001.
Panel A. Contract Treatments
Unlimited New New Capped
Vacation Capped 1 Capped 2 Vacation
Vacation Cap No Yes Yes Yes
Attendance Checks No No No Yes
Performance Requirement Yes Yes No No
Rule of Dismissal All workers who breach any aspect of the contract are dismissed
Panel B. Productivity Di↵erence between Unlimited Vacation vs. Treatment
New New Capped
Capped 1 Capped 2 Vacation
Feature Separated Out Vacation Feature Performance Requirement Attendance Checks
Baseline
Estimated Coe cient 0.151⇤⇤ 0.590⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.676⇤⇤⇤⇤
Contribution 22% 65% 13%
Controlling for Worker Type
Estimated Coe cient 0.157⇤⇤⇤ 0.358⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.509⇤⇤⇤⇤
Contribution 31% 39% 30%
Interaction with High-Performer
Estimated Coe cient 0.251⇤⇤ not statistically significant -0.538⇤⇤
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CHAPTER 2 : Social Safety Net and New Venture Performance:
The Case of New Jersey Paid Family Leave Program
Kau↵man Knowledge Challenge Grant Recipient, 2018
Abstract
Despite a large literature on how institutional environments shape venture formation, little
is known about how social safety nets for employees at entrepreneurial firms influence busi-
ness performance post the founding stage. This paper examines how employees’ access to
state-sponsored paid family leave impacts the profitability of new ventures by exploiting the
2009 New Jersey Paid Family Leave (PFL) program. Using a di↵erence-in-di↵erences de-
sign, I find that the state PFL program adversely a↵ects the likelihood of making profits for
the average new venture. The negative e↵ect is stronger for businesses in greater financial
stress and those that are more reliant on incumbent employees, suggesting two operating
mechanisms—the lack of financial resources and the lack of flexibility in sta ng—that ren-
der new ventures particularly vulnerable to human capital shocks as a result of institutional
changes. Innovative ventures, however, experience an asymmetric e↵ect and are more likely
to be profitable post treatment. Taken together, this study combines institutional per-
spectives, employment topics, and human resource considerations to highlight that social
safety nets for workers may have unintended consequences for nascent businesses, especially
considering the heterogeneity in how ventures can absorb these impacts.
2.1. Introduction
The relationship between institutional environments and entrepreneurship has been exten-
sively explored by strategy, entrepreneurship, and economics research, which has highlighted
how regulatory changes, such as easier access to capital (Chatterji and Seamans, 2012),
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lenient bankruptcy laws (Eberhart et al., 2017), business-friendly tax policy (Bruce and
Mohsin, 2006; Gentry and Hubbard, 2000), and lower firm registration costs (Castellaneta
et al., 2020), can spur the founding of new ventures. Despite the large focus on factors that
directly impact barriers to venture formation, little consideration has been given to social
safety nets for individuals working at new ventures that impact business operation post the
founding stage.1
On one hand, economic security provided by work-related government-sponsored social
safety net programs, such as unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and paid family
leave, may allow otherwise hesitant workers to more comfortably join, perform, and stay at
small, nascent ventures that are known to pay less (Burton et al., 2018; Evans and Leighton,
1989) and be prone to failures (Aldrich and Yang, 2012). The possibility of human capital
benefits suggests that the institutional capital from social safety nets may be converted
to firm-level competitive advantages (Chang and Wu, 2014; Oliver, 1997). On the other
hand, such programs may also incur unintended human resource burden for new ventures,
as they need to bear the associated administrative costs and deal with sta ng issues, for
instance, when workers are more likely to go on family leave. These costs can be particularly
challenging for firms facing the liabilities of newness and smallness, as they tend to lack
formal HR systems and flexibility in sta ng (Cardon, 2003; Cardon and Stevens, 2004).
Therefore, it remains unclear whether and how social safety nets for venture employees
would a↵ect the performance of new ventures.
This paper sheds light on this ambiguity by examining how employees’ access to state-funded
paid family leave impacts the profitability of new ventures. Paid family leave warrants
scrutiny since it is one of the social safety net programs that receive the most public attention
and ongoing policy debate.2 While only five states, California, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
1The scant work on the relationship between social safety nets and entrepreneurship has examined food
stamp programs (Olds, 2016b), the State Child Health Insurance Program (Olds, 2016a), and Medicare
qualification (Fairlie et al., 2011), but only to the extent of how these social safety net programs impact the
founding person in terms of entrepreneurial entry.
2Tierney Sneed, “Paid Family Leave Is Primed for a National Debate,” March 23, 2015, U.S. News,
https://www.usnews.com/.
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New York, and Washington, currently o↵er state-funded paid family leave for workers, an
increasing number of states, including Massachusetts, Connecticut, Oregon, and the District
of Columbia, have all enacted their own versions of Paid Family Leave (PFL) programs that
will soon start to provide the benefit, and the legal prospects of national paid family leave
are being discussed.3 Moreover, the study of paid family leave o↵ers strategic guidance for
small, nascent ventures deliberating over the provision of additional benefits and perks that
would complement the worker social safety nets supported by the government. As workers
are demanding more paid maternity and paternity leave in the changing labor market,4 small
businesses are showing strong interests in o↵ering such benefits in the hope of attracting,
incentivizing, and retaining employees.5 Hence, it is critical for both policy-makers and
practitioners to understand the consequences and contingencies of employee access to paid
family leave for small, new ventures.
While state-sponsored PFL programs have been shown to encourage more use of paid fam-
ily leave (Rossin-Slater et al., 2013), which is widely recognized as beneficial to individual
workers through improved economic security (Stanczyk, 2019), maternal health (Chatterji
and Markowitz, 2008), and subsequent employment probabilities (Baum and Ruhm, 2016),
there is little empirical evidence on how these programs a↵ect businesses. On one hand,
state PFL programs are typically funded through employee payroll taxes and present no
direct costs to employers, so they on the surface are “free” for small, nascent ventures
that often lack the resources to o↵er paid family leave themselves. The relief of economic
insecurity for employees may alleviate the recruiting and retention challenges faced by en-
trepreneurial firms (Cardon and Stevens, 2004) or may even improve employee productivity
through reduced cognitive burden and stress (Kaur et al., 2019), thus leading to human
capital benefits for venture performance. On the other hand, these state PFL programs
3Joyce Beebe, “To Win the Federal Paid Family Leave Debate, Allow States to Lead the Way,” September
30, 2019, The Hill, https://thehill.com/.
4Fractl (2016). Employee Benefits Study: The Cost and Value of Employee Perks. Retrieved from
http://www.frac.tl/employee-benefits-study/.
5Tim Shaw, “Key Takeaways from BPC’s Survey of Small Business Views on Paid Family Leave,” June
24, 2019, Bipartisan Policy Center, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/.
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may become an unintended burden for emerging companies that face unique challenges in
managing employee leave given their small sta↵ sizes,6 both in terms of finding replacement
workers timely and dealing with loss in productivity from employing temporary substitutes,
thus negatively impacting venture performance when employees become more likely to take
family leave.
Given these opposing consequences, this study aims to empirically estimate the average
e↵ect of workers’ access to state-sponsored paid family leave on new venture performance
and explore its contingencies. I do so by exploiting a natural experiment, a state PFL
program introduced in 2009 that entitles workers in New Jersey to take up to six weeks of
paid family leave,7 and by focusing on a longitudinal panel (2004-2011) of newly formed
businesses from the Kau↵man Firm Survey (Farhat and Robb, 2014).
Using a di↵erence-in-di↵erences design, I find that the average e↵ect of the state PFL pro-
gram on the profitability of new ventures is negative. This e↵ect is robust both when
New Jersey is compared to all other states and when New Jersey is compared only to
Pennsylvania—a common comparison state for New Jersey in di↵erence-in-di↵erences anal-
yses (Card and Krueger, 2000; Card and Levine, 2000). I then evaluate two potential
mechanisms to explain the negative e↵ect—the lack of resources to hire new worker substi-
tutes and the lack of flexibility in sta ng—that a↵ect firms’ ability to deal with shocks to
their human capital stock. I find evidence for both. Firms in financial stress, which prevents
them from hiring new workers, are more negatively a↵ected by the PFL program than those
in good financial standing. Moreover, firms that rely heavily on the availability of existing
employees (i.e., are inflexible in their sta ng), either because they have fewer employees
or because they are service-based, are more negatively a↵ected than larger, product-based
firms. These findings for the average nascent firm do not, however, apply to ventures in
high-tech industries or with patents, as the results show a positive e↵ect of the state PFL
6Benjamin Romano, “Washington’s New Paid-Leave Law Does Not Protect Jobs of Workers at Small
Firms,” December 17, 2019, The Seattle Times, https://www.seattletimes.com/.
7New Jersey was the second state to enact a PFL program; the first was California in 2004.
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program on venture profitability for those innovative ventures.
Overall, this study makes several contributions. First, it presents a new consideration for
the research on institutional theory and strategic management (Zhao et al., 2017), and
specifically in the context of entrepreneurship (Bruton et al., 2010; Tolbert et al., 2011).
Whereas past work has focused on how institutional factors such as legal environment,
culture, and industry tradition influence venture formation (e.g., Eberhart et al., 2017;
Eesley, 2016; Eesley et al., 2016) and subsequent founder decisions (e.g., Baron et al., 1999;
Burton and Beckman, 2007), my research identifies another institutional channel—social
safety nets for employees—that a↵ects venture performance post the founding stage due to
implications for human capital management. Second, this paper contributes to the research
on entrepreneurship and strategic human capital (Campbell et al., 2012b; Carnahan et al.,
2012; Chatterji and Patro, 2014) by shedding light on when better worker benefits may lead
to financial gains for ventures. Specifically, I show that ventures with su cient financial
resources and sta ng flexibility to manage employee leave are more likely to make profits
when their employees have better access to paid family leave. Lastly, my findings have
important policy and practitioner implications, given the ongoing debate on paid family
leave regulation and human resource trends in the changing labor market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional context: state-
sponsored PFL programs. Section 3 outlines the theoretical background for considering the
impact of state PFL programs on new ventures. Section 4 describes the data and empirical
strategy. Section 5 presents the main results and tests of mechanisms. Section 6 concludes
by discussing implications and limitations.
2.2. State-Sponsored Paid Family Leave Programs
The foundations of the modern social safety nets in the United States began during the 1930s
under the New Deal administration of Roosevelt, but it was not until the 1970s that work
requirements were first added for welfare recipients to emphasize the importance of work
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and reward working (Nightingale and Holcomb, 2003). In the following two decades, work
has gradually become the core of the U.S. social safety net, and much legal consideration
has been given to programs and regulations that will improve work conditions and work-
based employee benefits (Nelson, 1991). One of those considerations is work-family balance.
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 specifically focused on the need for
working individuals to balance work and family responsibilities by mandating employers
to provide eligible employees with up to 12 weeks of job-protected leave for family and
medical reasons.8 Yet, the family leave granted by the law is unpaid and does not apply
to employees at small businesses or those with short work tenure, for instance, at nascent
ventures.
Lacking a national mandate for paid family leave in the United States, several states have
made their own attempts to address this issue. California was the first state to enact its
Paid Family Leave (PFL) program, which took e↵ect in 2004 and o↵ered wage replacements
for individuals who took time o↵ work to care for a seriously ill family member or bond with
a new minor child. New Jersey then implemented a similar PFL program that took e↵ect
in 2009. The next decade witnessed rapidly growing state-level interest—Rhode Island,
New York, and Washington started paying out benefits through their PFL programs in
2014, 2018, and 2020 respectively; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Oregon, and the District
of Columbia have all enacted their own versions of PFL programs that will soon go into
e↵ect. More states are now considering PFL legislation, and the possibility of a federal
paid family leave initiative has been discussed.9 For workers at small and nascent ventures
who typically lack access to standardized employer-provided paid family leave, state-level
8FMLA applies to all public agencies, all public and private elementary and secondary schools, and
companies with 50 or more employees. Employees are eligible for leave if they have worked for their employer
at least 12 months, at least 1,250 hours over the past 12 months, and work at a location where the company
employs 50 or more employees within 75 miles. Whether an employee has worked the minimum 1,250 hours
of service is determined according to FLSA principles for determining compensable hours or work. Eligible
reasons include (i) birth and care of the newborn child of an employee, (ii) placement with the employee of a
child for adoption or foster care, (iii) to care for an immediate family member (i.e., spouse, child, or parent)
with a serious health condition, or (iv) to take medical leave when the employee is unable to work because
of a serious health condition.
9Stephen Miller, “States Impose Paid Family Leave as Congress Weighs National Policy,” March 21,
2019, Society for Human Resource Management, https://www.shrm.org/.
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legislative e↵orts are meaningful, as the PFL benefits may be their only source of income
during family leave.
This paper focuses on the 2009 New Jersey Paid Family Leave (PFL) program given the
Kau↵man Firm Survey (KFS) timeframe (2004-2011). The program was signed into law on
May 2, 2008 and took e↵ect on July 1, 2009. Specifically, eligible employees could receive up
to six weeks of paid family leave in a year in the form of partial wage replacements to care
for an ill relative or bond with a new child.10 The weekly benefit payments equal two-thirds
of the employee’s average weekly wage, up to a maximum benefit cap per week.11 This
program, which covers nearly all public and private employees, including nearly all part-
time workers, is financed entirely by mandated employee payroll deductions; in other words,
employers make no contribution. In its first year of commencement, the New Jersey PFL
program approved 14,127 claims for family leaves, and it approved over 300,000 claims up
until 2018.12 Recently, a new bill was signed into law that would double the New Jersey PFL
benefits period to 12 weeks (or 56 days for intermittent leave) and increase the maximum
weekly payment to $842, beginning July 2021. While the New Jersey PFL has received
widespread favorable public opinion from working individuals (White et al., 2013), there is
no consensus about its business implications, as opponents of the program are particularly
worried about costs for employers to find replacement workers.13
In what follows, I review the past literature that sheds light on the e↵ect of a PFL social
safety program for employees on the performance of nascent ventures.
10Employees are eligible for paid leave if they have worked for their employer for 20 base weeks, and earned
at least 1,000 times the New Jersey minimum wage during that time.
11The exact benefit cap was $524 in 2009 and has been adjusted every year since then. The amount is
indexed to the average wage of workers in the state.
12New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Temporary Disability and
Family Leave Insurance, https://myleavebenefits.nj.gov/about/stats/.
13Nicholas Pugliese and Trenton Bureau, “New Jersey Workers Could Get Twice as Much Time O↵ with
Expanded Family Leave,” February 6, 2019, northjersey.com, https://www.northjersey.com/.
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2.3. Theoretical Background
Before I discuss how employee access to state PFL programs may impact new venture
performance, it is important to understand the key characteristics of newly founded busi-
nesses that present them with unique challenges in human capital management. One major
challenge faced by nascent ventures is the absence of competitive advantages in terms of
recruiting, managing, and retaining employees. Known to have “the liabilities of newness”
(Stinchcombe, 1965), nascent firms face high risks of failure (Aldrich and Yang, 2012), lack
legitimacy as an employer organization (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Williamson et al.,
2002), and typically do not have formal HR policies or systems for managing employees
(Klaas et al., 2000). These firms also tend to not have su cient financial resources to at-
tract and incentivize employees with competitive compensation and benefits (Burton et al.,
2018; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Litwin and Phan, 2013). Another big challenge that new
firms often encounter is the lack of dynamic capability to weather unexpected, negative
shocks to their human capital stock, either due to limited financial resources (Bruderl and
Schussler, 1990) or due to the di culty in maintaining sta ng flexibility (Cardon, 2003).
On one hand, state PFL programs o↵er opportunities to nascent venture owners for miti-
gating the first human capital management challenge through improved economic security
for employees (Stanczyk, 2019), thus potentially leading to human capital benefits and a
positive e↵ect on venture performance. As workers access paid family leave, this added
layer of economic security may broaden their job choice set, allowing otherwise hesitant
workers to more confidently join and stay at new businesses that are risky, uncertain, and
less generous about compensation packages. Apart from alleviating recruiting and retention
di culties for nascent ventures, the availability of paid family leave may directly impact
employee productivity through several channels. For one, the extra source of income during
family leave may encourage employees to use family leave more comfortably (Baum and
Ruhm, 2016; Rossin-Slater et al., 2013), thus resulting in better maternal health (Chatterji
and Markowitz, 2008) and children’s health and development (Berger et al., 2005; Rossin,
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2011). The improved work-family balance and general employee well-being in turn suggest
that employees may be more likely to perform better after they return to their work (Gubler
et al., 2018; Moen et al., 2016). For another, employees may simply be more productive by
knowing that they can have access to paid family leave in the future, as a relief of economic
insecurity can reduce cognitive burden and stress and thus benefit decision-making pro-
cesses (Kaur et al., 2019). Therefore, state-sponsored paid family leave programs may have
a positive e↵ect on new venture performance through improving the hiring, productivity,
and retention of labor.
On the other hand, state PFL programs can lead to unintended human resource conse-
quences for nascent ventures due to another human capital management challenge—the
lack of dynamic capability to deal with unexpected human capital shocks—even though
these firms do not need to directly pay for the family leave themselves. Specifically, as more
employees choose to take family leave as they gain access to state PFL programs, this will
incur additional burden for small, new firms in terms of finding temporary substitutes and
managing potential turnover. Two specific mechanisms may be at play that can lead to a
negative e↵ect on organizational performance for newly founded businesses. First, nascent
ventures may not have su cient financial resources at their discretion to weather the addi-
tional costs associated with finding replacements for workers on leave. The costs associated
with hiring and training temporary workers of equal skill can far exceed those for paying
incumbent employees (Von Hippel et al., 1997), thus leading to increased human resource
expenses. Second, the small size at inception for most new firms, especially those that are
service-based, suggests that every existing employee may be irreplaceable for daily opera-
tions. Absence of any current workers may result in significant loss in productivity, even
when temporary substitutes can be found in time (Herrmann and Rocko↵, 2012), possibly
resulting in reduced revenue. Hence, state PFL programs that benefit employees can actu-
ally have a negative impact on venture employers that lack financial resources and sta ng
flexibility.
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When considering the aforementioned human capital management challenges faced by new
ventures, it is also important to distinguish startups, i.e., the technology and product-based
businesses that are growth-oriented, from other small businesses (Cardon, 2003). While
the former receive the most media attention and coverage, the latter comprise the majority
of the newly founded businesses in the United States (Goldschlag and Miranda, 2016) and
are more likely to reap human capital benefits from the state PFL programs through the
additional layer of economic security for their high proportion of middle- and low-income
workers who do not have access to employer-provided paid family leave (Nyström, 2019).
On the flip side, these non-technology/product-based businesses are also more likely to
encounter financial constraints and su↵er from temporary loss of sta↵, thus being subject
to unintended human resource burden caused by state PFL programs. These two opposing
e↵ects highlight the ambiguity in predicting the overall e↵ect of state PFL programs on new
venture performance and whether the overall e↵ect di↵ers for innovative vs. non-innovative
ventures.
The goal of the empirical analyses is to first estimate the average e↵ect of state-sponsored
paid family leave for employees on the performance of new ventures and then shed light
on the underlying mechanisms by evaluating the contingencies in its e↵ect. In summary,
while possible strategic human capital benefits regarding hiring, incentivizing, and retaining
labor suggest a positive overall e↵ect on venture performance, a lack of financial resources
or sta ng flexibility to cope with employee leave points to a negative impact.
2.4. Methodology
2.4.1. Data
There are two major challenges concerning the empirical study of nascent ventures in the
context of institutional changes that a↵ect their workforce and human capital management
for employees. First, longitudinal data that track new ventures from the very beginning of
founding are rare (Reynolds and Curtin, 2007). Newly formed businesses are less visible to
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researchers and it is di cult to observe them on a large scale (Yang and Aldrich, 2012).
Consequently, entrepreneurship scholars mostly resort to registration data that only in-
clude ventures that survived long enough to be recorded or only cover a period of ventures’
lifespan (Aldrich et al., 1989; Kalleberg et al., 1990). Second, there is a lack of represen-
tative longitudinal datasets that include information on how new ventures manage their
employees. Empirical studies at the intersection of entrepreneurship and human resources
tend to concentrate on the high-tech industries, be less geographically diverse, and mostly
use cross-sectional data (Dabić et al., 2011). Other research that exploits longitudinal new
firm data across various industries and locations tends to focus on human capital within
the founding team exclusively rather than among non-founder employees (e.g., Yang et al.,
2020).
To overcome these challenges, the analyses in this paper use the panel data from the Kau↵-
man Firm Survey (KFS), the largest longitudinal study (2004-2011) of newly formed busi-
nesses in the United States (Farhat and Robb, 2014). Because no single comprehensive
national business register of newly formed businesses is available as a frame, the Dun and
Bradstreet (D&B) database was chosen as the sampling frame source for KFS. The popu-
lation of interest was stratified in the KFS data based on industrial technology level and
founder gender, and oversampled within high- and medium-tech industries. The data pro-
vide a single-cohort panel that tracks the same group of businesses from a common starting
point (birth in 2004). The definition of a new business is a business that started as an
independent business, through the purchase of an existing business, or by the purchase of
a franchise in the 2004 calendar year in the United States. A wide range of time-varying
variables are included in the data to indicate the human resource practices adopted as well
as measures with respect to human resource expenses.
I restrict the sample to firms with non-missing information on location, industry, and the
total number of employees. Firms that changed their state location during the sampling
timeframe or had been merged or sold are excluded. Firms that do not have any employees
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are further excluded. The final sample consists of 11,544 firm-year observations for 2,496
unique firms covering 50 states (as well as Washington, D.C.) and 25 economic sectors
(including 441 NAICS industries).
2.4.2. Variables
The main dependent variable for evaluating venture performance is whether a business has
profits or not in a given year. I focus on financial performance due to the heterogeneity
in venture types and industries,14 and specifically consider profitability, as it is a common
measure of venture performance in the strategy and entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Delios
and Beamish, 2001; Vanacker et al., 2017)—the ability to earn profits requires the firm not
only to create value, but also to capture the value it creates (Cool and Schendel, 1988)
and thus is directly related to the firm’s competitive advantage. The choice of a binary
measure is due to the concern that profit amounts may be subject to potential distortions
as a result of di↵erent accounting procedures (McGee et al., 1995). For simplicity, the
dependent variable, Has Profits, takes value 1 if the business has profits greater than or
equal to zero in a given year and 0 otherwise. All the results remain unchanged if break-even
cases (4.4% of the data) are excluded.
The main independent variable is the post-treatment dummy, Treatment⇥Post, or in other
words, the interaction between Treatment and Post, where Treatment takes value 1 for firms
in New Jersey and 0 otherwise, and Post takes value 1 for observations post the start of the
New Jersey PFL program (i.e., from 2009 onwards) and 0 otherwise. A parsimonious set of
time-varying variables are included to control for other factors that can directly impact firm
profitability, including a firm’s financial capital (Equity Injection, i.e., the amount of dollars
injected into the business), human capital (Firm Size, i.e., the total number of employees),
and human capital management practices that can a↵ect the productivity of its human
capital pool. The practice variables include Paid Vacation, Paid Sick Leave, Health Plan,
14For instance, service- vs. product-based ventures may have di↵erent needs for employment growth; high-
tech vs. non-high-tech ventures have di↵erent needs for innovation; it is also di cult to have a consistent
measure of labor productivity across di↵erent industries.
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Retirement Plan, Stock Ownership, Bonus Plan, Tuition Reimbursement, and Flex Time
or Job Sharing, which are all binary and indicate whether a firm o↵ers the corresponding
benefit to employees.
To understand the underlying mechanisms, I decompose profitability into its key compo-
nents to examine how the state PFL impacts venture revenue and expenses. Revenue
represents the total money received from sales of goods, services, or intellectual property
in a given year. Expenses in a given year are separated into Payroll Expenses, which in-
cludes all payments to full-and part-time employees such as wages, salaries, and benefits,
and Non-Payroll Expenses, which includes all other business expenses.
Several additional variables of pre-treatment firm characteristics are considered to evaluate
the contingencies in the e↵ect of state PFL on profits. First, I define Average Financial
Stress Score Pre-Treatment to be the pre-treatment average of a firm’s annual financial
stress score from the Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) database and use it as a proxy for the
firm’s financial resources. The D&B financial stress score predicts a business’s likelihood
of experiencing financial stress over the next 12-month period, and its value ranges from 1
to 100.15 A high score indicates good financial standing and a lower probability of failure.
Second, I consider two variables that would impact how reliant a firm is on its existing em-
ployees, Average Firm Size Pre-Treatment (the pre-treatment average of the total number
of employees) and Service Firm (a binary indicator of whether the firm is service-based
vs. product-based). Small firms and those service-based firms that typically remain small
are less flexible in terms of sta ng than large, product-based firms (Cardon, 2003). Third,
to clearly distinguish the innovative and high-growth technology startups from other small
businesses that are more likely to recruit middle-/low-income workers and provide few
benefits, I create a binary variable, High-Tech Firm, to indicate whether a firm is in a high-
technology industry and a binary variable, Patent Firm, to indicate whether a firm has any
15Dun & Bradstreet defines a financially stressed company as one that obtains legal relief from creditors,
ceases operations with debts outstanding, goes into receivership or reorganization, or makes an arrangement
for the benefit of creditors over the next 12-month period.
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patents pre-treatment.
As is common in the literature, I use the natural logarithm of a number of measures that
are more subject to the impact of outliers (Equity Injection, Revenue, Payroll Expenses, and
Non-Payroll Expenses), calculated as log(x+0.01) where x represents the variable. Table
7 provides the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analyses at the firm-
year level. As can be seen, these new ventures are financially constrained, as the median
level of equity injection is 0 dollars (exp(-4.61)) and the average financial stress score pre-
treatment is relatively low (35.32 out of 100). They are small, with an average number
of five employees, and are mostly service-based firms (80%). The median firm does not
provide any typical benefits to employees. While the KFS population is oversampled within
high-tech industries, high-tech firms and firms with patents still account for only 18% and
7%, respectively, of the observations,16 confirming that most new ventures are not the





The analyses adopt a di↵erence-in-di↵erences design using ordinary least squares regressions
on the firm-year panel data. The first di↵erence is determined by Treatment, i.e., in vs. out
of New Jersey, and the second di↵erence is determined by Post, i.e., before vs. after 2009.
The main specification is as follows:
Has Profits i,t =  0 +  1Treatment i ⇥ Post t + ↵i +  t +   0Xi,t + ✏i,t
16At the firm level, high-tech firms account for 16% of the firms in the sample and firms with patents
account for 6% of the firms in the sample.
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where i indexes firms; t indexes years; ↵i and  t are firm and year fixed e↵ects respectively;
X is the vector of control variables; ✏ is the error term. In all specifications, standard errors
are clustered at the state level to account for potential serial correlation of observations
within the same state (Bertrand et al., 2004). The coe cient of interest is  1, which
captures the change in Has Profits following the start of the New Jersey PFL program.
Alternative dependent variables, including revenue (logged), payroll expenses (logged), and
non-payroll expenses (logged), are used in regressions that decompose venture profitability.
To further evaluate the contingencies of the average e↵ect, a triple-di↵erence strategy is
adopted and the following regression is estimated:
Has Profits i,t =  0 +  1Treatment i ⇥ Post t +  2hi ⇥ Post t +  3hi ⇥ Treatment i ⇥ Post t
+ ↵i +  t +  
0Xi,t + ✏i,t
where h is a pre-treatment firm characteristic, e.g., Average Financial Stress Score Pre-
Treatment, Average Firm Size Pre-Treatment, Service Firm, High-Tech Firm, or Patent
Firm. The coe cient of interest is  3, which captures the heterogeneous e↵ects of the state
PFL program based on venture characteristics.
2.5. Results
2.5.1. Main Results
Table 9 reports the main results for the e↵ect of New Jersey’s PFL program on venture
profitability. Across all specifications, the PFL program consistently has a statistically
significant negative e↵ect on new ventures’ probability of having profits. As indicated by the
estimated coe cients for Treatment⇥ Post, controlling for di↵erences in financial capital,
human capital, and human capital management practices, new ventures whose workers have
access to state-sponsored paid family leave due to the program experience a 7% decrease in
the likelihood of having profits.
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——————–Insert Table 9——————–
Figure 13 suggestively illustrates this negative e↵ect by displaying graphically the mean
of Has Profits for treated and untreated ventures, respectively. The vertical line denotes
the timing of the start of the New Jersey PFL program. There is a generally upward time
trend as the sample consists of the same group of businesses newly formed in 2004, and the
more profitable businesses are more likely to survive and remain in the sample over time.
The dip post 2006 is likely caused by the 2007-2008 financial crisis, but the upward trend
is restored post 2008, implying that the negative e↵ect observed post 2009 on New Jersey
ventures relative to other ventures is not a result of the crisis. In fact, while New Jersey
ventures are more likely to be profitable than ventures in other states, the gap between the
two lines in Figure 13 starts to shrink immediately following 2009, as the slope becomes
flatter for treated ventures but steeper for untreated ventures.
——————–Insert Figure 13——————–
Overall, there is a negative average e↵ect of state-sponsored paid family leave for employees
on the profitability of new ventures, which does not appear to coincide with a possible
negative e↵ect of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. A fully saturated model with year-specific
treatment e↵ects is also considered to visually check the pre-trend prior to treatment (e.g.,
Castellaneta et al., 2020, Figures 2-4), available upon request. Similar to the pattern
displayed by Figure 13, there is an upward pre-trend from 2008 to 2009, which is reverted
downwards post the start of the New Jersey PFL program.
2.5.2. Robustness Checks
A number of robustness checks are conducted in Table 10 to verify the negative main
e↵ect. First, to address the concern that treated firms (those in New Jersey) may not
be comparable to untreated firms (those outside New Jersey) and that treated firms only
comprise a small portion of the sample (3%), Model 1 re-evaluates the e↵ect of the New
Jersey PFL program by comparing the profitability of treated ventures with those ventures
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in an adjacent state, Pennsylvania. The choice of Pennsylvania as a comparison state for
New Jersey in di↵erence-in-di↵erences analyses is common in the economics literature (Card
and Krueger, 2000; Card and Levine, 2000). After restricting the sample to firms in New
Jersey or Pennsylvania, treated firms account for 45% of the data, and the negative e↵ect
on venture profitability doubles.
Second, because California is another state (and the only other state) that has a state-
sponsored PFL program (started in 2004) during the data timeframe, it is possible that
the observed main e↵ect also captures some of the di↵erence between the long-term e↵ects
and the short-term e↵ects of state PFL programs. Model 2 thus excludes observations for
ventures in California and a robust negative e↵ect is found.
Third, due to the nascent nature of these ventures, some of them consist of founders exclu-
sively. While founder-employees can also opt in for the state PFL coverage, these individuals
are fundamentally di↵erent from the joiner-employees (Roach and Sauermann, 2015). For
instance, founders may be less likely to take family leave as they are the key decision makers
for the day-to-day business operation.17 Therefore, Model 3 excludes the cases where all the
employees are founder-employees and shows a robust negative e↵ect that is also stronger.
Fourth, considering the heterogeneity in venture industry, Model 4 includes industry fixed
e↵ects based on the 5-digit NAICS industry code and shows consistent results.
——————–Insert Table 10——————–
The rest of the analyses examine the contingencies in this robust negative e↵ect of the
state PFL program on venture profitability and shed light on the possible contributing
mechanisms.
17Lottie O’Conor, “Back to Work Within a Week: Maternity Leave When You’re Self-Employed,” De-
cember 7, 2017, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/.
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2.5.3. Mechanisms
The negative main e↵ect of the state PFL program on venture profitability suggests that
the unintended human resource consequences outweigh the potential human capital bene-
fits. To further verify this point, I decompose profitability into its key components—revenue
and expenses. On one hand, if nascent ventures experience gains in hiring, incentivizing,
and retaining employees as a result of additional worker social safety net, they should see
improved labor productivity and possibly higher revenue. On the other hand, if ventures
encounter extra burden in managing more employee leave, they should see increased human
resource expenses when employee leave incurs additional costs for employers to find replace-
ment workers (Von Hippel et al., 1997), or even a reduction in revenue when employee leave
leads to loss in firm productivity (Herrmann and Rocko↵, 2012). Therefore, the overall
negative e↵ect may either come from a decrease in revenue or from an increase in expenses.
Table 11 presents the findings from profits decomposition. Treated ventures experience a
76.5% loss in revenue post the start of the New Jersey PFL program, as shown in Model
1, as well as a 93.7% spike in payroll expenses, as shown in Model 2, both contributing to
lower profits. The program, however, does not appear to a↵ect other non-payroll expenses,
as shown in Model 3, confirming that the program does not coincide with other market
changes in the costs of materials, rent, interests on loans, machinery or equipment, etc.
These results suggest that employee access to state-sponsored paid family leave does not
yield su cient human capital benefits and are most consistent with the reasoning that a
negative e↵ect on profits is induced through two channels at the same time—increased
costs associated with worker replacement and loss in labor productivity due to temporary
employee leave.
——————–Insert Table 11——————–
The prospects of higher human resource costs can be particularly worrisome for nascent
ventures because they are financially constrained, hindering their ability to hire new worker
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substitutes in a timely manner (Bruderl and Schussler, 1990). The possibility of loss in
productivity due to employee leave can also loom large for ventures that are small at incep-
tion and rely more heavily on incumbent employees since it is di cult for them to maintain
flexibility in sta ng (Cardon, 2003). In Table 12, I specifically test these two characteristics
of nascent ventures—the lack of financial resources and the lack of sta ng flexibility—as
the operating mechanisms underlying the negative main e↵ect of the state PFL program on
venture profitability.
Availability of financial resources. First, Model 1 of Table 12 examines how the e↵ect of
treatment is contingent on the financial standing of the venture, which is used as a proxy for
the availability of financial resources. While the main treatment e↵ect is negative, ventures
in good financial standing are less likely to be impacted negatively, as is indicated by the
positive estimated coe cient for the triple-di↵erence term, Average Financial Stress Score
Pre-Treatment ⇥ Treatment⇥ Post. In other words, new ventures that are more subject
to financial resource constraint and stress are more negatively impacted by the state PFL
program. Specifically, treated ventures that have an average pre-treatment financial stress
score above 49.4 = 0.247/0.005, which are about 25% of the venture population, in fact are
more likely to make profits after their employees have access to state-sponsored paid family
leave.
Sta ng flexibility. I also investigate how the treatment e↵ect on profitability is contin-
gent on factors that a↵ect ventures’ sta ng flexibility. Specifically, firm size and venture
business type are evaluated. Model 2 shows that large firms are less negatively impacted by
the treatment than small firms, as is indicated by the positive estimated coe cient for the
triple-di↵erence term, Average Firm Size Pre-Treatment ⇥ Treatment ⇥ Post. For firms
with a total of more than 18.6 = 0.093/0.005 employees, the treatment e↵ect becomes pos-
itive, though this is rarely the case for nascent ventures. Model 3 shows the di↵erential
treatment e↵ects for service-based versus product-based firms. While product-based firms
do not appear to be directly a↵ected by treatment, service-based firms experience a 10%
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decrease in the likelihood of making profits, as is indicated by the estimated coe cient
for the triple-di↵erence term, Service Firm ⇥ Treatment ⇥ Post. These two findings sug-
gest that firms that are more reliant on existing employees, for instance, small firms and
service-based firms, are more negatively impacted as their employees start to have access
to state-sponsored paid family leave.
——————–Insert Table 12——————–
These contingencies based on venture characteristics, including financial standing, firm
size, and venture business type, highlight the heterogeneous treatment e↵ects of the state
PFL program and provide suggestive evidence for multiple mechanisms at play. For one
thing, the lack of financial resources implies that new ventures are particularly burdened
with increased costs associated with worker replacement. For another, the lack of sta ng
flexibility indicates greater loss in productivity due to temporary employee leave.
2.5.4. Innovative Ventures
In the end, I distinguish innovative, high-growth startups from other nascent, small busi-
nesses that are not innovation- and growth-driven. While startups receive considerable
media coverage and public attention, they constitute only a small portion of the nascent
venture population. These ventures are di↵erent from the typical new firm, especially with
respect to human capital management strategy (Cardon, 2003). Specifically, I define inno-
vative ventures to either be in the high-technology industries, as is indicated by High-Tech
Firm, or have patents prior to treatment, as is indicated by Patent Firm. They should
be less likely to be subject to the aforementioned mechanisms of a negative e↵ect due to
potential employee family leave since they are more likely to be in better financial standing,
be larger at inception, and be product-based, according to t tests based on these venture
characteristics.
Table 13 shows the results for comparing the e↵ect of the New Jersey PFL program on
innovative ventures with its e↵ect on other businesses. Across the two models, the state
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PFL program has a robust and strong negative baseline e↵ect on non-innovative ventures (a
8.8%-13.7% decrease in the likelihood of having profits). For innovative ventures, however,
there is an increase in the likelihood of having profits following treatment, ranging from
4.9% = 0.186   0.137 for high-tech firms to 5.3% = 1.141   0.088 for firms with patents.
While it might be argued that the high-skilled employees at innovative ventures should not
be impacted by the state PFL program, either because they are well paid and do not care
about the relatively small capped wage recovery or because they are more work-centric and
are less likely to take family leave, these findings suggest that there is a non-negligible e↵ect,
and innovative businesses actually reap benefits from this additional layer of employee social
safety net. In other words, the e↵ect of the state PFL program on venture profitability is
asymmetric—it negatively impacts those that are already strained but positively a↵ects
those that are already blooming.
——————–Insert Table 13——————–
2.6. Discussion and Conclusion
Institutional environments have been found to have considerable impacts on firms (Zhao
et al., 2017) and particularly on entrepreneurial ventures (Bruton et al., 2010; Tolbert et al.,
2011). Ample scholarship has examined how institutional channels including legislation,
culture, and industry tradition can influence venture formation and founder decisions. But
little research has paid attention to those institutional factors that a↵ect employees working
at new ventures and thus have significant implications for venture performance post the
founding stage. A strand of work has started to highlight the importance of connecting
employment topics to the study of entrepreneurship (Burton et al., 2019). This paper sheds
light on how social safety nets for workers can have consequences for the profitability of
nascent businesses by studying the case of the New Jersey Paid Family Leave program.
While state-sponsored paid family leave is generally known to be beneficial to individual
workers, its overall e↵ect on employers is ambiguous due to the tension between the potential
human capital gains from a more productive workforce and the unintended human resource
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burden from replacing workers on leave.
Studying a large cohort of newly formed businesses, I find that the average e↵ect of state
PFL program on venture profitability is negative, which comes from both an increase in
payroll expenses and a decrease in revenue. Further analyses generate findings that are
consistent with two explanations of the unique human capital management challenges faced
by nascent, small ventures—these ventures lack the financial resources to cope with the
additional costs for finding temporary workers and they lack the sta ng flexibility to absorb
the loss in productivity. These results, however, do not apply to innovative ventures that
constitute a small portion of the business sample, as they appear to be more likely to make
profits post treatment.
Policy implications
These findings are extremely meaningful amidst ongoing policy debate over the expansion of
state paid family leave programs and the possibility of a federal paid family leave initiative.
The asymmetric e↵ects found for innovative versus non-innovative ventures highlight the
importance for policy-makers to recognize the heterogeneity among nascent firms. While
researchers and the media typically focus on the innovative startups when discussing en-
trepreneurship, the often neglected majority of new businesses are in fact non-innovative
and can be extremely vulnerable to institutional changes and thus are more likely to bear
the burden of unintended consequences.
Paradoxically, even though social safety net programs like state PFL programs are designed
to reduce economic inequality in the working population, they may backfire and widen
the income inequality between certain groups of workers. For instance, if the financially
strained businesses are negatively impacted while the resource-abundant businesses are pos-
itively a↵ected, the inequality between high-income and low-income workers would worsen.
Moreover, in the case of state PFL programs, if most new firms are struggling when em-
ployees access paid family leave, this may exacerbate the gender wage gap for low-income
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workers as employers avoid hiring women in their child-bearing years.
Therefore, policy-makers should actively evaluate the business implications in designing
social safety net programs pertaining to workers. Cash subsidies or tax relief for employers
may be bundled with state-sponsored benefits for employees to protect not only the vast
majority of new, small businesses but also the disadvantaged workers at these ventures.
Managerial implications
It is important for managers to understand the impacts of employees’ access to paid family
leave on businesses either to form dynamic capabilities to weather external changes or
to reinforce competitive advantages through human capital management. For one, new
ventures that are particularly vulnerable to human capital shocks as a result of institutional
policy changes should develop contingency plans for possible employee leave, even though
such human resource considerations are typically not a priority for them. For instance, these
ventures may establish reliable channels for finding substitute workers, locate outsourcing
partners in advance, develop internal training and reward systems that encourage employees
to acquire skills for multiple roles, etc.
For another, ventures with more financial resources and sta ng flexibility, especially those
high-growth and product-based innovative ventures, may consider even better employer-
provided paid family leave benefits for employees after estimating the additional costs of
doing so, as they appear to experience a positive e↵ect on profitability when paid family
leave becomes accessible to their employees. In these cases, better paid leave firm policy
that promotes work flexibility and work-family balance may lead to human capital bene-
fits through attracting, incentivizing, and retaining talent, hence leading to higher labor
e ciency and firm productivity.
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Limitations and directions for future research
This study highlights a new direction for entrepreneurship research by connecting employee
social safety nets with venture performance. A few limitations are worth noting. First,
the focus of this paper is on venture profitability, a short-term performance measure that
indicates a firm’s ability to create and capture value. This outcome variable choice allows
me to examine a wide range of ventures that may di↵er significantly in terms of type,
industry, objective, etc. However, a caveat is that the results can be subject to survival
bias, as only the surviving venture-year observations are included in the sample. The
estimated negative e↵ect of the state PFL program in this paper is thus likely understated
if the program also leads to more business closures for treated ventures. Future research
can extend this line of study by considering other outcome measures, such as long-term
survival and innovation. For instance, analyses addressing di↵erential venture survival rates
can devote more attention to the marginal businesses that are particularly prone to fail;
exploring innovation outcomes such as patent counts may shed light on those ventures that
are more likely to benefit from improved social safety nets for employees.
Second, the discussion of the possible operating mechanisms is hinged on firm-level patterns
since employee-level data are not observed. Future research would ideally look at how
the uncovered e↵ects are influenced by actual leave use and employee characteristics that
reflect replacement costs and di culties such as wage level, skill sets, work tenure, etc.
Furthermore, scholars can explicitly study how similar social safety net programs a↵ect
the recruitment, performance, and retention of workers with more detailed employee data.
In particular, the mechanisms for potential human capital gains are not the focus of this
paper; because an overall negative e↵ect is found, the e↵orts are spent on exploring the
mechanisms leading to negative impacts on venture profitability. For instance, it is unclear
why innovative ventures benefit from the state PFL program. Employees at innovative
ventures may be more productive on the job due to better physical and mental health from
taking more family leave or due to reduced cognitive burden of expected economic insecurity
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during future family leave. Future work in other empirically settings can elaborate on the
other side of the asymmetry and unpack the specific channels leading up to a positive e↵ect.
Lastly, this paper focuses on one specific type of social safety net program for employees
through a single natural experiment. More work can be done to extend this line of inquiry
through examining a wider range of social safety net programs that a↵ect worker benefits
and labor market conditions, such as staggered reforms for improving worker access to
health insurance in multiple states and the introduction of state-level business tax credit
for employers that provide employee-friendly benefits.
Conclusion
Overall, the findings in this study highlight that social safety nets that benefit workers may
have unintended negative consequences for new businesses, as ventures di↵er in terms of
their ability to absorb such impacts. I hope that these results can encourage more work that
combines institutional perspectives, employment topics, and human resource considerations
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Figure 13: Proportion of New Ventures with Profits by Treatment. This figure
shows the proportion of new ventures that have profits over time by treatment. The x-
axis indicates year, and the y-axis shows the average of Has Profits across all ventures.
The dotted line shows the proportion over time for treated ventures, i.e., ventures in New
Jersey; the solid line shows the proportion over time for untreated ventures, i.e., ventures
outside New Jersey. The vertical line highlights the timing of the start of the New Jersey
PFL program.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics. This table presents the summary statistics for the sample.
Due to data confidentiality, minimum and maximum values are not reported. Binary vari-
ables are indicated with (0/1). Logarithm refers to the natural logarithm of the variable
plus 0.01. The human resource practices refer to those for full-time employees.
VARIABLE COUNT MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV.
Has Profits (0/1) 11,444 0.64 1.00 0.48
Treatment (Location in New Jersey, 0/1) 11,544 0.03 0.00 0.17
Equity Injection ($, Logged) 11,323 1.16 -4.61 6.97
Firm Size 11,544 5.08 2.00 10.40
Paid Vacation (0/1) 9,151 0.42 0.00 0.49
Paid Sick Leave (0/1) 9,152 0.34 0.00 0.47
Health Plan (0/1) 9,165 0.35 0.00 0.48
Retirement Plan (0/1) 9,163 0.18 0.00 0.38
Stock Ownership (0/1) 9,132 0.07 0.00 0.25
Bonus Plan (0/1) 9,141 0.27 0.00 0.44
Tuition Reimbursement (0/1) 9,148 0.10 0.00 0.30
Flex Time or Job Sharing (0/1) 9,155 0.41 0.00 0.49
Revenue ($, Logged) 11,310 8.84 11.29 6.44
Payroll Expenses ($, Logged) 11,432 4.71 9.21 7.76
Non-Payroll Expenses ($, Logged) 10,887 9.58 10.70 4.49
Average Financial Stress Score Pre-Treatment 11,276 35.32 34.63 18.01
Average Firm Size Pre-Treatment 11,496 4.80 2.40 7.79
Service Firm (0/1) 11,544 0.80 1.00 0.40
High-Tech Firm (0/1) 11,544 0.18 0.00 0.38
Patent Firm (0/1) 11,491 0.07 0.00 0.26
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Table 8: Correlations. This table presents the pairwise correlations for the sample. Binary
variables are indicated with (0/1). Logarithm refers to the natural logarithm of the variable
plus 0.01. The human resource practices refer to those for full-time employees.
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Has Profits (0/1) 1.00
2. Treatment (Location in New Jersey, 0/1) 0.03 1.00
3. Equity Injection ($, Logged) -0.31 -0.04 1.00
4. Firm Size 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 1.00
5 . Paid Vacation (0/1) 0.12 -0.02 -0.07 0.28 1.00
6. Paid Sick Leave (0/1) 0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.22 0.75 1.00
7. Health Plan (0/1) 0.13 0.01 -0.04 0.29 0.49 0.42 1.00
8. Retirement Plan (0/1) 0.15 0.01 -0.09 0.24 0.34 0.31 0.39 1.00
9. Stock Ownership (0/1) -0.05 -0.01 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 1.00
10. Bonus Plan (0/1) 0.15 -0.01 -0.07 0.25 0.44 0.38 0.33 0.27 0.09 1.00
11. Tuition Reimbursement (0/1) 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.16 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.09 0.29
12. Flex Time or Job Sharing (0/1) 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.30 0.29 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.26
13. Revenue ($, Logged) 0.27 0.01 -0.17 0.19 0.30 0.25 0.26 0.20 0.00 0.22
14. Payroll Expenses ($, Logged) 0.15 0.00 -0.09 0.31 0.48 0.38 0.37 0.27 0.02 0.34
15. Non-Payroll Expenses ($, Logged) 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.19 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.17 0.07 0.18
16. Average Financial Stress Score Pre-Treatment 0.10 -0.01 -0.07 0.11 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.04 0.13
17. Average Firm Size Pre-Treatment 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 0.81 0.30 0.21 0.29 0.21 0.06 0.25
18. Service Firm (0/1) 0.09 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 -0.10 0.01
19. High-Tech Firm (0/1) 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.04
20. Patent Firm (0/1) -0.09 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.29 0.01
VARIABLE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
11. Tuition Reimbursement (0/1) 1.00
12. Flex Time or Job Sharing (0/1) 0.18 1.00
13. Revenue ($, Logged) 0.13 0.14 1.00
14. Payroll Expenses ($, Logged) 0.16 0.23 0.39 1.00
15. Non-Payroll Expenses ($, Logged) 0.12 0.11 0.37 0.25 1.00
16. Average Financial Stress Score Pre-Treatment 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.20 0.20 1.00
17. Average Firm Size Pre-Treatment 0.15 0.07 0.18 0.32 0.20 0.14 1.00
18. Service Firm (0/1) 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 1.00
19. High-Tech Firm (0/1) 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 1.00
20. Patent Firm (0/1) 0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.12 -0.22 0.19 1.00
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Table 9: Main Results, Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences Estimates. This table presents the
main results for the e↵ect of New Jersey’s PFL program on venture profitability. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *p < 0.10 **p < 0.05
***p < 0.01.
Dependent Variable: Has Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment ⇥ Post -0.024⇤ -0.023⇤ -0.066⇤⇤⇤ -0.066⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Post 0.024⇤ -0.010
(0.012) (0.013)
Equity Injection ($, Logged) -0.010⇤⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Firm Size 0.003⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Paid Vacation 0.037 0.032
(0.023) (0.022)
Paid Sick Leave 0.004 0.003
(0.016) (0.016)
Health Plan 0.031⇤⇤ 0.027⇤
(0.015) (0.015)
Retirement Plan 0.079⇤⇤⇤ 0.075⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.020)
Stock Ownership 0.013 0.019
(0.022) (0.022)
Bonus Plan 0.061⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.014)
Tuition Reimbursement 0.038⇤ 0.041⇤
(0.022) (0.022)
Flex Time or Job Sharing 0.022⇤ 0.022⇤
(0.013) (0.013)
Constant 0.638⇤⇤⇤ 0.521⇤⇤⇤ 0.556⇤⇤⇤ 0.507⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
Firm Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E↵ects No Yes No Yes
Observations 11,444 11,444 8,794 8,794
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Table 10: Robustness Checks. This table presents the results for the robustness checks.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *p < 0.10 **p < 0.05
***p < 0.01.
Dependent Variable: Has Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Comparing Excluding Non-Founder Industry
with PA CA Employees Fixed E↵ects
Treatment ⇥ Post -0.132⇤ -0.058⇤⇤⇤ -0.077⇤⇤⇤ -0.064⇤⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Equity Injection ($, Logged) -0.009 -0.009⇤⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Size -0.001 0.003⇤ 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Paid Vacation -0.102 0.034 0.020 0.029
(0.034) (0.025) (0.020) (0.023)
Paid Sick Leave 0.108 0.000 0.001 0.007
(0.088) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Health Plan 0.133 0.021 0.028 0.030⇤
(0.040) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Retirement Plan 0.034 0.084⇤⇤⇤ 0.077⇤⇤⇤ 0.071⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Stock Ownership -0.005 0.020 0.038⇤ 0.019
(0.074) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025)
Bonus Plan 0.076 0.052⇤⇤⇤ 0.056⇤⇤⇤ 0.058⇤⇤⇤
(0.091) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Tuition Reimbursement 0.025 0.036 0.047⇤⇤ 0.050⇤⇤
(0.133) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
Flex Time or Job Sharing 0.075 0.026⇤ 0.018 0.018
(0.057) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Constant 0.533⇤⇤ 0.508⇤⇤⇤ 0.500⇤⇤⇤ 0.664⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.060)
Firm Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 586 7,852 7,879 8,794
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Table 11: Decomposing Profitability. This table presents the results for decomposing
profitability as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the state level. *p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01.
Dependent Variables:
Revenue Payroll Expenses Non-Payroll
(Logged) (Logged) Expenses (Logged)
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment ⇥ Post -0.765⇤⇤⇤ 0.937⇤⇤⇤ -0.009
(0.132) (0.147) (0.100)
Equity Injection ($, Logged) -0.004 0.003 0.008
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Firm Size 0.043⇤⇤⇤ 0.053⇤⇤⇤ 0.015⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.013) (0.007)
Paid Vacation 0.737⇤⇤⇤ 1.550⇤⇤⇤ 0.187
(0.203) (0.234) (0.251)
Paid Sick Leave 0.671⇤⇤⇤ 0.790⇤⇤⇤ 0.072
(0.223) (0.233) (0.210)
Health Plan 0.431⇤ 0.817⇤⇤⇤ 0.524⇤⇤⇤
(0.234) (0.265) (0.176)
Retirement Plan 0.313 0.058 0.293
(0.265) (0.244) (0.209)
Stock Ownership 0.311 -0.487 0.166
(0.294) (0.306) (0.215)
Bonus Plan 0.292 0.767⇤⇤⇤ -0.053
(0.178) (0.123) (0.180)
Tuition Reimbursement -0.002 0.039 0.542⇤⇤
(0.278) (0.238) (0.230)
Flex Time or Job Sharing 0.285 0.779⇤⇤⇤ 0.097
(0.174) (0.148) (0.157)
Constant 5.297⇤⇤⇤ 2.833⇤⇤⇤ 8.327⇤⇤⇤
(0.167) (0.244) (0.194)
Firm Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,714 8,775 8,277
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Table 12: Testing the Mechanisms. This table presents the results for testing the
mechanisms underlying the main negative e↵ect of state PFL program on new venture
profitability. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *p <
0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01.
Dependent Variable: Has Profits
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment ⇥ Post -0.247⇤⇤⇤ -0.093⇤⇤⇤ 0.010
(0.036) (0.012) (0.034)
Equity Injection ($, Logged) -0.009⇤⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Size 0.002⇤⇤ 0.003⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Paid Vacation 0.031 0.032 0.032
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Paid Sick Leave 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Health Plan 0.026⇤ 0.027⇤ 0.027⇤
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Retirement Plan 0.073⇤⇤⇤ 0.076⇤⇤⇤ 0.075⇤⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Stock Ownership 0.019 0.020 0.019
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Bonus Plan 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.056⇤⇤⇤ 0.056⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Tuition Reimbursement 0.046⇤⇤ 0.042⇤ 0.042⇤
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Flex Time or Job Sharing 0.022⇤ 0.022⇤ 0.022
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Average Financial Stress Score Pre-Treatment ⇥ Post 0.000
(0.001)
Average Financial Stress Score Pre-Treatment ⇥ Treatment ⇥ Post 0.005⇤⇤⇤
(0.001)
Average Firm Size Pre-Treatment ⇥ Post -0.002
(0.001)
Average Firm Size Pre-Treatment ⇥ Treatment ⇥ Post 0.005⇤⇤⇤
(0.001)
Service Firm ⇥ Post -0.033
(0.032)
Service Firm ⇥ Treatment ⇥ Post -0.101⇤⇤⇤
(0.033)
Constant 0.507⇤⇤⇤ 0.506⇤⇤⇤ 0.507⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Firm Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,628 8,770 8,794
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Table 13: Innovative Ventures. This table presents the results comparing the heteroge-
neous treatment e↵ects for innovative ventures versus other businesses. Robust standard




Treatment ⇥ Post -0.137⇤⇤⇤ -0.088⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.013)
Equity Injection ($, Logged) -0.009⇤⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Firm Size 0.002⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Paid Vacation 0.032 0.033
(0.022) (0.022)
Paid Sick Leave 0.003 0.003
(0.016) (0.016)
Health Plan 0.027⇤ 0.027⇤
(0.015) (0.015)
Retirement Plan 0.071⇤⇤⇤ 0.075⇤⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.020)
Stock Ownership 0.020 0.018
(0.022) (0.022)
Bonus Plan 0.056⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.014)
Tuition Reimbursement 0.042⇤ 0.042⇤
(0.021) (0.022)
Flex Time or Job Sharing 0.023⇤ 0.022⇤
(0.013) (0.013)
High-Tech Firm ⇥ Post 0.043
(0.034)
High-Tech Firm ⇥ Treatment ⇥ Post 0.186⇤⇤⇤
(0.035)
Patent Firm ⇥ Post 0.014
(0.048)




Firm Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Observations 8,794 8,768
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CHAPTER 3 : Inequality Aversion Across Di↵erent Payo↵s:
Presentation E↵ect of Equity Compensation
Wharton People Analytics Research Paper Competition Finalist, 2017
This chapter is based on my master’s thesis; current version is joint work with Andy Wu
Abstract
Do workers have di↵erent equality preferences depending on the type of payo↵? In startups
that typically o↵er equity compensation (i.e., stock options), the distribution of equity
compensation often di↵ers substantively from the distribution of cash salary. We design an
experimental group production game to examine how workers respond to combinations of
di↵erent distributions of equity and salary. Results suggest that workers view salary and
equity in two separate domains, and they are more inequality averse in the equity domain,
implying that firms could benefit from a compensation structure that is more equitable in
the equity portion. Furthermore, we find a presentation e↵ect underlying inequality aversion
across di↵erent payo↵s: the separation of the two domains is only triggered when equity
is shown in a di↵erent percentage form from the absolute form of salary. These results
highlight that worker preferences can be contingent on the compensation domain, and more
specifically the framing of the domain, and therefore have implications for the design of
compensation structure in organizations.
3.1. Introduction
With the rise of the gig economy and the gaining popularity of entrepreneurial exploration,
modern workers, especially the skilled ones, are demanding more from their employers other
than the traditional paycheck. To attract, incentivize, and retain talent in such a time, firms
are increasingly reliant on a combination of di↵erent payo↵s for their workers. For instance,
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a compensation package consisting of salary plus equity, which links worker compensation to
the performance of the overall firm, has become the standard when startups recruit talent.
At the same time, workers still care about how they fare in compensation relative to their
peers (Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2018), and such concerns loom greater as tech startups are
leading a trend into pay transparency.1 Workers at the low end of the scale unsurprisingly
dislike the gap in compensation (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, 1990; Clark and Oswald, 1996;
Card et al., 2012) while workers at the high end of the scale may also view compensation
inequality negatively as it may harm team cohesion (Levine, 1991).
Therefore, there is a growing need for understanding workers’ equality concerns over the
simultaneous distribution of di↵erent kinds of payo↵s. While the prior literature has em-
pirically examined how compensation inequality a↵ects work behavior, job satisfaction, and
retention (Charness and Kuhn, 2007; Card et al., 2012), following the seminal work of Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) that establish the theoretical con-
struct of inequality aversion, it remains an open question as to whether and how inequality
aversion may vary across di↵erent forms of payo↵. In this paper, we center our discussion
on two common types of compensation in the modern workplace—salary versus equity. The
decision to focus on equity and salary is both driven by the prevalence of such combina-
tions in industry practice and also grounded in the interest of the incentive literature to
compare revenue sharing schemes and fixed-payment schemes (Eriksson and Villeval, 2008;
Dohmen and Falk, 2011). We aim to shed light on two questions: Can workers have distinct
preferences for equality in equity versus equality in salary? If so, when will this happen?
Anecdotal evidence suggests that workers may be asymmetrically averse to inequality across
the two compensation domains, and firm-level compensation structures are being designed
in response to this. Consider the case of the technology sector, where compensation packages
consisting of both salary and equity are common for all workers, from management to entry-
1Tanza Loudenback, “More tech companies have stopped keeping employee salaries secret – and they’re
seeing results”, Business Insider, May 3, 2017.
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level.2 Several major technology firms—such as the online payment firm Stripe, the video
streaming service Twitch, the job search engine Indeed, and the online dating platform
eHarmony—exhibit an equality-in-equity compensation strategy, i.e., they o↵er potential
employees the same levels of equity compensation but very di↵erent salaries across di↵erent
job ranks and functions.3 Joel Spolsky, the co-founder and CEO of the technology firm Stack
Exchange, argues that equity in particular should be “split equally among everyone in the
layer,” where the layer refers to employees hired in the same cohort as opposed to founders
or investors, because “fairness, and the perception of fairness, is much more valuable than
owning a large stake.” Even when equality is preferred by employees in equity allocations, in
some cases workers may even prefer outright inequality in salary.4 Given these observations,
we suspect that workers may dislike inequality in equity ownership more than inequality in
cash salary.
We propose a behavioral theory of domain-contingent inequality aversion, where “domain”
refers to the form of the payo↵.5 Building on the general notion of inequality aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), we argue that workers dislike inequality and their preferences
may di↵er depending on the type of compensation. The established construct of inequality
aversion stems from behavioral observations that individuals are concerned about their
social standing and economic payo↵s relative to others (Bracha et al., 2015; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Marr and Thau,
2In the technology setting, compensation comparisons are less commonly drawn between recently hired
employees and early employees, and even less so between late employees and founders and investors, who
receive substantial equity shares in the firm. Social comparisons are strongest among members of an in-group
with a shared group identify (Chen and Li, 2009), and the in-group in this setting is the employees of a
similar hiring cohort. Workers also exhibit baseline social preferences towards their employers consistent
with theories of warm glow and social norms (DellaVigna et al., 2016), which suggests that recently hired
employees would be more tolerant of the large equity shares of the founders and investors who serve as the
de facto employer.
3Based upon compensation packages o↵ered by firms in 2015 on AngelList, a popular online job-posting
site for technology firms.
4Rachel Sugar, “A CEO raised his company’s minimum wage to $70,000 a year, and some employees quit
because of it,” Business Insider, July 31, 2015.
5“Domain” typically refers to the context of decision-making when it appears in the discussion of context-
dependent risk preferences (Bonem et al., 2015; Weber et al., 2002) and social preferences (Bao and Ho, 2015;
De Oliveira et al., 2009). Furthermore, Schoemaker (1990) uses the phrase “payo↵ domain” to distinguish
gains from losses in monetary outcomes. In our theory, “domain” refers to the payo↵ form, and more
specifically equity versus salary, which can be a particular context for social preference to take place.
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2014), and they prefer equality under certain circumstances. He and Villeval (2017) further
find that individuals express more inequality aversion when making proposals to the group
than when they decide in isolation, suggesting that equality preferences may di↵er depending
on the decision-making environment. Our concept of domain-contingent inequality aversion
adapts such a context-dependent view of inequality aversion and extends the basic theory
by postulating that workers view cash salary and equity compensation as distinct domains
that impact individual inequality aversion di↵erently. More specifically, we assume that
employees are more inequality-averse in the equity domain than in the salary domain.
We incorporate domain-contingent inequality aversion into a theoretical model to derive
the results for workers’ e↵ort choices. We show that inequality in equity has a negative
asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort while inequality in salary may have a positive asymmetric e↵ect
on e↵ort. The negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity distinguishes the domain-
contingent inequality aversion model from standard models of inequality aversion. We then
hypothesize over the condition when the separation of two compensation domains will be
triggered. In particular, we suspect that how equity is presented may impact whether or not
it is viewed as a distinct domain from salary. In practice, equity compensation is typically
dictated in a unique percentage form to indicate a share of ownership—a very di↵erent
format from cash salary. Research has shown that the “relative” percentage framing and
the “absolute” cash framing can make people have di↵erential subjective valuations despite
having the same underlying value (DelVecchio et al., 2007; González et al., 2016; Kleber
et al., 2016). We speculate that the distinction between equity and salary will be mitigated
if equity is presented in the same format as salary, i.e., in the common dollar unit. As a
result, we predict that domain-contingent inequality aversion is only present when equity
and salary are presented in di↵erent formats. Finally, we consider the firm-level implication
of domain-contingent inequality aversion by assuming that management takes such worker
preferences into account and optimizes the compensation strategy over the entire group of
employees. We argue that, in the presence of a negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in
equity and a positive asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in salary, the equality-in-equity strategy
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is optimal for firms with a fixed equity compensation budget.
To test our model predictions, we conduct an experiment to identify domain-contingent
inequality aversion and whether these worker preferences are driven by how equity and
salary are presented. In a within-subject design, participants experience seven scenarios
of group production with di↵erent compensation schemes reflecting varied distributions of
salary and equity. Participants can increase the probability of group success at a personal
cost. We complement the experiment with a between-subject design to test whether there
is a presentation e↵ect that drives the separation of the two compensation domains. In the
control group, participants view equity in the same format as salary, i.e., experiment points.
In the treatment group, participants view equity in a di↵erent format, i.e., as a percentage.
The only di↵erence between the two groups is the presentation of equity, mirroring the
forms that equity compensation is presented to employees in practice. Our experiment
o↵ers evidence for the existence of domain-contingent inequality aversion. We further find
a presentation e↵ect underlying inequality aversion in the two di↵erent payo↵s, as the
negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity only appears when equity is presented
di↵erently from salary in its percentage form.
This paper makes several contributions. First, we propose a behavioral theory of domain-
contingent inequality aversion, which represents a new consideration for the labor economics
and management literature on the subject of employee incentive compensation and its link
to worker and firm performance. We are the first to highlight the distinction between in-
equality in equity compensation and inequality in salary compensation. In the spirit of
Chen and Li (2009), who argue that social preferences for equality depend on the identity
of the comparison group, we argue that social preferences for equality also depend on the
domain where the inequality occurs. Second, we provide experimental results for how indi-
viduals respond to intra-group compensation distributions when di↵erent types of payo↵s
are used simultaneously. Using output share to mimic equity and flat payment to mimic
salary, we are also the first to test experimentally how compression in output share a↵ects
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individual contribution when flat payment is present and when the value of the share is
uncertain. Third, we identify a presentation e↵ect that drives the separation of domains
for equality preferences. Fourth, as equity is becoming increasingly a popular component
of compensation, our findings have practical implications, particularly for technology firms,
for the optimal allocation of equity among their workers.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents our theoretical model of domain-
contingent inequality aversion. Section 3.3 lays out the experimental design and Section 3.4
discusses the results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2. Theoretical Model
We present a model of domain-contingent inequality aversion that builds upon a standard
group production model with stochastic output and convex cost function (Nalbantian and
Schotter, 1997) but adopts a di↵erent stochastic form.6 Adapting the fairness model of
Benjamin (2015), we assume inequality aversion of the form in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
Under domain-contingency, we write distinct functions for inequality aversion in salary and
inequality aversion in equity. We employ this model to generate hypotheses that we test
experimentally.
3.2.1. Model Setup
We consider two risk-neutral7 workers i 2 {1, 2} in a firm engaged in a group task with
output Ṽ exerting e↵ort ei with homogeneous cost function C(ei) = e2i .
8 The individual
payo↵ consists of a salary xi and an equity payo↵ yi which is a share of the group output
6In contrast to Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), we adopt a stochastic form involving a binary output
that simplifies the model. Moreover, this setup links better with the treatments in our empirical experiment
by allowing us to present the subjects with a fixed number of experimental points in the case of group success
to keep treatments equivalent.
7Risk neutrality is an appropriate simplifying assumption for deriving predictions to be tested in a
laboratory setting since people are approximately risk neutral when stakes are small (as is in the lab)
according to the expected-utility theory.
8We choose this specification for model tractability and also for a convex cost function.
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V, with probability p(e1 + e2) Group “Succeeds”
0, otherwise. Group “Fails”
assuming p(e1 + e2) = k(e1 + e2) with k > 0.9 Salary is a fixed payment regardless of
the outcome of group output, which does not elicit more e↵ort from a self-interested agent
absent the introduction of social preferences. However, the equity share can a↵ect the
individual’s optimal e↵ort. The value of equity is yiṼ for share yi.
Without loss of generality, we consider the problem from the perspective of worker i = 1.
Given compensation structure x1, x2, y1, y2 and worker 2’s e↵ort choice e2, the problem




Eu(e1; e2, x1, x2, y1, y2) = p(e1 + e2) · uSuccess + [1  p(e1 + e2)] · uFailure (3.1)
where uSuccess = x1 + y1V   C(e1)  (DX +DY ), and (3.2)
uFailure = x1   C(e1) DX . (3.3)
DX represents the worker’s inequality aversion in the salary domain and has the form
DX = ↵x
⇣





max{(x1   C(e1))  (x2   C(e2)), 0}
⌘
. (3.5)
↵x is the degree of inequality aversion in salary when the worker is in a disadvantageous
position, i.e., having lower utility than the other worker in the salary domain, and  x denotes
the degree of inequality aversion in salary when the worker is in an advantageous position,
i.e., having higher utility than the other worker in the salary domain.
The variable DY represents the worker’s inequality aversion in the equity domain when the
9We choose this linear specification for model tractability.
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group “succeeds” and takes the form
DY = ↵y
⇣




max{(y1   y2)V ), 0}
⌘
. (3.6)
DY only appears when the group succeeds, as group output and value of equity is zero
when the group fails. ↵y is interpreted as the degree of inequality aversion in equity when
the worker is in a disadvantageous equity position, and  y denotes the degree of inequality
aversion in equity when the worker is in an advantageous equity position.
In the model, we assume all workers are self-interested, and thus are more inequality-averse
when they are in the disadvantageous position than when they are in the advantageous
position (↵x >  x,↵y >  y). We also assume that both disadvantageous and advantageous
workers are averse to inequality, but only to an extent: the disutility caused by inequality
cannot exceed the value of such inequality (1 > ↵x,↵y, x, y > 0). Finally, both disadvan-
tageous and advantageous workers are more averse to inequality in equity than to inequality
in salary (↵y > ↵x, y >  x).
3.2.2. Implications for the Worker
Domain-Contingent Inequality Aversion
Let the utility-maximizing e↵ort of worker i be denoted by e⇤i . Without loss of generality, we
focus on e⇤1. We first examine how the compensation package (salary and equity) of worker
1 and the package of the other worker a↵ect worker 1’s equilibrium e↵ort choice. These
are standard results and are left to the Appendix (see Propositions A.1-A.3). Following
Benjamin (2015), we derive our key results in Propositions 1-2 which predict how workers
respond to inequality in equity under di↵erent model assumptions. All proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
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Proposition 1. Optimal E↵ort Response to Inequality in Equity Under Domain-





















> 1. Relative to equality
in equity (y1 = y2 = y0), e↵ort responds more to equity cuts (y1 < y0) than to equity raises
(y1 > y0).
Inequality in equity has a negative asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort. A change in y1 a↵ects the
choice of e⇤1, and the change in the choice of e
⇤
1 in turn may a↵ect inequality aversion in
the salary domain, causing e⇤1 to readjust. By the assumption that the employee is more
inequality averse in the equity domain, we conclude the e↵ect of equity must outweigh
the e↵ect of salary. Moreover, the assumption that the worker is self-interested suggests
that disadvantageous equity positions (equity cuts) outweigh the e↵ect of advantageous
equity positions (equity raises), thus yielding Proposition 1. As we note in the proof of this





















is larger) when ↵y
or  y is larger.
The negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity, stated in Proposition 1, is a unique
result of our domain-contingent inequality aversion model. In the next proposition, we com-
pare this result with implications from a model with no inequality aversion (i.e., no inequal-
ity aversion terms at all in the utility function) and a model with non-domain-contingent
inequality aversion (i.e., no separation of salary and equity payo↵ in the inequality aversion
terms).
Proposition 2. Optimal E↵ort Response to Inequality in Equity Absent Domain-
Contingent Inequality Aversion. Let y2 = y0. Let ẽ1 be worker 1’s optimal e↵ort choice
absent inequality aversion. Let ê1 be worker 1’s optimal e↵ort choice under non-domain-






































= 1. Relative to
equality in equity (y1 = y2 = y0), e↵ort responds symmetrically to equity cuts (y1 < y0) and
equity raises (y1 > y0).
In contrast to the prediction of the domain-contingent inequality aversion model, Proposi-
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tion 2 says that models absent domain-contingent inequality aversion predict a symmetric
e↵ect of inequality in equity on e↵ort. Propositions 1 and 2 together suggest that the nega-
tive asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity is uniquely derived from the domain-contingent
inequality aversion assumption. Models without this assumption do not exhibit this e↵ect.
Therefore, we conclude that this negative asymmetric e↵ect is a unique manifestation of
domain-contingent inequality aversion. Since we hypothesize that workers have domain-
contingent inequality aversion in equity and salary, we have the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Domain-Contingent Inequality Aversion. There is a negative asym-
metric e↵ect of inequality in equity, i.e., workers respond more to equity cuts than to equity
raises.
We also derive additional results regarding how the employee responds to inequality in
salary (see Proposition A.4) and how the worker’s response to inequality in salary relates
to his response to inequality in equity (see Proposition A.5). These results are left to the
Appendix.
Separation of Domains
Furthermore, we hypothesize that the separation of the equity and the salary domains are
triggered by whether or not equity is presented in the same format as salary. In other
words, when equity is presented di↵erently from salary, it is perceived as a distinct domain
that can trigger domain-contingent inequality aversion. As a result, we are more likely to
observe the negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity. When equity is presented in
the same format as salary, workers no longer experience more inequality aversion in the eq-
uity domain and we may not observe the negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity.
Therefore, we hypothesize that domain-contingent inequality aversion, tested through the
existence of a negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity, is more likely to appear
when equity is presented di↵erently from salary.
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Hypothesis 2. Presentation E↵ect of Equity The negative asymmetric e↵ect of in-
equality in equity is more likely to occur when equity is presented in a di↵erent format from
salary.
3.2.3. Implications for the Firm
The propositions and hypotheses in Section 3.2.2 provide testable predictions for our labo-
ratory experiment and also have implications for compensation decisions. Hypothesis 1 is
particularly pertinent for a firm having a fixed employee equity pool, a situation faced by
most firms issuing equity compensation. Firms that allocate a fixed total equity to employ-
ees devise a scheme to maximizes the total e↵ort of their workers. According to Hypothesis
1, the negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity on e↵ort suggests that equitable
distribution of equity is the optimal compensation strategy. The optimal strategy of salary
compensation is less clear since firms may not set aside a fixed amount of cash for their
employees. Yet, salary dispersion may be justified when inequality in salary has a positive
asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort under conditions specified in Proposition A.4. In the presence
of a negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity and a positive asymmetric e↵ect of
inequality in salary, the equality-in-equity strategy (same equity but di↵erent salary) is the
optimal strategy for firms.10 According to Hypothesis 2, such a negative asymmetric e↵ect
would more likely be present when equity is presented in its distinct form which suggests
our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Total Group E↵ort. Equality in equity is more likely to induce the highest
total group e↵ort when equity is presented in a di↵erent format from salary.
Moreover, while our model considers a two-worker case, the implications for equity com-
pensation can be easily extended to any firm with a fixed employee equity pool. The case
of companies consisting of two worker types of equal numbers is clearly a direct extension
10The current version of this paper focuses on predictions for workers’ e↵ort choices since our lab experi-
ment only examines responses to predetermined compensation packages. In future work, we plan to derive
equilibrium results by solving the firm’s problem rigorously as in Benjamin (2015).
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of the two-worker case. In fact, even when there are unequal numbers of multiple worker
types, any deviation from general equality will lead to a reduction in total e↵ort in the
presence of a negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity.11
3.3. Experimental Design
We test our hypotheses using an experimental design borrowed from Charness and Kuhn
(2007) and Kessler (2010), which enables us to impose a quadratic e↵ort cost function and
a linear production function to match the model specifications.
We recruited 960 workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to participate in a 15-
minute study via Qualtrics during October and November 2016. MTurk workers have
become a useful sample in the study of worker e↵ort and multi-person games (Chandler and
Kapelner, 2013; Dreber et al., 2013; Rand et al., 2015; Jordan et al., 2016; Balasubramanian
et al., 2017). In particular, many studies have shown there are no significant di↵erences
between the experimental results from MTurk and those derived from physical lab settings
for various types of economic games (Horton et al., 2011; Suri and Watts, 2011; Amir
et al., 2012). To ensure participants pay attention to experimental materials, we conducted
comprehension checks at the beginning of the experiment after the participants read the
instructions. Each participant needed to correctly answer comprehension questions related
to the instructions in order to proceed with the study. These questions were designed to
make sure that participants understood the rules of the experiment and the factors a↵ecting
their earnings. When questions were answered incorrectly, participants were o↵ered a new
set of comprehension questions. Participants who failed three attempts were excluded from
11Suppose there are T types of workers. a
t
is the number of workers of type t, t = 1, 2, ..., T . Suppose
the equity pool for workers is fixed. Under equality in equity, each worker receives equity share of the total
pool y = 100PT
t=1 at
. Let e be the optimal e↵ort provided by each worker when everyone receives y. Under
inequality in equity, suppose there are S types of workers getting less than y, then there are T   S types
of workers getting more than or equal to y with at least one type of workers getting more than y. Without
loss of generality, let t = 1, ..., S be the types of workers getting less than y. Let y
t
be the equity share
of the total pool received by a type t worker and let e
t
be the optimal e↵ort provided by this type of






































). In the presence of negative asymmetric e↵ect of equality in equity, we
have total increase in e↵ort









= 1, so there is a reduction in total e↵ort.
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the study and were only paid their guaranteed payment. The comprehension checks screened
out 186 participants, resulting in a sample size of 774 workers.
Participants were told this study investigated individual decision making and behavior.
They were informed that they could earn bonus money in addition to their guaranteed pay-
ment ($0.25) based on their decisions in the study. The experiment had a within-subject
design with each participant experiencing 7 scenarios (in a random order) of group produc-
tion with di↵erent compensation schemes. In each scenario, a participant was paired with a
random partner (new for each scenario), and each received a flat payment to mimic salary
and a share of group output to mimic equity. Payo↵s were denoted in experiment points
with each point worth $0.001. Compensations for both people were public. Then, both
participants had the opportunity to increase the probability of group success at a personal
cost. Group output was V = 500 if the project succeeded but was zero if the project failed.
Participants did not get any feedback during the 7 scenarios about the group outcome. In
the end, one of the 7 scenarios was randomly selected to determine the final earnings of the
participants. Compensation depended on decisions made by both participants in the group
and the realization of group output. Basic demographic information including gender, edu-
cation, race, and work experience was collected at the end of the experiment. Instructions
were conveyed in a neutral language without mentioning concepts of e↵ort, equity, salary,
firm, or worker.
The experiment was further complemented by a between-subject design to test the pre-
sentation e↵ect that may trigger the separation of compensation domains. There are two
groups: control and percentage treatment. The only di↵erence between these two groups is
the presentation of the output share. We presented output share as a percentage instead
of in experiment points in the percentage treatment group. For example, while workers in
the control group were presented with an o↵er of 250 experiment points as their share of a
total group output of 500 points, workers in the percentage treatment group were presented
with the equivalent 50% of output share. In a real world context, these two presentations
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mirror the two ways that equity compensation can be presented to workers, grounding this
design in an external valid fashion. In principle, the description of the output share does not
change the real value of the output share, but only how it is presented to the participants.
Compensation levels are displayed in Table 14. There were three possible levels of flat
payment (high, medium, low) and three possible levels of output share (high, medium,
low). The control group comprised 387 workers , for which output share was presented in
experiment points. 387 workers were in the percentage treatment group, for which output
share was presented in percentage form.
——————–Insert Table 14——————–
Table 15 summarizes the seven individual-level scenarios experienced by each participant (in
a random order). We can collapse the individual-level scenarios into group-level conditions
based on output share and flat payment equality/inequality. There are four group-level
conditions in total: general equality, equality in share, equality in flat payment, and general
inequality. We call a higher payo↵ in either flat payment or output share as an advantageous
position and a lower payo↵ is designated a disadvantageous position. Each scenario is named
first by the group-level condition, and then by the advantageous or disadvantageous position
of the participant. Note that we set the value of inequality in share for a successful project,
e.g., (60% 40%)⇥500 = 100, equal to the inequality in flat payment, i.e., 300 200 = 100.
——————–Insert Table 15——————–
In each scenario, participants made a private decision to increase the probability of group
project success at a personal cost. The cost schedule shown in Table 16 was identical for
all participants across all scenarios. We refer to the number of points sacrificed to increase
project success probability as one’s contribution. There are 5 possible contribution choices
that increase quadratically for each increment in success probability. The square root of this
privately stated level of contribution is interpreted as our measure of unobservable e↵ort.
Each unit of e↵ort would increase the probability of success linearly by k = 4%. This type
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of stated e↵ort measure is common in the experimental economics literature, especially
studies on worker compensation and productivity in group production (Nalbantian and
Schotter, 1997; Charness and Kuhn, 2007; Clark et al., 2010; Harbring and Irlenbusch,
2011). The advantage of our e↵ort measure is that we could exactly impose a quadratic
e↵ort cost function and a linear production function in the experiment and directly test our
predictions in Section 3.2. Based on the design parametrization, the optimal e↵ort for a
self-interested worker is 4, 5, or 6 when the output share is 40%, 50%, or 60% respectively.
Our model of inequality aversion suggests that actual worker e↵ort choices should deviate
from these values.
——————–Insert Table 16——————–
The average payment for participants was $0.47 with an average response time of 20.8
minutes and a median response time of 9.3 minutes. While the payment appears low,
it is within the range for a typical MTurk job that lasts around 10-20 minutes.12 $0.25 is
guaranteed and the rest of the payment depends on the actual decisions of both participants
in a group based on a randomly selected scenario, which can range from $0.15 to $0.59.
3.4. Results
We first describe simple summary statistics of individual e↵ort. We then report a regression
analysis that tests our Hypothesis 1 regarding domain-contingent inequality aversion and
evaluates Hypothesis 2 that a presentation e↵ect drives the separation of domains. We
conclude the section by providing suggestive evidence for Hypothesis 3 that o↵ering the
same equity but di↵erent salaries induces the highest total group e↵ort only in presence of
domain-contingent inequality aversion.
12Based on the study of Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, $0.75 is a reasonable rate
for a 30-minute survey (Link: http://www.siop.org/tip/oct11/03barger.aspx). This means the reasonable
rate is $0.25-$0.50 for a job that lasts around 10-20 minutes.
121
3.4.1. Summary Statistics of Individual E↵ort
Table 17 reports summary statistics for all individual-level scenarios. In both control and
percentage treatment groups, individual e↵ort is higher in high payo↵ (“advantageous”) sce-
narios and lower in low payo↵ (“disadvantageous”) scenarios, relative to the general equality
scenario. At the individual scenario level, the di↵erences between the control group and the
percentage treatment group are not statistically significant, except for the general inequality
(disadvantageous) scenario in which individuals in the percentage treatment group provide
less e↵ort than those in the control group on average. According to Table 17, the average
e↵ort choice under the general equality scenario is 5.45, suggesting that risk-aversion is un-
likely a dominant factor in our experiment since a risk-averse agent would choose an e↵ort
level below 5 in this scenario absent any inequality.
——————–Insert Table 17——————–
Figure 14 shows the distribution of individual e↵ort choices under each scenario, pooling
the control and the percentage treatment groups. We group the 7 individual scenarios
into 4 general group-level conditions: general equality, equality in share, equality in flat
payment, and general inequality. The distributions tend to shift to the right for workers in
the advantageous scenarios. Specifically, workers with both higher flat payment and higher
output share than their partners (in the general inequality condition) exhibit the largest
rightward shift. The rightward shift to higher e↵ort choices also is slightly more prominent
in the equality-in-share condition than in the equality-in-flat-payment condition. On the
other hand, the distributions tend to shift to the left for workers in the disadvantageous
scenarios. In particular, workers with both low flat payment and low output share than their
partners (in the general inequality condition) exhibit the largest leftward shift. Comparing
the equality-in-share condition and the equality-in-flat-payment condition, we see that fewer
workers choose the lowest e↵ort and more workers choose the highest e↵ort when there is
no inequality in share.
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Another pattern from Figure 14 is that an e↵ort choice of 5 appears to be the modal choice in
the general equality condition and all the disadvantageous individual scenarios. A potential
concern is that workers randomly pick an e↵ort choice across 3 to 7 and in expectation would
pick a choice of 5. We evaluate this concern by examining the mean e↵ort choices reported in
Table 17 and find that the mean e↵ort choice is statistically significantly di↵erent from 5 for
most scenarios (p < 0.001 for scenarios (a)-(d) and scenario (f), p < 0.05 for scenario (e)),
except for scenario (g). Therefore, we do not believe that workers tend to choose an e↵ort
level of 5 as a result of randomizing over all e↵ort choices. On the other hand, our model
predicts that the optimal e↵ort choice is 5 under the general equality scenario since workers
should not experience inequality aversion. Some workers do choose other e↵ort levels, with
more people choosing levels above 5. We do not believe these non-optimal choices are due
to inattentiveness since the change in mean e↵ort choice under the general equality scenario
is not statistically significant when we restrict the sample to workers with longer response
time (10 minutes and above). A number of these most attentive workers still choose e↵ort
levels above 5, leading to a mean e↵ort choice of 5.38 (statistically significantly di↵erent
from 5 with p < 0.001). Two possible reasons for these high e↵ort choices are pure altruism
and risk-seeking behavior, especially when the financial stake in the experiment is relatively
small. While some workers may exhibit these preferences, the two theories cannot generate
the negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity in Hypothesis 1 that is only predicted
by the domain-contingent inequality aversion theory. In particular, risk-seeking preference
suggests a positive asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity, i.e., workers respond more to
equity raises than to equity cuts.
——————–Insert Figure 14——————–
Figure 15 shows the average individual e↵ort choice by the grouped scenarios. In the
equality-in-flat-payment condition (but inequality in share), workers in the disadvantageous
position on average provide less e↵ort than those in the disadvantageous position of the
equality-in-share condition. Workers in the advantageous position on average provide less
123
e↵ort than those in the advantageous position of the equality-in-share condition, though not
significantly so. The patterns provide some evidence that inequality in di↵erent domains can
a↵ect e↵ort provision di↵erently. Relative to the general equality condition, redistributing
flat payment within the group while holding share equal appears to have a symmetric e↵ect
on e↵ort.13 That is, higher flat payment increases e↵ort by approximately the same amount
that lower flat payment decreases e↵ort. However, relative to the general equality condition,
redistributing output share within the group while holding flat payment equal appears to
have a negative asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort.14 Lower share decreases e↵ort more than the
increase in e↵ort from higher share.
——————–Insert Figure 15——————–
We further examine how e↵ort responds to di↵erent compensation schemes by collapsing
the 7 individual scenarios based on the level of output share and flat payment respectively.
Table 18 Panel A reports the summary statistics for all output share levels, and Panel B
displays statistics for all flat payment levels. Suggestively, Panel A shows that e↵ort on
average responds to high and low output share almost symmetrically relative to medium
level in the control group but responds to low output share more negatively in the treatment
group. From Panel B, we see that e↵ort appears to respond more negatively to low flat
payment in the treatment group compared to the control group and, at the same time,
responds more positively to high flat payment, though not significantly so for the latter.
Before we formally test these patterns from the two panels and examine our hypotheses
regarding inequality aversion in di↵erent domains, we notice that Panel B alone shows
that workers clearly exhibit quite strong general inequality aversion consistent with the
form predicted by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) since they respond heavily to inequality in flat
payment, which is in contrast to the prediction of the neoclassical model that flat payment
13Running a regression of e↵ort on all scenario indicators and controlling for individual fixed e↵ects, we
find that the changes in the two scenarios under the equality in share condition relative to the general
equality condition is not statistically significantly di↵erent from each other (F-test gives a p-value of 0.7916).
14Running a regression of e↵ort on all scenario indicators and controlling for individual fixed e↵ects, we
find that the changes in the two scenarios under the equality in flat payment condition relative to the general




3.4.2. Individual Level E↵ort
First, we perform a full-sample regression analysis to test Hypothesis 1 that workers expe-
rience domain-contingent inequality aversion regarding equity and salary. We then conduct
subsample analysis for the control group and the percentage treatment group to test Hy-
pothesis 2 that domain-contingent inequality aversion is driven by how equity is presented.
Table 19 reports regression results examining how di↵erent levels of compensation a↵ect
individual e↵ort choice. According to Propositions 1 and 2, the domain-contingent in-
equality aversion model predicts a negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity, or in
other words,  1 < | 3|. In contrast, models with non-domain-contingent inequality aversion
and no inequality aversion predict a symmetric e↵ect, i.e.,  1 = | 3|. Consistent with the
presence of domain-contingent inequality aversion, we find a negative asymmetric e↵ect of
inequality in equity. The estimated  1 is smaller than the absolute value of the estimated  3
(Columns (1)-(3)). In other words, workers respond more to low share than to high share.
Such a negative asymmetric e↵ect is statistically significant at the 10% level for the fixed
e↵ects specification in Column (3) (p-value of the F-test is 0.0649), and presents evidence
for Hypothesis 1 that workers experience domain-contingent inequality aversion. We con-
sider the fixed e↵ects model as the ideal specification since it controls for time-invariant
individual heterogeneity arising from inattentiveness, confusion, or shirking by dropping
those individuals who do not change e↵ort choices across scenarios.
——————–Insert Table 19——————–
Result 1. Consistent with the prediction of the domain-contingent inequality aversion model,
inequality in equity has a negative asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort, i.e., e↵ort responds more to
low share than to high share.
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Furthermore, recall that we hypothesize that the domain-contingency is driven by how
equity is presented. In particular, Hypothesis 2 says that domain-contingent inequality
aversion is more likely to occur when equity is presented di↵erently from salary. Conse-
quently,  1 < | 3| is more likely to be observed for the treatment group when compared to
the control group. In Table 19, we see that the negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in
equity becomes more prominent in the treatment subsample (Column (4)) with a p-value of
0.0593 for the F-test, but turns out to be statistically insignificant in the control subsample
(Column (5)) with a p-value of 0.4559 for the F-test. We use the individual fixed e↵ects
specification for the subsample analysis to deal with potential inattentiveness of workers.
Some workers do not change e↵ort choices across scenarios so the specification using within-
person variation is the ideal regression analysis. Hence, the test confirms Hypothesis 2 since
the domain-contingency inequality aversion only appears in the treatment group for which
equity is in its percentage form.
Result 2. We find that domain-contingent inequality aversion (i.e., more severe inequality
aversion in the output share domain than in the flat payment domain) only appears when
equity is presented in the percentage format but does not appear when equity is presented
in the same format as the flat payment.
We do not believe that worker attentiveness is a challenge to our results with the inclusion of
attention checks in our design. Experimental evidence has shown that MTurk participants
perform better on online attention checks than do subject pool participants (Hauser and
Schwarz, 2016). To further deal with the concern that workers may stop paying attention
after passing pre-screening questions, we restrict our main analysis in Table 19 to workers
with response time greater than 5 minutes. This drops 8% of the sample, leaving us 713
workers. We find that our fixed e↵ects regression is still robust and the negative asymmetric
e↵ect of inequality in equity is even stronger for the treatment subsample but not for
the control subsample (p-value for the F-test is 0.0712 for the full sample, 0.0250 for the
treatment subsample and 0.7034 for the control subsample).
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Table 19 also has implications for the parameter space of the degree of inequality aversion
in the two separate domains. First, the e↵ect of inequality in flat payment appears to be
positive asymmetric since high flat payment increases e↵ort more than the drop in low flat
payment ( 2 > | 4|), though this asymmetric e↵ect is marginally statistically significant
at the 10% level (p value from F-test of the null hypothesis that  2 +  4 = 0 is 0.1082).
Second, relative to general equality, low share induces a larger decrease in e↵ort than low
flat payment (| 3| > | 4|) even when the share reduction is at most equal to that of the
flat payment reduction.15 The di↵erence is statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value
from F-test of the null hypothesis that  3 =  4 is 0.0036). Third, we see that e↵ort
responds less to an increase in share than to an increase in flat payment ( 1 <  2), though
not significantly so (p-value from F-test of the null hypothesis that  1 =  2 is 0.4222).
According to Propositions A.4 and A.5, given the model assumption of domain-contingent
inequality aversion, these results imply that ↵x    x  2↵x x.
3.4.3. Group Level E↵ort
We now consider the group-level outcomes in a test of Hypothesis 3, which predicted that
equality in equity is more likely to induce the highest total group e↵ort when equity is
shown di↵erently from salary. In other words, o↵ering the same equity but di↵erent salaries
is more likely the optimal firm compensation strategy when equity is presented in its distinct
percentage form.
Figure 16 illustrates the average total group e↵ort across conditions. While average total
group e↵ort is the highest under the equality-in-share condition for the treatment group,
group e↵ort is lower than the average total group e↵ort under other conditions (general
equality and general inequality) for the control group. This finding, though not statistically
significant, is consistent with Hypothesis 3 that equality-in-share is more likely the opti-
mal compensation strategy (in the sense of inducing the highest total group e↵ort) when
15The value of share reduction is at most (60%  50%) ⇥ 500 = 50. The value of flat payment reduction
is 300  250 = 50.
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share is shown in percentage form. A regression analysis further supports this conclusion.
Table 20 reports regression results examining how total group e↵ort is a↵ected by di↵erent
group-level conditions. We find that total group e↵ort is higher under the equality-in-share
condition relative to the equality-in-flat-payment condition (Column (1)), and more so when
we restrict to the percentage treatment subsample (Column (2)). When compared to the
other two group conditions (general equality and and general inequality), we do not have
enough statistical significance for our estimates, but the signs suggest that the equality-in-
share condition likely induces higher total e↵ort than those other two conditions only in the
percentage treatment sample (i.e., when share is shown in the percentage form).
——————–Insert Figure 16——————–
——————–Insert Table 20——————–
These suggestive findings are consistent with the implications from our experimental results
in the previous section. Domain-contingent inequality aversion implies that inequality in
output share has a negative asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort while inequality in flat payment
can have a positive asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort. As a result, the equality-in-share condition
(but inequality in flat payment) is more likely to induce the highest total group e↵ort when
domain-contingent inequality aversion is more prominent, i.e., in the treatment group when
equity is presented in a di↵erent percentage form from the control group.
3.5. Conclusion
We propose a behavioral model of domain-contingent inequality aversion and argue that
workers dislike inequality in the equity domain more than salary inequality when equity is
presented di↵erently from salary. In contrast to other models with non-domain-contingent
inequality aversion or no inequality aversion, our model features a negative asymmetric
e↵ect of inequality in equity. This negative asymmetric e↵ect, coupled with a possible
positive asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in salary, suggests that the equality-in-equity com-
pensation strategy could benefit firms. In an experiment, we examine how workers respond
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to combinations of di↵erent distributions of equity and salary. Our findings produce cor-
roborating evidence for the existence of domain-contingent inequality aversion, and further
demonstrate that the separation of domains is driven by a presentation e↵ect.
While our findings are suggestive of an important pattern for compensation design, our
study has limitations related to external generalizability. The character of workplace in-
teractions can be far more complex than what is presumed in our experimental setting,
and consideration of real-e↵ort contribution may not be perfectly proxied by stated e↵ort.
This concern is valid, but our experiment intents to shed light on the underlying layers of
inequality aversion and the factors that influence behavior under combinations of di↵erent
incentives.
Furthermore, we consider a number of competing stories about worker preferences in our
setting and find evidence that rules them out. While some workers may exhibit pure al-
truism or risk-seeking behavior to some extent, our observed negative asymmetric e↵ect
of inequality in equity characterizing domain-contingent inequality aversion cannot be ex-
plained by these two preferences. Moreover, even though risk-averse workers may potentially
produce the aforementioned negative asymmetric e↵ect, our summary statistics show that
risk-aversion is not a dominant factor as workers tend to choose e↵ort levels above what is
predicted by risk-aversion.
Our experimental design enables us to identify a presentation e↵ect that drives the separa-
tion of compensation domains. While we do not have a clear answer for why workers are
more inequality averse in the equity domain when the separation of domains is triggered,
we provide one possible explanation—when equity is presented in its percentage form, it is
more likely to be perceived as more scarce than salary. Most firms have a limited amount of
equity—a set percentage of the firm in their options pool—to distribute,16 and employees
may then perceive equity rewards as a scarce commodity.17 A percentage form of equity fa-
16The creation and issuing of additional options beyond the existing options pool are costly to prior
employees because the new options dilute their percentage ownership of the firm.
17“Equity Compensation in An Era of Scarcity”, Solium Capital, accessed November 26, 2016.
129
cilitates the relative comparison of share size between participants (Dieckmann et al., 2009;
Waters et al., 2006), and thus driving the salience of the finiteness of the 100% output. A
fixed 100% means that there is a limited supply of output to be shared, and consequently
increases the perception of scarcity.18
The design also screens out many alternative mechanisms for why equity is viewed di↵erently
from salary, such as a failure to recognize the importance of equity (since most employees
do not understand the value of the options they hold),19 di↵erential bargaining power over
equity versus salary, distinct information structures (salary information is likely confidential
while equity information is likely public knowledge), and overoptimism about the equity
value (Bergman and Jenter, 2007; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005) since both equity and salary
are essential, non-negotiable, public, and bounded in our design. Our results, however, do
not rule out two other potential mechanisms for why equity and salary occupy separate
domains. Perhaps equity di↵ers from salary because of its non-pecuniary benefits, such
as a sense of ownership and legitimacy of status (Graham et al., 2002; Hamilton, 2000).
Also, equity likely might be viewed as a current asset while cash might just be viewed
as current income, in which case cash and equity are in di↵erent mental accounts that
interact di↵erently with individual inequality aversion (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). These
alternatives would complement the view of domain-contingent inequality aversion.
Human capital is the most critical asset of modern technology and service firms. Compen-
sation structures incentivize performance and facilitate the hiring and retention of skilled
employees and managers. The finding that workers respond to inequality di↵erently de-
pending on the compensation domain, and more specifically the framing of the domain,
provides implications for compensation package design in organizations.
18 Limiting supply is a common intervention to induce perception of scarcity in experiments (E↵ron and
Miller, 2011; Mittone and Savadori, 2009).
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Figure 14: Distributions of Individual E↵ort Choice by Scenario. This figure shows
the distribution of individual e↵ort choices under each scenario, pooling the control and
the percentage treatment groups. The 7 individual-level scenarios are organized into 4
general group-level conditions in 4 subfigures: general equality (top left), equality in share
(top right), equality in flat payment (bottom left), and general inequality (bottom right).
The x-axis represents individual e↵ort choice. Note that e↵ort choice is converted from
individual contribution to the group and ranges from 3 to 7. The y-axis and the histograms
represent the fractions of each e↵ort choice within the condition. In the equality-in-share
condition, equality-in-flat-payment condition, and general inequality condition, there are
two types of scenarios: advantageous (white bars with black outlines) and disadvantageous
(light grey bars). In the equality-in-share condition, advantageous refers to the scenario
with high flat payment; disadvantageous denotes the scenario with low flat payment. In the
equality-in-flat-payment condition, advantageous scenario signifies the scenario with high
output share while disadvantageous scenario refers to the scenario with low output share. In
the general inequality condition, advantageous scenario refers to the scenario with both high
flat payment and high output share while disadvantageous scenario signifies the scenario



























General Equality Equality in Share Equality in Flat Payment General Inequality
Advantageous Disadvantageous
Figure 15: Average Individual E↵ort Choice by Scenario. This figure shows the aver-
age individual e↵ort choice by scenarios, pooling the control and the percentage treatment
groups. The 7 individual-level scenarios are organized into 4 general group-level conditions
in 4 bars: general equality (first bar), equality in share (second bar), equality in flat payment
(third bar), and general inequality (fourth bar). The x-axis represents the condition. The
y-axis represents the average individual e↵ort. Error bars are displayed in black, represent-
ing 95% confidence intervals. In the equality-in-share condition, equality-in-flat-payment
condition, and general inequality condition, there are two overlaid bars that represent two
types of scenarios: advantageous (white bars with black outlines) and disadvantageous (light
grey bars). In the equality-in-share condition, advantageous scenario refers to the scenario
with high flat payment while disadvantageous scenario denotes the scenario with low flat
payment. In the equality-in-flat-payment condition, advantageous scenario refers to the
scenario with high output share while disadvantageous scenario signifies the scenario with
low output share. In the general inequality condition, advantageous scenario refers to the
scenario with both high flat payment and high output share while disadvantageous scenario

























General Equality Equality in Share Equality in Flat Payment General Inequality
Control Treatment
Figure 16: Average Total Group E↵ort by Condition. This figure shows the average
total group e↵ort across conditions for the control and percentage treatment groups re-
spectively, in support of Hypothesis 3. There are 4 general group-level conditions: general
equality, equality in share, equality in flat payment, and general inequality. The x-axis rep-
resents the group-level conditions. The y-axis and the bars represent the average total group
e↵ort. The control group averages are in dark grey and the percentage treatment group
averages are in light grey. Error bars are displayed, representing 95% confidence intervals.
The black dashed horizontal line is added to compare the equality-in-share condition with
other conditions for the control group. The grey dotted horizontal line is added to compare
the equality-in-share condition with other conditions for the percentage treatment group.
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Table 14: Levels of Compensation. This table displays the possible levels of flat payment
and output share. There are three possible levels for either flat payment or output share:
high, medium, and low. Flat payment is shown in experiment points. Output share is
presented in di↵erent formats depending on the group. In the control group, output share
if the project succeeds is shown in experiment points. In the percentage treatment group,
output share is shown in percentage. Note that the total group output is 500 points if the
project succeeds, so the value of output share is the same in both control and percentage
treatment groups.
Output Share
Level Flat Payment Control (Points) Percentage Treatment (%)
High 300 300 60%
Medium 250 250 50%
Low 200 200 40%
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Table 15: All Individual-Level Scenarios. This table shows the 7 individual-level sce-
narios. First column provides the names of scenarios. Each scenario is named first by the
group-level condition (general equality, equality in share, equality in flat payment, general
inequality) and then named by the advantageous or disadvantageous position. Second and
third columns show the amount of flat payment (in experiment points) received by the par-
ticipant and his partner respectively given the scenario. Fourth and fifth columns show the
amount of output share received by the participant and his partner respectively given the
scenario. Note that output share is shown in percentage form for the percentage treatment
group and is shown in experiment points for the control group.
Flat Payment Output Share
Scenario Participant His Partner Participant His Partner
(a) General Equality 250 250 50% / 250 50% / 250
(b) Equality in Share (Advantageous) 300 200 50% / 250 50% / 250
(c) Equality in Share (Disadvantageous) 200 300 50% / 250 50% / 250
(d) Equality in Flat Payment (Advantageous) 250 250 60% / 300 40% / 200
(e) Equality in Flat Payment (Disadvantageous) 250 250 40% / 200 60% / 300
(f) General Inequality (Advantageous) 300 200 60% / 300 40% / 200
(g) General Inequality (Disadvantageous) 200 300 40% / 200 60% / 300
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Table 16: Cost Schedule for Increasing Probability of Group Project Success. This
table shows the cost schedule for increasing probability of group project success. Probability
of success can be increased linearly at a 4% interval. We refer to the number of points
sacrificed to increase project success probability as one’s contribution. There are 5 possible
levels of contribution, increasing quadratically. The square root of this privately stated level
of contribution is interpreted as our measure of unobservable e↵ort.
Increased Probability of Success 12% 16% 20% 24% 28%
Cost of Points (Contribution, Seen) 9 16 25 36 49
E↵ort Choice (
p
Contribution, Unseen) 3 4 5 6 7
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Table 17: Summary Statistics: Means of Individual E↵ort Choice by Scenario.
This table reports the summary statistics for individual e↵ort choice by individual-level
scenario. The first column lists all the scenarios. The second and third columns report
the means of individual e↵ort and standard errors (in parentheses) for the control group
and the percentage treatment group respectively. The fourth column shows the full sample
averages and standard errors (in parentheses). The last column reports the p-values from
two-tailed t-tests between the control group and the treatment group (*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01).
Group p-Value
Scenario Control Treatment Total (Control vs. Treatment)
(a) General Equality 5.47 5.42 5.45 0.55
(0.059) (0.062) (0.043)
(b) Equality in Share (Advantageous) 5.64 5.70 5.67 0.54
(0.060) (0.066) (0.044)
(c) Equality in Share (Disadvantageous) 5.22 5.19 5.21 0.77
(0.062) (0.065) (0.045)
(d) Equality in Flat Payment (Advantageous) 5.65 5.63 5.64 0.84
(0.061) (0.064) (0.044)
(e) Equality in Flat Payment (Disadvantageous) 5.10 5.10 5.10 0.93
(0.063) (0.067) (0.046)
(f) General Inequality (Advantageous) 5.80 5.87 5.84 0.45
(0.061) (0.064) (0.044)
(g) General Inequality (Disadvantageous) 5.12 4.92 5.02 0.04⇤⇤
(0.066) (0.066) (0.047)
Observations 387 387 774
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Table 18: Summary Statistics: Means of Individual E↵ort Choice by Compen-
sation Level. This table reports the summary statistics for individual e↵ort choice by
compensation level. In Panel A, each scenario is categorized based on the level of output
share (high, medium, low). In Panel B, each scenario is categorized based on the level of
flat payment (high, medium, low). Note that for both Panels A and B, there are 774 ob-
servations for high and low levels per group (control or treatment), and 1,161 observations
for medium levels per group (control or treatment). For both panels, the first column lists
the compensation level, the second and third columns report the means of individual e↵ort
and standard errors (in parentheses) for the control group and the percentage treatment
group respectively, the fourth column shows the full sample averages and standard errors
(in parentheses), and the last column reports the p-values from two-tailed t-tests between
the control group and the treatment group (*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01).
Group p-Value
Level Control Treatment Total (Control vs. Treatment)
Panel A: Levels of Output Share
High 5.73 5.75 5.74 0.70
(0.043) (0.046) (0.031)
Medium 5.45 5.44 5.44 0.88
(0.035) (0.038) (0.026)
Low 5.11 5.01 5.06 0.13
(0.046) (0.047) (0.033)
Panel B: Levels of Flat Payment
High 5.72 5.78 5.75 0.33
(0.043) (0.046) (0.031)
Medium 5.41 5.38 5.40 0.62
(0.036) (0.038) (0.026)
Low 5.17 5.06 5.11 0.092⇤
(0.045) (0.047) (0.033)
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Table 19: Regression Results for Individual E↵ort. This table shows the regression
results for individual e↵ort, in support of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. The dependent
variable is individual e↵ort. The independent variables include the indicators for each
output share level (high, medium, low) and for each flat payment level (high, medium, low).
Medium share and medium flat payment indicators are dropped as reference categories.
Columns (1)-(3) report the estimates using the full sample. Column (1) shows the estimates
for the main regression specification. Column (2) shows the estimates when additional
individual controls are included. The individual controls include gender, education, race,
and whether the person has working experience or not. Column (3) shows the estimates
when individual fixed e↵ects are added. Column (4) shows the estimates for the percentage
treatment group. Column (5) shows the estimates for the control group. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the individual level in the fixed
e↵ects regression (Column (3)). p-values from the F-tests on  1 = | 3| are reported.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Dependent Variable: Individual E↵ort
Full Sample Subsamples
OLS OLS FE Treatment Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High Share ( 1) 0.202⇤⇤⇤ 0.202⇤⇤⇤ 0.202⇤⇤⇤ 0.200⇤⇤⇤ 0.204⇤⇤⇤
(0.043) (0.042) (0.028) (0.040) (0.040)
High Flat Payment ( 2) 0.233⇤⇤⇤ 0.233⇤⇤⇤ 0.233⇤⇤⇤ 0.267⇤⇤⇤ 0.199⇤⇤⇤
(0.043) (0.042) (0.027) (0.039) (0.037)
Low Share ( 3) -0.276⇤⇤⇤ -0.275⇤⇤⇤ -0.276⇤⇤⇤ -0.305⇤⇤⇤ -0.247⇤⇤⇤
(0.044) (0.044) (0.027) (0.037) (0.040)
Low Flat Payment ( 4) -0.169⇤⇤⇤ -0.170⇤⇤⇤ -0.169⇤⇤⇤ -0.207⇤⇤⇤ -0.131⇤⇤⇤
(0.044) (0.043) (0.026) (0.037) (0.037)
Constant 5.420⇤⇤⇤ 4.231⇤⇤⇤ 5.420⇤⇤⇤ 5.418⇤⇤⇤ 5.423⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.211) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025)
F-test p-value ( 1 = | 3|) 0.2815 0.2872 0.0649⇤ 0.0593⇤ 0.4559
Individual Controls No Yes No No No
Individual Fixed E↵ects No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,418 5,411 5,418 2,709 2,709
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Table 20: Regression Results for Total Group E↵ort. This table shows the regression
results for total group e↵ort, in support of Hypothesis 3. The dependent variable is total
group e↵ort. The independent variables include the indicators for all group-level conditions:
general equality, equality in share, equality in flat payment, and general inequality. The ref-
erence condition is equality-in-share (but inequality in flat payment) and is hence dropped.
Column (1) reports the estimates using the full sample. Column (2) shows the estimates
for the percentage treatment group. Column (3) shows the estimates for the control group.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Dependent Variable:
Total Group E↵ort
Full Sample Treatment Control
(1) (2) (3)
General Equality ( 1) 0.062 -0.098 0.219
(0.107) (0.159) (0.143)
Equality in Flat Payment ( 2) -0.178⇤⇤ -0.242⇤ -0.112
(0.089) (0.128) (0.125)
General Inequality ( 3) -0.013 -0.086 0.062
(0.090) (0.130) (0.125)
Constant 10.865⇤⇤⇤ 10.921⇤⇤⇤ 10.806⇤⇤⇤
(0.063) (0.092) (0.086)
Observations 2,696 1,350 1,346
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Unlimited Vacation Capped Vacation
Founding Year
Figure A.1: Distribution of Firms by Firm Founding Year in Setting 1. The
histograms show the distribution of firms by founding year (restricted to 1998-2018) for
































Unlimited Vacation Capped Vacation
Firm Size
Figure A.2: Distribution of Firms by Firm Size in Setting 1. The histograms show
the distribution of firms by the number of employees for firms with and without unlimited
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Post-Transfer
Distribution of Monthly Time Off (Days)
LTO to UTO LTO to LTO
Figure A.3: Distribution of Monthly Time O↵ in Setting 2. This figure shows the
distribution of monthly time o↵ in days for the treatment group (LTO to UTO) and the
control group (LTO to LTO) pre- vs. post-transfer.
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Figure A.4: Treatments (Experiment 2) in Setting 3. This table shows treatment

































1 2 3 4
Week
Capped (With Selection) Unlimited (With Selection)
Capped (No Selection) Unlimited (No Selection)
Labor Efficiency over Time
Figure A.5: Overall Labor E ciency by Contract and Sorting in Setting 3. This
































































































































































Capped Vacation Unlimited Vacation
Figure A.6: Weekly Individual Worker Productivity by Contract over Time Based
on Sorting and Worker Type in Setting 3. This figure shows the average weekly
productivity (number of outputs per minute) by vacation contract over time in Setting 3
(RCT), depending on whether workers can choose between two contracts and on worker
type. The top left subfigure shows the average weekly productivity over time for high-
performers who can choose between two contracts. The top right subfigure shows the
average weekly productivity over time for high-performers who are randomly assigned a
contract. The bottom left subfigure shows the average weekly productivity over time for
low-performers who can choose between two contracts. The bottom right subfigure shows
the average weekly productivity over time for low-performers who are randomly assigned a
contract. The di↵erences between the means is statistically significant di↵erence at the 5%

































1 2 3 4
Week
Unlimited (No Extra Outputs) Capped (No Selection)
Unlimited (No Selection)
Labor Efficiency over Time
Figure A.7: Hypothetical Overall Labor E ciency for Unlimited Vacation in
Setting 3. This table shows the hypothetical overall labor e ciency under unlimited
vacation if workers were simply meeting the performance requirement and produced no
extra work outputs, and compares it with the actual overall labor e ciency levels under
unlimited and capped vacation when there is no sorting.
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I lost track of how many images
I had correctly counted.
I worried that I would be dismissed
if I had produced less.
I wanted to work more than what was required
to signal commitment to the job.
I appreciated the monetary compensation
and wanted to work more in return.
I appreciated the availability
of as many paid vacation days as needed
and wanted to work more in return.
Work habbit related, e.g.,
just a personal drive
to exceed expectations.
I enjoyed the task.
I tried to work the
minimum amount required.
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Density
Why did you produce more work than
what was required by
the output threshold in the contract?
Figure A.8: Reason for Producing Extra Work in Setting 3. This figure shows the
distribution of why workers under the unlimited vacation produced more than required by
their contract based on worker responses in the follow-up survey in Setting 3 (RCT). 88
workers answered this question. The rest of the workers did not answer this question since























































Weekly Vacation Time (Minutes)
Firing Threat
Vacation Patterns under Unlimited Vacation by Firing Threat
Figure A.9: Weekly Vacation Patterns under Unlimited Vacation by Firing
Threat in Setting 3. This figure summarizes the weekly vacation patterns for work-
ers under strong vs. weak firing threat separately in Setting 3 (RCT), using workers who
work under the unlimited vacation. The left subfigure shows the average weekly vacation
days by firing threat treatments, with a statistically significant di↵erence at the 0.1% level.
The right subfigure shows the average weekly vacation time in minutes by firing threat
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Weak Firing Threat
Number of Weekly Vacation Days
Distribution of Weekly Vacation Days under Unlimited Vacation
Figure A.10: Distribution of Weekly Vacation Days under Unlimited Vacation by
Firing Threat. This figure shows the distribution of the weekly vacation days for workers
under strong vs. weak firing threat separately, using workers who work under the unlimited
vacation.
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Working on my primary job other than MTurk
Working on other MTurk jobs
Spending time with family
Relaxation or entertainment
Dealing with family or medical emergencies
Chores and errands
Unspecified vacation use
Technical issues, e.g., no internet
Thinking about this job
0 .1 .2 .3
Density
What was your vacation time typically used for?
Figure A.11: Use of Vacation Time in Setting 3. This figure shows the distribution of
how workers typically used their vacation time based on worker responses in the follow-up
survey in Setting 3 (RCT). 326 workers answered this question. 68 workers did not answer
this question since they did not take any vacation during the job.
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Table A.1: Employee-Level Summary Statistics in Setting 2. This table shows
employee-level summary statistics for the treatment and the control groups in Setting 2.
Control Group Treatment Group
LTO to LTO LTO to UTO
N=114 N=238
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.
Age 30.32 29.00 5.50 30.93 29.00 6.71
Female (%) 0.49 0.50 0.38 0.49
Married (%) 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35
Job Level before Transfer 1.02 1.00 0.14 1.33 1.00 0.47
Job Tenure (Months) at Transfer 18.14 17.50 8.00 17.84 16.28 9.09
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Table A.2: Weekly Productivity by Worker and Contract Characteristics in Set-
ting 3. This table shows the regression results for evaluating productivity gain from the
unlimited vacation contract in Setting 3 (RCT), including controls on worker and contract
characteristics. The dependent variable is weekly productivity (number of outputs per
minute). All models use workers who are randomly assigned a contract. Model (4) includes
only workers in the capped vacation contract and workers in the unlimited vacation contract
with a strong firing threat. Model (5) includes only workers in the capped vacation contract
and workers in the unlimited vacation contract with a weak firing threat. All models include
week fixed e↵ects. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in
parentheses. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 **** p < 0.001.
Dependent Variable:
Weekly Productivity (Number of Outputs per Minute)
Firing Threat
Strong Weak
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unlimited Vacation 0.553⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.574⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.169 0.782⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.403⇤⇤⇤⇤
(0.086) (0.087) (0.195) (0.102) (0.098)
High Job Commitment 0.741⇤⇤⇤⇤ 0.448⇤⇤⇤
(0.159) (0.142)
Unlimited Vacation ⇥ High Job Commitment 0.408⇤
(0.208)
Constant 0.299⇤⇤⇤ -0.402⇤⇤ -0.105 0.092 0.695⇤⇤⇤⇤
(0.101) (0.170) (0.149) (0.123) (0.120)
Observations 695 682 682 454 514
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A.2. Chapter 1 Appendix: Theoretical Model Proofs
Workers solve the following utility maximization problem:
max
l
U(l;R) = w(R)  c(T   l)
subject to l  L̄ when R = 0 or l  T when R = 1. Since the utility function is mono-
tonically increasing in vacation time, workers under capped vacation would choose L⇤(R =
0) = L̄; workers under unlimited vacation would choose L⇤(R = 1) = L0 = T   Y⌘(1+⌧
1
) if
not slacking and L⇤(R = 1) = T if slacking. Note that L0 may or may not be positive so
it is likely that some workers are not able to choose L0 when T   Y⌘(1+⌧
1
) < 0, in which
case they would slack for sure and choose L⇤(R = 1) = T . In particular, firms will only
set Y such that at least the high ability workers can meet the threshold given time T , or
otherwise everyone will be slacking. Therefore, total time T will only be binding for the low
ability workers. There are two possible cases: (i) both high ability and low ability workers
do not slack at unlimited vacation firms, and (ii) high ability workers do not slack while
low ability workers slack at unlimited vacation firms.
Whether a worker slacks depends on whether the worker is paid above his or her non-slacking
condition:
w(1)   2
p  pac(T   L0) +
b
1  a [w(0)  c(T   L̄)] +
(1  a  b)
1  a Vu.
A.2.1. Proof of Prediction 1
Prediction 1. Sorting. High-performers are more likely to choose unlimited vacation over
capped vacation than low-performers.
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Proof. In Case (i), we have for high-performers, they will choose unlimited vacation if
w(1)  c(T   L0; ⌘H) > w(0)  c(T   L̄)
and capped vacation otherwise. For low-performers, they will choose unlimited vacation if
w(0)  c(T   L̄) > w(1)  c(T   L0; ⌘L)
and capped vacation otherwise. In Case (ii), we have for high-performers, they will choose
unlimited vacation if
2[w(1)  c(T   L0; ⌘H)] > 2[w(0)  c(T   L̄)]
and capped vacation otherwise. For low-performers, they will choose unlimited vacation if
2[w(0)  c(T   L̄)] > (2  p)w(1) + pVf
and capped vacation otherwise.
When total time T is binding and low-performers cannot produce Y given time T , then as
reasoned, they will slack at unlimited vacation firms. Then we will be in Case (ii). Including
this additional discussion of the binding case is more complete since the results are no longer
sensitive to the choice of Y .
We first consider Case (i). We denote XH = w(1) c(T L0; ⌘H), XL = w(1) c(T L0; ⌘L),
X0 = w(0)   c(T   L̄). We can show that XH > XL. There are 4 possible scenarios as










]Case (i) Scenario 1: Pooling Equilibrium (Unlimited)











]Case (i) Scenario 3: Separating Equilibrium













]Case (i) Scenario 5: Pooling Equilibrium (Capped)
Across all scenarios, if a low-performer is choosing unlimited vacation, then a high-performer
is for sure choosing unlimited vacation. Therefore, in Case (i) where nobody slacks, we have
that high-performers are more likely than low-performers to choose unlimited vacation.
Reversely, low-performers are more likely than high-performers to choose capped vacation.
Then we consider Case (ii), which is more complicated. We denote X 0H = w(1)   c(T  







L, then similar to Case (i), we can show that high-performers are more
likely than low-performers to choose unlimited vacation. When 2X 0H < X
0
L, however, the
reasoning for Case (i) suggests that low-performers are more likely than high-performers to
choose unlimited vacation. Now we show that 2X 0H  X 0L > 0.
2X 0H  X 0L = pw(1)   2c(T   L0; ⌘H)   pVf . Recall that in Case (ii), the high-performers
do not slack, so the non-slacking condition strictly holds for high-performers and we have
w(1) > 2pc(T   L0; ⌘H) + b[w(0)  c(T   L̄)] + (1  b)Vu =
2
pc(T   L0; ⌘H) + Vf . Therefore,
the NSC for high-performers suggest that 2X 0H  X 0L > 0. As a result, as in Case (i), high-
performers are more likely than low-performers to choose unlimited vacation. In summary,
we have established the baseline prediction of sorting.
A.2.2. Proof of Prediction 2
Prediction 2. Productivity. Worker productivity is higher under unlimited vacation than
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under capped vacation, even after controlling for the sorting e↵ect.
Proof. Productivity is ⌘(1 + ⌧R). This prediction is a direct result of the assumption that
⌧1 > ⌧0   0, where the assumption is based on the discussion in Section 1.2.2.
A.2.3. Proof of Prediction 3
Prediction 3. Slacking and Firing Threat. Under unlimited vacation, workers are
more likely to meet the output threshold, i.e., they are less likely to slack, when firing threat
is stronger.
Proof. When p increases, i.e., when firing threat is stronger, the non-slacking condition
becomes easier to satisfy for both high- and low-performers, so there are fewer slackers and
workers are more likely to meet the output threshold.
A.2.4. Implications for Firm Decisions
Now I formally derive the implications for firm-level vacation scheme decision and show
that a firm is more likely to be profitable adopting unlimited vacation when the following
statements are true:
1. when the firm has greater needs for high-performers (i.e., v(x) is higher for any x)
2. when the firm has a stronger culture of firing conditional on performance (i.e., p is
higher)
3. when the firm sees a stronger complementarity gain between unlimited vacation and
worker performance (i.e., ⌧1   ⌧0 is higher)
Proof. A firm choosing capped vacation scheme expects profit:




(T   L̄)⌘L(1 + ⌧0)  w(0).
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A firm choosing unlimited vacation scheme expects profit:








, both high- and low-performers comply, or




, high-performers comply, low-performers slack
A firm should adopt unlimited vacation if E⇡(R = 1) > E⇡(R = 0). This can only
happen when the non-slacking condition (NSC) is being met at least for the high-performers
(otherwise, E⇡(R = 1) = 0). There are two cases we consider: (A) when the firm finds it
optimal to set a high NSC wage under unlimited vacation such that no worker slacks, and
(B) when the firm finds it optimal to set a low NSC wage under unlimited vacation such
that the low-performers slack while high-performers do not slack.
Case (A): The firm finds it optimal to adopt unlimited vacation if








(T   L̄)⌘L(1 + ⌧0)  w(0)
Case (B): The firm finds it optimal to adopt unlimited vacation if








(T   L̄)⌘L(1 + ⌧0) w(0)
For both cases, the profitable condition is more likely to hold when any of the followings is
true:
1. v(x) is higher for any x;
2. p is higher; and
3. ⌧1   ⌧0 is higher.
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A.3. Chapter 3 Appendix: Additional Propositions
All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.5.
A.3.1. Proposition A.1
Proposition A.1. e⇤1 is nondecreasing in x1 and is nonincreasing in x2.
Proposition A.1 says that higher salary cannot reduce a worker’s e↵ort, and can only increase
it or have no impact. On the other hand, higher salary of one’s coworker cannot increase
one’s e↵ort, and can only decrease it or have not impact. These patterns are hinged on
inequality aversion in the salary domain.
A.3.2. Proposition A.2















Increasing a worker’s equity may not necessarily increase his e↵ort but is guaranteed to
increase his e↵ort when the equity change is large enough. Proposition A.2 gives a su cient
but not necessary condition. It is possible for a su ciently small increase in equity to




) is increasing in ↵x and  x, the equity change is more
likely to be large enough when the degree of inequality aversion in the salary domain is
small.
A.3.3. Proposition A.3
Proposition A.3. Let  y2 > 0 be the change in y2, then
(a) 9  > 0 such that e⇤1 is decreasing in y2 if  y2 2 ( ,+1);
(b) 9 0 > 0 and  00 > 0 such that e⇤1 is increasing in y2 if y2 < y1 and  y2 2 ( 0,  00).
Proposition A.3(a) states that a raise in the coworker’s equity reduces the worker’s own
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e↵ort when the raise is big enough. But according to Proposition A.3(b), a raise in the
coworker’s equity may increase the worker’s e↵ort if the worker is in a position with relatively
high equity and the coworker’s raise is not too big. When a big raise in coworker’s equity
exacerbates inequality in equity, the worker responds unfavorably due to inequality aversion.
On the other hand, if the equity raise in the coworker’s pay mitigates inequality in equity,
the worker may respond favorably by providing more e↵ort.
A.3.4. Proposition A.4
Proposition A.4. Let x2 = x0, and let e⇤1 = e
0





|e⇤1   e01|   limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01|
(i) if y2 > y1; or





|e⇤1   e01|  limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01|
(i) if y2 < y1; or
(ii) if y2 = y1 and ↵x    x  2↵x x.











Relative to equality in salary (x1 = x2 = x0), when a worker’s e↵ort responds more to salary
raises (x1 > x0) than to salary cuts (x1 < x0), we say that inequality in salary has a positive
asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort. If the reverse is true, we say that inequality in salary has a
negative asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort. The e↵ect is symmetric if a worker’s e↵ort responds
to salary cuts and raises in the same magnitude. Unlike the negative asymmetric e↵ect in
the equity domain, Proposition A.4 suggests that the results on the e↵ect of unequal salary
are mixed. According to Part (i) of Proposition A.4(a), inequality in salary has either a
symmetric or negative asymmetric e↵ect on worker 1’s e↵ort when worker 1 has less equity
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than worker 2. When worker 1 has more equity than worker 2, Part (i) of Proposition A.4(b)
says that inequality in salary has either a symmetric or positive asymmetric e↵ect. Part
(ii) of Propositions A.4(a) and A.4(b) state that when workers have the same equity, the
relationship between advantageous and disadvantageous inequality aversion in the salary
domain (↵x, x) determines whether there is a positive or negative asymmetric e↵ect. Fi-
nally, if e⇤1 remains unchanged regardless of equity cuts or raises, then it is trivially true
that the e↵ect of inequality in salary is symmetric.
A.3.5. Proposition A.5
Proposition A.5. Let x2 = x0, y2 = y0, and let e⇤1 = e
0









































According to Proposition A.5, relative to general equality (x1 = x2 = x0, y1 = y2 = y0),
e↵ort responds more to equity cuts (y1 < y0) than to salary cuts (x1 < x0) if and only if
e↵ort responds more to salary raises (x1 > x0) than to equity raises (y1 > y0).
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A.4. Chapter 3 Appendix: Experimental Procedures
Figure A.12 lays out the experimental procedure. Detailed experimental instructions for
the control group and the treatment group are available in the Supplementary Appendix,
available upon request.
Realization of group output
Earnings in points converted to cash payment
Demographic Questions
Group Assignment (2 per Group)
Each member receives a flat 
payment (in points) & a share of 
group output (%)
Make a decision to increase 
probability of group success 
at a personal cost 
Instructions & 
Comprehension Checks
7 Scenarios of group 
production game with different 
compensation schemes
Control Group Treatment Group
Group Assignment (2 per Group)
Each member receives a flat 
payment (in points) & a share of 
group output (in points)
Make a decision to increase 
probability of group success 
at a personal cost 
Instructions & 
Comprehension Checks
7 Scenarios of group 




Figure A.12: Experimental Procedures.
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A.5. Chapter 3 Appendix: Theoretical Model Proofs
A.5.1. Some General Results




U1 = x1   C(e1) + p(e1 + e2)y1V
  [↵xmax{x2   C(e2)  (x1   C(e1)), 0}+  xmax{x1   C(e1)  (x2   C(e2)), 0}]
  p(e1 + e2)[↵y max{(y2   y1)V, 0}+  y max{(y1   y2)V, 0}] (A.1)




U2 = x2   C(e2) + p(e1 + e2)y2V
  [↵xmax{x1   C(e1)  (x2   C(e2)), 0}+  xmax{x2   C(e2)  (x1   C(e1)), 0}]
  p(e1 + e2)[↵y max{(y1   y2)V, 0}+  y max{(y2   y1)V, 0}]. (A.2)
Since the expected utility functions are not di↵erentiable everywhere, we discuss 6 conditions
separately. Since y1, y2, x1, x2 are exogenously given, equilibrium e↵ort choices e⇤1 and e
⇤
2
must satisfy one of the following conditions:
1. y2   y1, x2   x1 > C(e⇤2)  C(e⇤1)
2. y2   y1, x2   x1 < C(e⇤2)  C(e⇤1)
3. y2 < y1, x2   x1 > C(e⇤2)  C(e⇤1)
4. y2 < y1, x2   x1 < C(e⇤2)  C(e⇤1)
5. y2   y1, x2   x1 = C(e⇤2)  C(e⇤1)
6. y2 < y1, x2   x1 = C(e⇤2)  C(e⇤1)
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Under each condition, the expected utility functions faced by the two workers are di↵er-
entiable. Given Condition l, where l = 1, 2, ..., 6, we denote the equilibrium e↵ort choices
under this condition el1 and e
l
2. Given the specifications that C(ei) = e
2
i and p = k(e1+ e2),







[y1   ↵y(y2   y1)], e12 =
kV
2(1   x)
[y2    y(y2   y1)]. (A.3)






[y1   ↵y(y2   y1)], e22 =
kV
2(1 + ↵x)
[y2    y(y2   y1)]. (A.4)






[y1    y(y1   y2)], e32 =
kV
2(1   x)
[y2   ↵y(y1   y2)]. (A.5)






[y1    y(y1   y2)], e42 =
kV
2(1 + ↵x)
[y2   ↵y(y1   y2)]. (A.6)






[y1   ↵y(y2   y1)], e52 =
kV
2
[y2    y(y2   y1)]. (A.7)






[y1    y(y1   y2)], e62 =
kV
2
[y2   ↵y(y1   y2)]. (A.8)
Under Condition 1, y2   y1. Since ↵y >  y > 0, y2    y(y2   y1)   y1   ↵y(y2   y1). Since
↵x >  x > 0, we have e12 > e
1
1. Therefore, we have the following result:
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Result 1. x2   x1 > C(e12)  C(e11) > 0.
Similarly, we have
Result 2. x2   x1 < C(e42)  C(e41) < 0.
Result 3. x2   x1 = C(e52)  C(e51)   0 with the equality holds at y1 = y2.
Result 4. x2   x1 = C(e62)  C(e61) < 0.
We will use these results in proving the propositions. At equilibrium, we must have e⇤1 2
{e11, e21, e31, e41, e51, e61} and e⇤2 2 {e12, e22, e32, e42, e52, e62}.
A.5.2. Proof of Proposition A.1
Proposition A.1. e⇤1 is nondecreasing in x1 and is nonincreasing in x2.
Proof. Given x1, x2, y1, y2, suppose the equilibrium e↵ort choices e⇤1 and e
⇤
2 satisfy Condition





0 be the new equilibrium
e↵ort choice for worker 1 after the change. If the equilibrium e↵ort choices still satisfy











If the equilibrium e↵ort choices now satisfy Condition m instead of Condition l, m 6= l, we









1, if x1 < x2   (C(e12)  C(e11))
e
5
1, if x1 = x2   (C(e52)  C(e51))
e
2
1, if x1 > x2   (C(e22)  C(e21))
















x2   (C(e12)  C(e11)) < x2   (C(e52)  C(e51)) < x2   (C(e22)  C(e21)).
When there is a shift in condition as x1 increases, it has to be from Condition 1 to Condition
5, or from Condition 5 to Condition 2, or from Condition 1 to Condition 2. As a result,
either one of the followings must be true:






















1 when there is a shift in condition as x1 increases.









1, if x1 < x2   (C(e32)  C(e31))
e
4
1, if x1 = x2   (C(e62)  C(e61))
e
6
1, if x1 > x2   (C(e42)  C(e41))















x2   (C(e32)  C(e31)) < x2   (C(e62)  C(e61)) < x2   (C(e42)  C(e41)).
When there is a shift in condition as x1 increases, it has to be from Condition 3 to Condition
6, or from Condition 6 to Condition 4, or from Condition 3 to Condition 4. As a result,
either one of the followings must be true:























1 when there is a shift in condition as x1
increases. Hence, e⇤1 is nondecreasing in x1.
1 The proof for the e↵ect of an increase in x2
on e⇤1 is symmetric.
A.5.3. Proof of Proposition A.2















Proof. Given x1, x2, y1, y2, suppose the equilibrium e↵ort choices e⇤1 and e
⇤
2 satisfy Condition
l. Consider an increase of y1 to y01. Let e
⇤
1
0 be the new equilibrium e↵ort choice for worker
1 after the change.











































































1This proposition may not hold in the case of status seeking, i.e.,  
x
< 0. When  
x






































)), so increasing x
1
may result in a shift from Condition 5 to Condition 2. Therefore, it

















2. If the equilibrium e↵ort choices now satisfy Condition m instead of Condition l, m 6= l,
we need to discuss how the shift a↵ects equilibrium e↵ort choices. First, suppose
x2 > x1. Then by Results 1 to 4, we have l 6= 4, 6. When y1 is increased to y01 while
y2 is fixed, let  y1 = y01   y1 > 0, there are two cases:
(a) y1  y2, y01  y2: In this case, we must have e⇤1 2 {e11, e21, e51} and e⇤10 2 {e11, e21, e51}.













































































































1   ↵y(y2   y01)
1 + ↵x
>
y1   ↵y(y2   y1)
1   x
. (A.12)












2 , and we have e
⇤
1
















































1   ↵y(y2   y01)
1 + ↵x
> y1   ↵y(y2   y1). (A.13)






(1   x)[(1 + ↵y)(y1 + y1)  ↵yy2)] > (1 + ↵x)[(1 + ↵y)y1   ↵yy2]
,(1   x)(1 + ↵y) y1 > (↵x +  x)[(1 + ↵y)y1   ↵yy2]. (A.14)
Since y2   y01, we have (1 + ↵y)y1   ↵yy2  (1 + ↵y)y1   ↵yy01, so a su cient
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condition for inequality A.14 is





1   x + ↵y + ↵x↵y
. (A.15)
Therefore, under the case y1  y2, y01  y2, e⇤10 > e⇤1 as long as inequality A.15
holds.








































(1   x)[y01    y(y01   y2)] > (1 + ↵x)[y1   ↵y(y2   y1)]
,(1   y)(1   x) y1 + (1   x)[(1   y)y1 +  yy2] > (1 + ↵x)[(1 + ↵y)y1   ↵yy2].
(A.16)
Since y1  y2, the lefthandside of inequality A.16 is larger than or equal to
(1   y)(1   x) y1 + (1   x)y1 and the righthandside is smaller than or equal
to (1 + ↵x)y1. Therefore, a su cient condition for inequality A.16 is







Therefore, under the case y1  y2, y01 > y2, e⇤10 > e⇤1 as long as inequality A.17
holds.











Second, suppose x2 = x1. Then by Results 1 to 4, we have l 6= 1, 4, 6. Note that l 6= 5
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when y1 6= y2. There are three cases as y1 increases:





































1   x + ↵y
. (A.19)



























1, we must have
y
0






















1, we must have
y
0
1    y(y01   y2)
1 + ↵x
>
y1   ↵y(y2   y1)
1   x
,(1   x)(1   y) y1 + (1   x)[(1   y)y1 +  yy2] > (1 + ↵x)[(1 + ↵y)y1   ↵yy2].
(A.21)









































Third, suppose x2 < x1. Then by Results 1 to 4, we have l 6= 1, 5. There are two
cases as y1 increases:








































1 as long as
kV [y01    y(y01   y2)]
2(1 + ↵x)
>
kV [y1   ↵y(y2   y1)]
2(1   x)
. (A.24)







(b) y1 > y2, y01 > y2: In this case we have e
⇤
1 = {e31, e41, e61} and e⇤10 = {e31, e41, e61}.














) , and e
⇤
1























































kV [y01    y(y01   y2)]
2(1 + ↵x)
>
kV [y1    y(y1   y2)]
2(1   x)
. (A.26)





0 = e31 or e
⇤
1











kV [y01    y(y01   y2)]
2(1 + ↵x)
>
kV [y1    y(y1   y2)]
2
(A.27)





1, which is equivalent to
(1   y)(1   x) y1 > (↵x +  x)[(1   y)y1 +  yy2]. (A.28)
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This is still true when taking into consideration the case when the change in y1 does
not cause a shift from Condition l to Condition m.
A.5.4. Proof of Proposition A.3
Proposition A.3. Let  y2 > 0 be the change in y2, then
(a) 9  > 0 such that e⇤1 is decreasing in y2 if  y2 2 ( ,+1);
(b) 9 0 > 0 and  00 > 0 such that e⇤1 is increasing in y2 if y2 < y1 and  y2 2 ( 0,  00).
Proof. Given x1, x2, y1, y2, suppose the equilibrium e↵ort choices e⇤1 and e
⇤
2 satisfy Condition
l. Consider an increase of y2 to y02. Let e
⇤
1
0 be the new equilibrium e↵ort choice for worker
1 after the change.
























) , if y2 > y1, x2   x1 > C(e
1
2)  C(e11)













) , if y2 > y1, x2   x1 < C(e
2
2)  C(e21)











2 , if y2 > y1, x2   x1 = C(e
5
2)  C(e51)
0, if y2 = y1, x2   x1 = C(e52)  C(e51)
kV  
y












> 0, if y2 < y1
= 0, if y2 = y1
< 0, if y2 > y1.
(A.33)
2. If the equilibrium e↵ort choices now satisfy Condition m instead of Condition l, m 6= l,
we need to discuss how the shift a↵ects equilibrium e↵ort choices. First, suppose
x2   x1. Then by Results 1 to 4, we have l 6= 4, 6. When y2 is increased to y02 while
y1 is fixed, let  y2 = y02   y2 > 0. There are two cases:






















































kV [y1   ↵y(y02   y1)]
2(1 + ↵x)
>











1 as long as
kV [y1   ↵y(y02   y1)]
2(1   x)
<
kV [y1    y(y1   y2)]
2(1 + ↵x)
)  y2 >














































































(y1 y2) =  1 > y1 y2. Since y02   y1 implies that  y2   y1 y2,
we have e⇤1 is increasing in y2 if  y2 2 [y1   y2,  1) and is decreasing in y2 if
 y2 2 ( 2,+1).
(b) y2   y1, y02   y1: When there is no shift in condition, we have e⇤1 is decreasing in
y2 by the relationship in A.33, so we derive the su cient condition on  y2 for
e
⇤






1 as long as
kV [y1   ↵y(y2   y1)]
2(1 + ↵x)
>








(y1   y2) ⌘  3. (A.36)
Note that when y2 < y1 and y02 < y1, i.e.,  y2 < y1 y2, there is no shift in condition,
so by the relationship in A.33, we have e⇤1 is increasing in y2. Hence, when x2   x1 and
y2 < y1, e⇤1 is increasing in y2 if  y2 2 (0,  1) and is decreasing in y2 if  y2 2 ( 2,+1).
When x2   x1 and y2   y1, e⇤1 is decreasing in y2 if  y2 2 ( 3,+1).
Second, suppose x2 < x1. There are two cases:





0 2 {e31, e41, e61}. When there is no shift in
condition, we have e⇤1 is increasing in y2, so we derive the su cient condition on
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1 as long as
kV [y1    y(y1   y2)]
2(1   x)
<








(y2   y1) ⌘  4. (A.37)
Since y02 < y1 implies that  y2 < y1   y2, we have e⇤1 is increasing in y2 when
 y2 2 ( 4, y1   y2) if  4 < y1   y2.
(b) y2 < y1, y02   y1: In this case, e⇤1 2 {e31, e41, e61} and e⇤10 = e21. We have e⇤10 > e⇤1 as
long as e21 > e
4
1, i.e.,
kV [y1   ↵y(y2   y1)]
2(1   x)
>















kV [y1   ↵y(y02   y1)]
2(1   x)
<
kV [y1    y(y1   y2)]
2(1 + ↵x)
)  y2 >
(↵x +  y)y1 + (↵y +  y + ↵x↵y    x y)(y1   y2)
(1 + ↵x)↵y
⌘  2. (A.39)
 5 > y1   y2. Since y02   y1 implies that  y2   y1   y2, we have e⇤1 is increasing
in y2 if  y2 2 [y1   y2,  5) and is decreasing in y2 if  y2 2 ( 2,+1).
Note that when y2   y1 and y02   y1, there is no shift in condition, so by the
relationship in A.33, we have e⇤1 is decreasing in y2. Hence, when x2 < x1 and
y2   y1, e⇤1 is decreasing in y2. When x2 < x1 and y2 < y1, e⇤1 is increasing in y2 if
 y2 2 (min{ 4, y1   y2},  5) and is decreasing in y2 if  y2 2 ( 2,+1). In summary,
(a) when x2   x1 and y2   y1, e⇤1 is decreasing in y2 if  y2 2 ( 3,+1);
(b) when x2   x1 and y2 < y1, e⇤1 is decreasing in y2 if  y2 2 ( 2,+1) but is
176
increasing in y2 if  y2 2 (0,  1);
(c) when x2 < x1 and y2   y1, e⇤1 is decreasing in y2;
(d) when x2 < x1 and y2 < y1, e⇤1 is decreasing in y2 if  y2 2 ( 2,+1) but is










































(y2   y1) and  5 = ↵y+ y 
y
(y1   y2). Therefore,
e
⇤
1 is decreasing in y2 if




 3, if y2   y1
 2, if y2 < y1
(A.40)
and e⇤1 is increasing in y2 if




0, if x2   x1






 1, if x2   x1
 5, if x2 < x1.
(A.41)
This is still true when taking into consideration the case when the change in y2 does
not cause a shift from Condition l to Condition m.
A.5.5. Proof of Proposition A.4
Proposition A.4. Let x2 = x0, and let e⇤1 = e
0





|e⇤1   e01|   limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01|
(i) if y2 > y1; or






|e⇤1   e01|  limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01|
(i) if y2 < y1; or
(ii) if y2 = y1 and ↵x    x  2↵x x.











Proof. Let e01 be the equilibrium e↵ort choice of worker 1 under equality in salary, i.e., when
x1 = x2 = x0. We discuss three cases depending on the relationship between y1 and y2 and
examine how a change in x1 a↵ects e⇤1 relative to e
0
1.
1. Suppose y2 > y1. We have e01 = e
2
1 when x2 x1 = 0. When x1 > x0, then x2 x1 < 0,
so e⇤1 = e
2
1 and limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01| = |e21   e21| = 0. When x1 < x0, then x2   x1 > 0, so
e
⇤




























2. Suppose y2 < y1. We have e01 = e
3
1 when x2 x1 = 0. When x1 > x0, then x2 x1 < 0,





































2)   C(e21) < 0. We also
have C(e52)   C(e51) = 0. Thus, we have e01 = e51 when x2   x1 = 0. When x1 > x0,
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> 0. When x1 < x0, then x2   x1 > 0, so e⇤1 = e11 and limx1"x0 |e⇤1   e01| =






































|e⇤1   e01|   limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01|, vice versa.




|e⇤1   e01|   limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01| if y2 > y1 or if




|e⇤1   e01|  limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01| if y2 < y1 or if y2 = y1











A.5.6. Proof of Proposition A.5
Proposition A.5. Let x2 = x0, y2 = y0, and let e⇤1 = e
0









































Proof. When x1 = x2 = x0 and y1 = y2 = y0, we have e01 = e
5
1. We examine how e
⇤
1
responds to changes in x1 and y1 relative to e01.
1. Fixing y1 = y2, when x1 > x0, then x2   x1 < 0, so e⇤1 = e21 and limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01| =











> 0. Fixing x1 = x2, when y1 > y0, then
y2 y1 < 0, so e⇤1 = e31 and limy1#y0 |e⇤1 e01| = limy1#y0 |e31 e51| = limy1#y0 | kV2(1+↵
x
) [y1 









































|e⇤1   e01|   limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01|, vice versa.
2. Fixing y1 = y2, when x1 < x0, then x2   x1 > 0, so e⇤1 = e11 and limx1"x0 |e⇤1   e01| =











> 0. Fixing x1 = x2, when y1 < y0, then
y2 y1 > 0, so e⇤1 = e21 and limy1"y0 |e⇤1 e01| = limy1"y0 |e21 e51| = limy1"y0 | kV2(1  
x
) [y1 


































|e⇤1   e01|   limx1"x0 |e⇤1   e01|, vice versa.






















 1 , ↵x    x  2↵x x. (A.48)
A.5.7. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Optimal E↵ort Response to Inequality in Equity Under Domain-





















> 1. Relative to equality
in equity (y1 = y2 = y0), e↵ort responds more to equity cuts (y1 < y0) than to equity raises
(y1 > y0).
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2 , if x2   x1 = C(e
5
2)  C(e51)

































2 , if x2   x1 = C(e
6
2)  C(e61).




























































































































































Moreover, when ↵y or  y is large, the lefthandside is larger, suggesting a larger asymmetric
e↵ect.
A.5.8. Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. Optimal E↵ort Response to Inequality in Equity Absent Domain-
Contingent Inequality Aversion. Let y2 = y0. Let ẽ1 be worker 1’s optimal e↵ort choice
absent inequality aversion. Let ê1 be worker 1’s optimal e↵ort choice under non-domain-






































= 1. Relative to
equality in equity (y1 = y2 = y0), e↵ort responds symmetrically to equity cuts (y1 < y0) and
181
equity raises (y1 > y0).
Proof. In a model absent inequality aversion, uSuccess = x1 + y1V   C(e1) and uFailure =




x1   C(e1) + p(e1 + e2)y1V. (A.49)
We have the specifications that C(ei) = e2i and p = k(e1 + e2), k > 0. The first order























Under a model with non-domain-contingent inequality aversion, uSuccess = x1 + y1V  
C(e1) DSuccess and uFailure = x1   C(e1) DFailure, where
DSuccess =↵
⇣





















x1   C(e1) + p(e1 + e2)y1V 
↵max{
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Worker 2 faces a symmetric problem. Equilibrium e↵ort choices ê1 and ê2 must satisfy one
of the following conditions:
1. x1   C(ê1) + p(ê1 + ê2)y1V > x2   C(ê2) + p(ê1 + ê2)y2V
2. x1   C(ê1) + p(ê1 + ê2)y1V = x2   C(ê2) + p(ê1 + ê2)y2V
3. x1   C(ê1) + p(ê1 + ê2)y1V < x2   C(ê2) + p(ê1 + ê2)y2V










[y2   ↵(y1   y2)]. (A.54)


















[y1   ↵(y2   y1)], ê32 =
kV
2(1   ) [y2    (y2   y1)]. (A.56)
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